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**VOLUNTARY INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION
(VIC) PROJECT**


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COLLEGE OF LITERATURE, SCIENCE, AND THE ARTS
Department of Political Science

FINAL REPORT

VOLUNTARY INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION

Raymond Tanter
Principal Investigator

ORA Project 010356

under contract with:

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b. The Berlin Crises: Modelling and Managing International Conflicts by Raymond Tanter.	
c. "A Conflict Model for Strategists and Managers," by Gregory B. Markus and Raymond Tanter.	

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13. ABSTRACT

This manual is designed to aid users of CASCON on the Michigan Terminal System (MTS). The manual is composed of an introduction to the development and general theory behind CASCON, an instruction manual with specific examples of how to use CASCON on MTS, and appendices which contain lists of the components of the CASCON system.

KEY WORDS	LINK A		LINK B		LINK C	
	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT
CASCON conflict MTS (Michigan Terminal System) phase factor category measures descriptors cases dispute hostilities military force						

II

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VOLUNTARY INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION (VIC) PROJECT--FINAL REPORT

June, 1971 - December, 1972

Research Program and Plan

The Voluntary International Coordination (VIC) Project has had three major functions during the three years of its existence: (1) promotion of convergence among quantitative international affairs projects on theoretical priorities for data generation and modelling, variable definitions, coding rules, and data quality control; (2) purchase of a small number of data sets to stimulate data generation; and (3) development of computer based models for conflict modelling and management--the Computer Aided System for Handling Information on Local Conflicts (CASCON) and the Computer Aided Conflict Information System (CACIS).

OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT

During the last contract period (June, 1971 - December, 1972), major VIC activities were: (1) reviewing requests for purchase orders and providing funds for data set generation via the International Data Archive Advisory Committee (IDAAC); (2) sponsoring informal VIC seminars; (3) implementing the Computer Aided System for Handling Information on Local Conflicts (CASCON) on the Michigan Terminal System (MTS) and preparing a users manual; (4) developing the Computer Aided Conflict Information System (CACIS), which included research and quantitative analysis of the Berlin crises of 1948-49 and 1961 and incorporating this research within the framework of CACIS; and (5) introducing various government agencies and academic institutions to VIC related work.

1. VIC PURCHASE ORDERS

The International Data Archive Advisory Committee (IDAAC) met twice (June, 1971 and September, 1972) to review and approve purchase order requests for data generation. The committee was composed of Davis Bobrow, Charles McClelland, Robert North, James Rosenau, Robert Young, and Raymond Tanter, Project Director. The following purchase order requests were approved:

William Coplin
Michael O'Leary

Recoding events from the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) for \$1,000.

William Coplin
Michael O'Leary

Validity tests of the Programmed International Computer Environment (PRINCE) model for \$1,500.

John Gillespie
Dina Zinnes

Evaluation of Mathematical Models of Arms Race Theory and Subsequent Modifications; Collection of International Trade Data for \$5,000.

Patrick McGowan

Collection of African Event/Interaction Data for \$3,466.

Lawrence Peterson
James Harf

Collection of Inter-Governmental Organization Data for \$1,454.

Completed data sets were received from Coplin and O'Leary, McGowan, and Gillespie and Zinnes. In addition, the following data sets were received from investigators who had been recipients of VIC purchase orders under the previous contract (N000-14-67-A-0181-0026).

Michael Sullivan

Perceptions of Symbols in Foreign Policy:
Data from the Vietnam Case

Barry Hughes

Dyadic and Multilateral Events: 1948-1970 plus "Moses", a computer program for analyzing the data.

Jeffrey Milstein
John Sullivan

Middle East Time Series Data

Robert North
Richard Lagerstrom
William Mitchell

British Speeches, 1870 - 1914 and German
Speeches (in German), 1871 - 1912, plus
DICTION--a high speed program for thematic
analysis of large texts.

2. VIC SEMINARS

Though VIC seminars were not conducted in a formal manner during this contract period, international relations scholars were invited to participate in informal seminars with VIC staff, and were extremely helpful in commenting on VIC related research, e.g., conflict modelling and management, forecasting, simulations, etc., as well as in presenting their own research progress.

Scholars who participated in these seminars were: Nazli Choucri, M.I.T.; Harold Guetzkow, Northwestern; Paul Hammond, University of California, Berkeley; Edward Morse, Princeton University; I.M. Destler, the Brookings Institution; Grant Hilliker, Ohio State University; William Quandt, RAND Corporation.

3. CASCON

The Computer Aided System for Handling Information on Local Conflicts (CASCON) was developed by Lincoln Bloomfield, Robert Beattie, and Amy Leiss (M.I.T.) to provide policy planners and analysts with a computerized and model-based mechanism to help them in handling local conflict situations. CASCON works on the assumption that all local conflicts go through a series of "phases." The user of CASCON has on-line access to information (482 coded factors) on 52 cases of local conflict since 1945. CASCON originally had 27 cases of local conflict which were updated, with VIC support, to 52. CASCON can help The user obtain information on policy alternatives and their possible outcomes. CASCON has been implemented on the Michigan Terminal System (MTS), and a users manual has been prepared.

4. THE COMPUTER-AIDED CONFLICT INFORMATION SYSTEM (CACIS)

The Computer-Aided Conflict Information System (CACIS) is an interactive computer-based system which allows its user to: (1) recall from data files pertinent information regarding past major power conflicts; (2) simulate past, current, and imagined international conflicts on the basis of alternative models or empirical parameters derived from past conflicts; (3) search for a most appropriate precedent to the current or imagined conflict via a precedent search routine; and (4) compare simulated output from alternative models of a precedent conflict to actual data as a basis for choosing a model with which to simulate the current or imagined conflict. CACIS is intended as an aid to conflict management; it is successful in this respect to the extent that it provides information to the conflict manager regarding the effects (or non-effects) of alternative courses of behavior on the behavior of a current or imagined adversary.

A central consideration in the design of CACIS, therefore, is that it should provide means for aiding the anticipation of adversary behavior in a conflict. CACIS provides this assistance through its capability to identify a precedent conflict (i.e., a conflict most similar to the current or imagined one on a number of dimensions), its ability to model the current or imagined conflict on the basis of parameters associated with the precedent conflict or on the basis of a theoretical model which is found to fit the precedent conflict; and its ability to simulate the behavior of the adversary on the basis of the selected model. These capabilities are found in the three major CACIS modules: the precedent search module, the memory module, and the theory module.

The precedent search module contains algorithms through which the past conflict most similar to the present or imagined one is identified. The CACIS user describes the nature of the current conflict on a number of dimensions, including the interests of the parties in the outcome of the conflict, and their economic and military capabilities. The precedent search routine then refers to the memory module; finds the corresponding information for conflicts stored in CACIS; and finds the past conflict which most closely approximates the current one on the precedent search dimensions.

The CACIS user then may find in the memory module the particular values of various parameters which constitute a model of the precedent conflict. The values of such parameters vary not only across conflicts, but across time in an individual conflict. The memory module contains the latter type of information as well as the former. For example, extensive analysis of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) behavior during the 1948-1949 and 1961 Berlin conflicts has yielded the values of "organizational process" and "interaction" parameters which account for the behavior of each side at different points during the conflicts (Tanter, forthcoming 1973).¹ If one of these conflicts were viewed as a precedent for a current conflict, the values of the precedent parameters could assist the conflict manager in anticipating future adversary behavior. Analyses similar to those of the Berlin conflicts soon will be undertaken for two Taiwan conflicts (1954-1955; 1958) and for the Cuban missile crisis (1962), as part of the continuing development of CACIS undertaken by the ARPA supported International Security Analysis Project (ISAP).

¹Tanter, Raymond. The Berlin Crises: Modelling and Managing International Conflicts, forthcoming, 1973.

The memory module also contains information describing the behavior across time of parties to past conflicts. For example, this module contains the conflictive intensities of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO during the two Berlin conflicts, and will contain similar data for the parties to the Taiwan and Cuban conflicts. The theory module contains alternative conflict models which draw upon this memory data in order to find the model that best fits a given conflict. For example, the theory module now contains a model of conflict behavior that is based on several assumptions, the most important of which is that the adversary is a rational actor. The CACIS user may specify the values of the parameters of this model according to his perception of what their values were in a precedent conflict. He then may compare the simulated output of this model with the actual behavior in the precedent case that is stored in the memory module. If the fit between actual and simulated behavior is good, then the user may wish to use the model as an anticipatory device for the current conflict. If the fit is not good, then he may choose to repeat this process using an alternative conflict model, and so on until he discovers a model of best fit.

For example, the CACIS user could, at this point, evaluate the fit of the precedent data to a second model which is under development. This model will propose that behavior at any given time is a result either of interaction processes, or of organizational processes, or of some combination of the two. The model will vary the relative strength of these two processes according to the values of indicators of other variables, including the stress and certainty under which decision-makers are operating.

CACIS is, in short a system for the storage and use of analytical results, theory, and data pertaining to great power conflicts. CACIS

development in each of these areas is proceeding under the assumption that each may be utilized in the manner described above for the purpose of contributing to conflict management. CACIS will contain information regarding a large number of major-power conflicts. Multiple conflicts will allow a number of comparisons. Comparison across several situations is a way of increasing the validity of models of conflicts generally, a requisite for anticipation.

CACIS at present contains behavior data for the Warsaw Treaty Organization and North Atlantic Treaty Organization during the two Berlin conflicts. Similar data for the two Taiwan conflicts and the Cuban missile crisis are being compiled. CACIS contains empirical estimates of interaction and organizational process parameters for the two Berlin conflicts, and soon will contain the corresponding estimates for the Taiwan and Cuban conflicts. The precedent search routine is operative. The rational actor model has been programmed, additional models are under development.

5. PRESENTATIONS, CONFERENCES, AND COURSES

During this contract period, project director Raymond Tanter and VIC staff have introduced VIC research to various individuals in government agencies. Presentations have included a general overview of the project and specific demonstrations of products, e.g., CASCON. The following individuals and government agencies participated in these presentations.

1. Ted Curran, Department of State, Secretariat;
2. Sheldon Rosen, Automatic Data Processing Office, Department of State;
3. Susan Trit, Management Systems Staff, Department of State;

4. Thomas Thayer, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Systems Analysis;
5. Clayton McManaway, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Systems Analysis;
6. Edmund S. Finegold, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency;
7. Godfrey Harvey Summ, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Director of African and Inter-American Affairs, Department of State;
8. Dennis Doolin and Sheila Buckley, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs.

In addition to the above, various Air Force, Army and Navy personnel were introduced to VIC project research.

A delegation of Soviet visitors, headed by Georgy Pavlov, Head of the Administrative Section, Central Committee of the Communist Party also visited the project.

Results of project research, such as computer based software packages were presented at the School of Professional Studies, Foreign Service Institute course on "Computers and Foreign Affairs" during September, 1971 and March and June, 1972.

Pre-testing of CASCON was supported by VIC in two graduate level courses taught at Johns Hopkins University, School for Advanced International Studies and George Washington University, Department of Political Science.

Pre-testing of CASCON was also conducted during a University of Michigan, Department of Political Science undergraduate level course on "Disarmament and National Security Affairs."

VIC staff participated in a conference held by the Consolidated Analysis Centers, Inc. on the Utilization of ARPA Supported Research which brought together international relations scholars doing ARPA supported research and potential government users.

The following attachments are included as part of this final report:

1. Users Manual for THE COMPUTER AIDED SYSTEM FOR HANDLING INFORMATION ON LOCAL CONFLICTS (CASCON) via the Michigan Terminal System (MTS/CASCON II)
2. The Berlin Crises: Modelling and Managing International Conflict by Raymond Tanter. An abstract of a larger study of the same name, submitted for publication, January 1973
3. "A Conflict Model for Strategists and Managers," by Gregory B. Markus and Raymond Tanter, published in a Special Issue of the American Behavioral Scientist, Why Fight? Volume 15, Number 6, July/August, edited by Raymond Tanter.

Users Manual for
THE COMPUTER AIDED SYSTEM FOR HANDLING INFORMATION
ON LOCAL CONFLICTS (CASCON)
Via the Michigan Terminal System (MTS/CASCON II)

Raymond Tanter, Director
Voluntary International Coordination (VIC)
Project

This manual was prepared in connection with research supported by the Advanced Research Projects Agency, ARPA Order No. 1411, and monitored by the Office of Naval Research, Contract No. N00014-67-A-0181-0042.

PREFACE

The Computer Aided System for Handling Information on Local Conflicts was developed at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, by Lincoln Bloomfield and Robert R. Beattie, with support from the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The product of that development was an on-line computerized information system on 27 cases of local conflict which was usable on M.I.T.'s time-sharing system. Professor Raymond Tanter, Director of the International Data Archive and Voluntary International Coordination (VIC) project at The University of Michigan, supported an expansion of the data base to 52 cases and the implementation of CASCON on the Michigan Terminal System (MTS) in Fortran IV.

This manual is designed to aid users of CASCON on MTS. It is adapted from the revised CASCON manual by Lincoln Bloomfield, Robert R. Beattie and G. Allen Moulton with Robert Mandel and John J. Spear, developed by the Arms Control Project at the Center for International Studies, M.I.T.

The manual is composed of an introduction to the development and general theory behind CASCON, an instruction manual with specific examples of how to use CASCON on MTS, and appendices which contain lists of the components of the CASCON system.

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INTRODUCTION *

The Conflict Model

CASCON is a computerization of the principal features of a model of local conflict dynamics and control developed by Lincoln Bloomfield and Amelia Leiss. A local conflict is "a small war or potentially military clash within or between all but the major powers." The primary concern of the CASCON computer experiment was policy utility, in the sense of seeking to contribute to improving responses to new conflict situations by principal actors in crisis diplomacy.

The Local Conflict Model assumes that a conflict is a sequence of phases of varying durations. Within each phase exist factors--conditions, perceptions, situations, or relationships--that generate conflict-relevant pressures. Some of these pressures tend toward increased conflict, and some tend away from it. The relative strength of these pressures determines whether or not the conflict worsens.

A local conflict originally rises out of a substantive dispute. This dispute may be over territory, legitimacy, ideology, power, religion, etc. At the outset, this dispute over a particular issue may not necessarily be perceived in military terms by either side. It is waged at the polls, in the courts, in the press, through the UN or other diplomatic media, economically, politically--in short, any way but militarily. A potential conflict under these circumstances is, according to the model, in phase 1--dispute.

When at least one party to the conflict views the solution to the dispute in military terms, the local conflict has intensified and entered phase 2--conflict (pre-hostilities). This comes about when one side acquires military material, for example, when a disaffected group acquires arms and thus equips itself with the option of pressing its demands by force. A military option could be introduced in an interstate conflict in which both sides have standing military establishments, when one side indicates that its military capability is specifically relevant to the dispute. The introduction of a military option means that hostilities become more likely to occur. In this sense, the local conflict is "more violent" than in phase 1.

*For a more thorough review of CASCON's development and theory, see Lincoln Bloomfield and Robert R. Beattie, "Computers and Policy-Making: The CASCON Experiment," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. XV, March, 1971, pp. 33-46.

Phase 3--hostilities--occurs when one side actually employs military force to resolve the dispute. This signifies the inflicting of casualties and/or the destroying of property in a systematic way. Moreover, the level of violence can escalate within this phase. The hostilities may spread to wider geographic areas; more participants may become engaged; small-scale skirmishes may burgeon into pitched battles; or a war begun with small arms may develop into one in which the full panoply of weapons in the adversaries' inventories is hurled against opposing forces and perhaps civilian targets as well.

If hostilities are terminated, a threshold is crossed to phase 4--conflict (post-hostilities). Fighting no longer occurs as in phase 3, but at least one party continues to view the conflict in military terms. Phase 5--dispute (post-hostilities)--is entered when the dispute is no longer viewed in military terms. However, the issues in the original dispute remain. If the sides manage to resolve the issues, or if they cease to care about them, the dispute is settled.

The local conflict model rests on five basic hypotheses:

- (a) Local conflicts have a general common structure rather than being always unique and random phenomena.
- (b) All conflicts go through the first phase, dispute, and one or more of the three conflict phases (2,3,4).
- (c) In each phase factors can be identified; some factors generate pressures that tend to push the conflict across a threshold into another phase; these factors may be countered by other factors generating pressures that tend toward settlement of the basic dispute.
- (d) Changes in the relationship among these specific factors will alter the likelihood of a conflict undergoing transition from one phase to another.
- (e) The course of a local conflict can be significantly altered by policy measures aimed at reinforcing violence-minimizing factors and offsetting violence-generating factors.

This last hypothesis needs clarification. The conflict-control aspect of the model and the CASCON system is designed to answer in a systematic way the question, "what would one do if the objective were to minimize international violence?" One policy objective of conflict control is common to every phase,

that is, to settle the underlying dispute. But, failing that, there are additional objectives to work toward. Initially, the objective is to keep a dispute (phase 1) non-military. Once a military option has been introduced (phase 2), the objective is to prevent the outbreak of hostilities and to contain, i.e., restrict the scope of potential hostilities. If hostilities break out (phase 3) the objective is to contain, i.e., moderate, or terminate them. Once open hostilities are terminated (phase 4), one then wishes to prevent their resumption, and as before, to restrict the scale of potential resumption. If the disputants are pacified to a point where there is no longer any intention to seek a military solution (phase 5), the objective is to keep it that way.

Control is achieved through measures, i.e., policy actions that can be taken by governments, international organizations, or other groups to offset factors that generate pressures toward violence and reinforce factors that tend away from violence. In phase 1, measures are directed at keeping the dispute nonmilitary. In phase 2 measures are aimed at preventing and containing potential hostilities. In both phases, measures are designed to offset factors that tend toward crossing a threshold to the next phase, or to reinforce factors that tend toward settlement, or at least to prevent the case from moving into the next phase. In phase 3, measures are either to offset factors that prolong or intensify hostilities, or to reinforce factors that tend to terminate or to reduce fighting. Appropriate phase 4 measures would be those which offset factors tending back to hostilities, and those which reinforce factors influencing the case to move toward settlement.

The CASCON System

Knowing that a new case may not be unique is hardly enough. The analyst is still faced with problems of information handling. The development of CASCON rests on the conviction that the local conflict model, linked to a time-sharing computer system, can supply a potentially workable and acceptable tool for handling information and for crisis management. The utility of a time-sharing, interactive system is that any single user is given the impression that he has unhampered access to the computer while in reality up to thirty or so users can simultaneously make use of it. Because of the extraordinary speed of operation, the user has almost instantaneous feedback, and from his standpoint is interacting

in what appears to be real time. It is the time-sharing capability of present-day high-speed computers that makes CASCCN feasible.

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that such a system is by no stretch of the imagination conceived or intended as a substitute for the indispensable human experience, judgment, and intuition that must inform crucial policy decisions. What is asserted is that, properly used, it can serve as an aid to the memory of the decision-maker by bringing before him in rapid and useful fashion, pertinent experience of the past.

Computerizing the Model

Bloomfield and Leiss in their earlier work applied the model of local conflict to some 14 cases of local conflict. To make up the 52 cases now in CASCON (see Appendix C), 13 additional cases were researched by Browne and Shaw International Studies Division of Bolt, Beranek and Newman, and the Voluntary International Coordination Project at the University of Michigan supported research on the remaining 25. The factors that were identified phase by phase were all "case-specific." That is, the factors discovered in, e.g., the India-China case were derived from that conflict. Such specific factors, while of obvious value in understanding a case, are by definition not applicable in that form to a different case. But each case-specific factor could be generalized so that it might apply to a variety of other cases.

For example, a factor specific to the India-China case is: "Chinese advances in the Northeast Frontier Agency threatened the Assam oil fields and menaced Indian control of the narrow neck of land that connects Assam to the rest of India." This factor could be generalized to read: "Advances by one side threaten important economic resource area of other side." For the purpose of translating the case material into a broader framework, each case-specific factor identified in the original model was thus generalized for use in CASCON.

Thus, CASCON contains 52 cases of local conflict with a number of factors applicable to each case. The cases are divided into phases--phase 1, dispute; phase 2, conflict; phase 3, hostilities; phase 4, conflict, post hostilities; phase 5, dispute, post hostilities; and settlement. The factors move the parties to the conflict toward or away from violence. Additionally, there are measures associated with the factors which aid in assessing decisions that could move a conflict toward or away from hostilities.

In the CASCON system, there are actually only three phases-phase 1, phase 2, and phase 3, that are operational on the time-sharing system. The next section instructs the user in how to use CASCON on the University of Michigan System (MTS) and gives examples of relevant commands. Following that section, there are five appendices which list the commands, definitions, cases, descriptors of the cases, factors, and measures.

USING MTS

Signing-On to MTS

The following steps will connect the terminal to the University of Michigan computer and allow you to use CASCON.

1. Turn the terminal "on."
2. To call the computer, push the "talk" button, and dial
(313)-763-1500**

When you hear a high-pitch tone, push the "data" button, and hang the phone receiver in the cradle.

3. The computer will type a few lines:

%LC01:2741

MTS : ANN ARBOR (DC03-0093)

4. You type:

sig XXXX

where XXXX is a four-letter sign-on I.D. designation

5. Next, the computer will ask for your password:

#ENTER USER PASSWORD.

?███████████████

After you enter the password, the computer will respond with a few lines of information--time, date, etc.

An example of the sign-on procedure is given below.

%LC01:2741

MTS : ANN ARBOR (DC03-0093)

#sig sbc0

#ENTER USER PASSWORD.

?███████████████

#**LAST SIGNON WAS: 09:54.05 12-13-72

USER "SBC0" SIGNED ON AT 09:55.35 ON 12-13-72

Correcting Errors

There are two ways to correct any errors you make while using MTS. To correct one or a few mis-typed letters on a line, merely backspace to the beginning of the error and type correctly over the letter(s). Remember to finish typing the entire line after correcting an error. You may backspace as many times as you wish.

To erase an entire line, merely type underscore once. The console will ignore the preceding line and give a carriage return so you can type it again.

Signing-Off

You must exit from CASCON before signing-off from MTS. The procedure to get out of CASCON will be discussed below.

After the user has finished working with CASCON, and is ready to get off the machine, he types:

#sig

Here is an example of the full signing-off procedure:

```

#sig
#OFF AT 11:04.56      12-08-72
#ELAPSED TIME        4.5 MIN.          $.23
#CPU TIME USED       1.564 SEC.        $.12
#CPU STOR VIII        .15 PAGE-MIN.    $.01
#WAIT STOR VIII       .457 PAGE-HR.
#DRUM READS          150
#APPROX. COST OF THIS RUN IS    $.36
#DISK STORAGE         3017 PAGE-HR.     $.62
#APPROX. REMAINING BALANCE:   $19.3,

```

To get a shortened version, here is another type of sign-off procedure:

```

#sig short
#OFF AT 09:58.48      12-15-72
#E      3.2             $.16
#C      8.14            $.64
#G      5.233           $.25
#W      2.426
#D      395
#     $1.05
#     $-.63

```

CASCON

Calling CASCON

CASCON may be entered by typing:

#source sbcu:cascon

A brief introduction to CASCON will be printed on the terminal:

```
##SET ECHO=OFF
#EXECUTION BEGINS
10:10.37
DEC 13, 1972
```

THIS IS THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN (MTS) VERSION OF THE COMPUTER-AIDED SYSTEM TO HANDLE INFORMATION ON LOCAL CONFLICTS, DEVELOPED BY LINCOLN BLOOMFIELD AND ROBERT R. BEATTIE, ARMS CONTROL PROJECT, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, M.I.T. CASCON IS DESIGNED TO AID USERS IN IDENTIFYING FACTORS INFLUENCING PARTIES TO LOCAL CONFLICTS TOWARD OR AWAY FROM MILITARY CONFRONTATION. THE 52 LOCAL CONFLICTS IN THE CASCON DATA BASE ARE DIVIDED INTO THREE PHASES: PHASE I - DISPUTE ONLY; PHASE II - CONFLICT ONLY, PRE-HOSTILITIES; AND PHASE III - HOSTILITIES. IN ADDITION TO DATA RETRIEVAL AND MANIPULATION, CASCON HAS THE FOLLOWING TWO CAPABILITIES:

1. TO COMPARE ACROSS CASES FOR SIMILAR FACTORS LEADING TOWARD OR AWAY FROM VIOLENCE;
2. TO STORE CASES ENTERED BY THE USER AND COMPARE THEM TO OTHER CASES IN THE DATA FILE.

ADDRESS QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS TO JAN CECIL, 764-1344, 237 CITY CENTER BUILDING.

IF YOU WISH A FURTHER INTRODUCTION, TYPE "INTRODUCTION". FOR A LIST OF COMMANDS IN CASCON, TYPE "LIST COMMANDS". FOR A LIST OF DEFINITIONS, TYPE "LIST DEFINITIONS".

After this introduction is completed, the computer will type:

DATA BASE HAS BEEN INITIALIZED.
PHASE= 2

Then, as in the example above, the computer will ask you which phase you would like to work in for this run. You respond by typing 1, 2, or 3.

Phase 1 is the dispute phase; phase 2 is the conflict, pre-hostilities phase;

and phase 3 is the phase in which hostilities occur. CASCON will remain in this phase throughout the entire time.

After this preliminary introduction, and after each command is completed, the computer will ask:

TYPE COMMAND

At this point you may wish a further introduction to CASCON. To do this you type: "Introduction." The computer will respond with this passage:

1. THIS IS A PILOT MODEL, AND AS SUCH IS HIGHLY EXPERIMENTAL. ITS PURPOSE IS TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES OF A MORE COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM THAT COULD SERVE AS A USEFUL TOOL FOR THE GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL ENGAGED IN CRISES--OR PREFERABLY PRE-CRISIS--DIPLOMACY AND DECISION-MAKING. WHEN FULLY DEVELOPED, SUCH A SYSTEM COULD SERVE AS AN AID TO HIS MEMORY BY STORING FOR HIM DATA ON AN INCIPIENT CONFLICT SITUATION, AND PRODUCING FOR HIM AT WILL BOTH THAT STORED DATA, AND STORED DATA ON PAST LOCAL CONFLICTS (ORGANIZED AS EXPLAINED BELOW) THAT HAD IN COMMON WITH HIS NEW CASE VIOLENCE-GENERATING OR VIOLENCE-MINIMIZING FACTORS (ALSO EXPLAINED BELOW).
2. THE WAY THE DATA IS ORGANIZED AND STORED IS BASED ON A DYNAMIC STRUCTURAL MODEL OF LOCAL CONFLICT DEVELOPED BY THE MIT/CIS RESEARCHERS. ACCORDING TO THAT MODEL, ALL CONFLICTS CAN GO THROUGH A NUMBER OF STANDARD PHASES. FOR CONVENIENCE ARABIC NUMBERS ARE USED TO DESIGNATE PHASES IN CASCON ALTHOUGH IN THE ACLIM MODEL ROMAN NUMERALS ARE USED. PHASE I (1) BEGINS WHEN A DISPUTE BEGINS. PHASE II (2) IS THE BEGINNING OF A CONFLICT, SIGNALLED BY AT LEAST ONE SIDE VIEWING THE DISPUTE IN POTENTIALLY MILITARY TERMS. IF HOSTILITIES BREAK OUT THE CONFLICT IS IN PHASE III (3) WITHIN WHICH IT CAN INTENSIFY (ESCALATE) OR NOT. IF FIGHTING ENDS BUT THE CONFLICT REMAINS, IT IS PHASE IV (4). IF ONLY THE DISPUTE REMAINS, IT IS PHASE V (5). IDEALLY, THE CASE CAN GO TO SETTLEMENT ANY TIME. CASCON ONLY LISTS DATA FOR PHASES I, II, AND III. A FUTURE COMPUTERIZED SYSTEM MAY CONTAIN ALL PHASES. (ACTUALLY PHASE IV (4) IS OFTEN VERY SIMILAR TO PHASE II (2) EXCEPT THAT IN PHASE IV (4) THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN SOME FIGHTING.)
3. WITHIN EACH PHASE THERE ARE FACTORS--THAT IS, EVENTS, FACTS, SITUATIONS, AND THE LIKE, WHICH INFLUENCE THE DIRECTION OF THE CONFLICT TOWARD OR AWAY FROM VIOLENCE--I.E., ARE CONFLICT-PROMOTING, OR CONFLICT-MINIMIZING. EACH FACTOR IS, BY DEFINITION, CONSIDERED TO BE INFLUENTIAL ON THE COURSE OF THE CONFLICT, TENDING TOWARD OR AWAY FROM VIOLENCE.

4. IN THE 27 CASES ALREADY--ABOUT HALF OF THE LOCAL CONFLICTS SINCE WORLD WAR II (14 CASES WERE PREVIOUSLY ANALYSED BY THE MIT RESEARCHERS, ANOTHER 13 BY THE BROWNE & SHAW INTERNATIONAL STUDIES DIVISION OF BOLT BERANEK AND NEWMAN UNDER AN ACDA CONTRACT) WE IDENTIFIED A TOTAL OF SEVERAL HUNDRED FACTORS, DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE VARIOUS PHASES OF CONFLICT, AND CATEGORIZED AS TO DIRECTION. FOR EACH FACTOR, WE THEN DEFINED A POLICY MEASURE THAT, ACCORDING TO SHEER LOGIC, WOULD HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATE (THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY DESIRABLE) IF CNE'S ONLY AIM HAD BEEN TO REINFORCE THAT PARTICULAR VIOLENCE-MINIMIZING FACTOR OR OFFSET THAT PARTICULAR VIOLENCE-GENERATING FACTOR.

5. WE THEN TRANSLATED THE MANY CASE-SPECIFIC FACTORS INTO ABOUT 400 GENERALLY-WORDED FACTORS, AND STORED THE LATTER IN THE CASCON DATA BASE, CLASSIFIED AS TO CATEGORY (MILITARY, ECONOMIC, ETHNIC, ETC.), AS TO WHETHER IN A PARTICULAR PAST CASE A GIVEN FACTOR WAS PRESENT, WHETHER IT WAS INFLUENTIAL IN PROMOTING OR AVERTING VIOLENCE, AND, IF SO, HOW MUCH (LITTLE, SOME, MUCH). THE LATTER JUDGMENTS REPRESENT A COMPOSITE OF FACTOR CODING FOR EACH CASE BY MIT RESEARCHERS AND BY EXPERTS WHO WERE OFFICIALLY INVOLVED IN EACH CASE. (REMEMBER, HOWEVER, THAT THIS DATA BASE REPRESENTS ONLY A FRACTION OF ALL PAST CONFLICTS, AND IS ALSO BIASED IN THAT IT DOES NOT CONTAIN (AS WE HOPE A FUTURE SYSTEM WILL) CASES THAT DID NOT MOVE TOWARD VIOLENCE.)

6. FOR A NEW CONFLICT CASE (POSSIBLY STILL IN THE DISPUTE STAGE, I.E., PHASE 1), THE USER MUST DO SOME BASIC THINGS. HE WILL HAVE TO NAME IT, SAY WHAT PHASE IT IS IN, IDENTIFY TWO SIDES, AND SAY WHICH SIDE IS THE 'STATUS-QUO' AND WHICH IS THE 'NON-STATUS-QUO'. (THESE LABELS ARE NON-IDEOLOGICAL AND REFER TO THE SIDE INITIATING OR PREPARING VIOLENCE TO ACHIEVE ITS ENDS, VS THE SIDE "IN POSSESSION.") HE WILL ALSO HAVE TO TRANSLATE (WITH CASCON'S HELP) THE FACTORS HE KNOWS ABOUT INTO THE SYSTEM'S GENERAL FACTORS, AND ASSIGN A VALUE TO EACH FACTOR ACCORDING TO WHETHER HE ADJUDGES IT AS INFLUENTIAL IN MOVING THE CONFLICT EITHER TOWARD OR AWAY FROM VIOLENCE. THE PILOT CASCON SYSTEM IS DESIGNED SO THAT THIS TRANSLATION OF REAL-LIFE FACTS, REPORTS, ETC., ABOUT AN INCIPIENT (OR ACUTE) CONFLICT SITUATION CAN BE MADE BY THE USER RIGHT AT THE COMPUTER CONSOLE, WITH THE SYSTEM ASKING HIM QUESTIONS AND TELLING HIM IN WHAT TERMS TO GIVE HIS ANSWERS. OF COURSE, ONCE HE BECOMES FAMILIAR WITH THE SYSTEM HE CAN BYPASS THE INITIAL EXPLANATIONS, LISTS, DEFINITIONS, AND SO FORTH.

7. TO SUM UP WHAT CASCON CAN DO FOR YOU--1) IT WILL STORE IN A STANDARDIZED FORM ANY DATA YOU GIVE IT ON A DEVELOPING LOCAL CONFLICT, AND RETRIEVE DATA FOR YOU ON COMMAND. 2) IT WILL TELL YOU WHAT ADDITIONAL DATA ARE LACKING IN THE CURRENT CASE, EITHER BY CATEGORY, OR IN TERMS OF ADDITIONAL FACTORS WITHIN A PARTICULAR CATEGORY. 3) IT WILL RETRIEVE FOR YOU INFORMATION ABOUT ANY OR ALL OF THE 27 CASES NOW STORED IN THE PILOT DATA BASE, EITHER BY CASE, OR BY CATEGORY, OR BY FACTOR, OR BY RELATIVE WEIGHTING ACCORDED TO PARTICULAR FACTORS IN PAST CONFLICTS. 4) IT WILL PRINT OUT THE CONFLICT-CONTROLLING POLICY MEASURES THAT WERE ORIGINALLY DERIVED AS APPROPRIATE TO OFFSET THE FACTOR IF THE LATTER WAS VIOLENCE-PROMOTING, OR TO ENHANCE THE FACTOR IF IT WAS VIOLENCE-MINIMIZING. NATURALLY, SOME OF THESE MEASURES WILL NOT BE APPROPRIATE TO A PRESENT CASE, ALTHOUGH SOME MIGHT. 5) IT WILL MAKE SOME COMPARISONS OF YOUR PRESENT CASE, WITH PAST DATA ON THE BASIS OF A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS (WHICH AT THIS STAGE IS HIGHLY EXPERIMENTAL), AS WELL AS INDICATE WHICH FACTORS WERE ALSO PRESENT. (EVENTUALLY, SUCH COMPARISONS USING VALIDATED ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES COULD PRODUCE LISTS OF POLICY MEASURES THAT MIGHT BE VERY RELEVANT TO A NEW SITUATION, WHILE SHOWING WHICH WERE IN FACT TAKEN IN THE PAST).

8. THERE ARE ONLY TWO THINGS YOU SHOULD HAVE THAT ARE NOT IN THE COMPUTERIZED SYSTEM--1) INSTRUCTIONS ON ENTERING CASCON, AND 2) A SET OF STANDARD CASCON FACTOR CODING FORMS.

If you do not wish a further introduction, you may type a different command. There are four basic types of commands in the CASCON system. These commands are:

- (1) List commands which tell the system (a) to print information about the classification of data in the system, as factor definitions, codes, categories, etc., or (b) to retrieve names of cases or factors which satisfy user-specified criteria.
- (2) Display tells the system to print case information (descriptors, categories, factors, summaries) it has stored; this also includes information about a user case that has been provisionally stored.
- (3) Enter is used to create a new user case or to add information to or modify a current user case.
- (4) Compare tells the system to compare the current user case to data in the 52 data-base cases, either in toto, or grouped by the three different types. The user may also compare cases in the CASCON data base.

LIST COMMANDS

List Commands*

First, you may want to know all the commands available in CASCON. Commands are messages which direct the computer to perform certain operations on the data base. The commands are:

List Commands	List Phase
List Definitions	List Cases Having
List Cases	Display
List Factor Categories	Enter
List Factors	Save Name 1 Name 2
List Factors Long Text	Restore Name 1 Name 2
List Factor Codes	Catalog
List Factors Having	Define
List Measures	Compare
	End

Here is an example of how to get a complete list of commands:

TYPE COMMAND
list commands

COMMAND	FUNCTION
LIST CASES	PRINTS A LIST OF ALL THE CASE NAMES AND THEIR DATES.
LIST FACTOR CATEGORIES	PRINTS A LIST OF THE FACTOR CATEGORIES.

*See Appendix A for a complete list of commands.

LIST DEFINITIONS*

DEFINE

You may want to know something about the assumptions, or various definitions used in CASCON, for example, how conflict is defined. You may either list the entire range of definitions, or select one definition to be listed. Here are examples of these two commands, respectively:

TYPE COMMAND

list definitions

DISPUTE: A QUARREL OR DISAGREEMENT OVER SOMETHING SUBSTANTIVE, OR THE EXISTENCE OF A DIVISIVE ISSUE BETWEEN TWO PARTIES. NEITHER OF THESE PARTIES HAS YET CONSIDERED, OR AT LEAST HAS NOT YET DEMONSTRATED WILLINGNESS TO RESORT TO MILITARY FORCE. THIS IS PHASE I OF THE ACILIN MODEL. IF A DISPUTE (BUT NOT CONFLICT) SITUATION EXISTS AFTER HOSTILITIES, IT IS CALLED POST-HOSTILITIES DISPUTE. IT IS PHASE V OF THE MIT MODEL.

TYPE COMMAND

define military force

MILITARY

FORCE: INFILCTING CASUALTIES AND/OR DESTROYING PROPERTY IN A SYSTEMATIC WAY SO AS TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL GOAL.

LIST CASES**

Suppose you want to list the cases in CASCON? The computer will respond to a "LIST CASES" command by asking for the group, e.g., interstate, internal, or colonial. All cases in the CASCON data base belong to one of these conflict groups. An interstate conflict is between two nations; an internal conflict is between rival groups within a nation; a colonial conflict is between a colonial power and her colony. If you want to list all 52 cases, simply hit the carriage return when the computer asks for the group. If you want to list only those cases within a group, here is an example of what to do:

*See Appendix B for a list of definitions.

**See Appendix C for a list of cases and case codes.

TYPE COMMAND
List cases
GROUP= interstate

CASE NAMES	DATES	CODE	GROUP
ALGERIA-MOROCCO	1962-63	ALM	INTERSTATE
ARAB-ISRAELI WAR	1967	AIW	INTERSTATE
BAY OF PIGS	1961	BOP	INTERSTATE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-HAITI	1963	DRII	INTERSTATE
ECUADOR-USA	1963-	EUS	INTERSTATE
EL SALVADOR-HONDURAS	1960-	ESH	INTERSTATE
GHANA-UPPER VOLTA	1964-66	GUV	INTERSTATE
GUINEA-IVORY COAST	1966-67	GIC	INTERSTATE
GUINEA-PORTUGUESE GUINEA	1970	GPG	INTERSTATE
GUYANA-VENEZUELA	1970	GYV	INTERSTATE
INDIA-CHINA BORDER	1954-62	ICB	INTERSTATE
INDIA-PAKISTAN	1965-66	INP	INTERSTATE
INDONESIA-MALAYSIA	1963-65	IMC	INTERSTATE
KASHMIR	1947-49	KAS	INTERSTATE
KUWAIT-IRAQ	1961-63	KUI	INTERSTATE
MOROCCO-MAURITANIA	1957-70	MON	INTERSTATE
MOROCCO-SPAIN	1956-	MOS	INTERSTATE
NICARAGUA-COSTA RICA	1955-56	NCR	INTERSTATE
NICARAGUA-HONDURAS	1957-60	NHH	INTERSTATE
PANAMA	1964	PAN	INTERSTATE
QUEHOU-HATSU	1954-58	QHM	INTERSTATE
SINAI	1956	SIN	INTERSTATE
SOHALIA-ETHIOPIA-KENYA	1960-64	SEK	INTERSTATE
SOUTH TYROL	1957-69	STY	INTERSTATE
SOVIET-IRAN	1945-46	SOI	INTERSTATE
SUTZ	1956	SUE	INTERSTATE
SYRIA-TURKEY	1956-57	SYT	INTERSTATE
TRIESTE	1945-54	TRI	INTERSTATE

LIST FACTOR CATEGORIES

A central part of the CASCON system are the factors.* Factors are defined as:

Conditions, events, or actions within a phase which generate pressures that tend either toward or away from transition of the conflict across a threshold into the next phase. In phases 1 and 2, factors that tend to keep the local conflict in the current phase or tend toward settlement are factors that tend away from violence, i.e., violence-minimizing factors. In phases 1 and 2, factors that tend to push the local conflict to the next phase are factors tending toward violence, i.e., violence-promoting factors. In phase 3, factors that tend to increase the level of hostilities or tend to prolong them are violence-promoting factors. Factors that tend to lower the level of hostilities or terminate them are violence-minimizing factors.

*See Appendix E for a list of factors in abbreviated and full text.

There are 482 factors in CASCON: 144 in Phase 1--dispute only; 141 in Phase 2--conflict only, pre-hostilities; and 197 in Phase 3--hostilities. The factors in each phase are divided into eleven general categories. Here is how to list these factor categories:

TYPE COMMAND
List factor categories

FACTOR CATEGORIES

- 1 PREVIOUS OR GENERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SIDES
- 2 GREAT POWER INVOLVEMENT
- 3 EXTERNAL RELATIONS GENERALLY
- 4 MILITARY-STRATEGIC
- 5 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, LEGAL, OPINION
- 6 ETHNIC- MINORITIES, REFUGEES
- 7 ECONOMIC
- 8 INTERNAL POLITICAL
- 9 CHARACTERISTICS OF ONE SIDE
- 10 COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION
- 11 ACTIONS OR CONTROLS IN THE DISPUTED AREA

List Factor Commands

There are two list factor commands. One of these, "List Factors", gives a shortened version of the factors, while "List Factors Long Text" gives the full version for each factor.

LIST FACTORS

You may wish to get a list of all the factors in a given category. You may either list all factors in the phase or list factors in specific categories, from the categories above. To list all the factors, simply hit the carriage return when the computer asks you for category. To list all the factors in a specific category, type the category number or the first four letters of the category name (e.g., 4, or mili for the military-strategic category). Here is an example of how to list factors in a specific category:

TYPE COMMAND
List factors •
CATEGORY= 2

GREAT POWER INVOLVEMENT
PHASE= 2

FACTORS...

- 18 DISCOUNTING THREAT OF OPPONENT'S ALLY.
- 19 ALLY OF NSQ PREFERS PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.
- 20 NSQ ALLY INDIFFERENT TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.
- 21 US PUBLIC OPINION FAVORS NSQ.
- 22 US FRIENDLY TO NSQ.
- 23 US LACKS PARTIALITY.
- 24 US NOT IMPARTIAL.
- 25 SUPERPOWER(S) ARE IMPARTIAL.
- 26 SUPERPOWER(S) NOT IMPARTIAL.
- 27 US URGES SETTLEMENT.
- 28 ALLIES PLACE AREA IN ONE SPHERE OF INFLUENCE.
- 29 AREA NOT IN ONE SPHERE OF INFLUENCE.

LIST FACTORS LONG TEXT

The user may obtain a sentence describing a specific factor. The user must specify the factor he wants described by typing in a factor number (See Appendix E) when the computer asks. The computer will continue to ask for single factor numbers until you hit the carriage return. Then the computer reverts to "Type Command." Here is an example:

TYPE COMMAND
List factors long text

TYPE FACTOR NUMBER
52

THE FACTOR IS...
THE STATUS QUO SIDE REINFORCED ITS GARRISON IN THE
DISPUTED AREA.

TYPE FACTOR NUMBER
45

THE FACTOR IS...
"NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE HAS MILITARY SUPERIORITY IN THE
DISPUTED AREA.

LIST MEASURES

There is a measure associated with each factor. These are "conflict-minimizing" policy measures designed to suggest actions that could be taken by the user. To list a measure associated with a specific factor, you must list the factor number when the computer asks for it. Here is an example:

TYPE COMMAND
list measures

TYPE FACTOR NUMBER
52

THE MEASURE IS...

ASSIST STATUS QUO SIDE IN MAINTAINING MILITARY PREPONDERANCE
IN THE AREA.

!- this command, the computer will continue to ask for single factor numbers until you hit the carriage return, as in "List Factors Long Text."

List Factors Having and List Cases Having

LIST FACTOR CODES

LIST FACTORS HAVING

Each factor in the list of 482 factors has been assigned an effect and influence in each case in which the factor is present. An effect is:

The kind of dynamic effect that a particular factor has with regard to changing the level of violence in a particular case. A factor may be coded as having no effect (i.e., no information, not present, or present but not having any influence with regard to the level of violence) or it may be coded as having one of two kinds of effects--toward increasing the level of violence, or away from increasing the level of violence.

An influence is:

The degree to which a specified factor has an effect toward or away from increased violence. There are three kinds of influences--little, some, or much.

Thus, in each case, a factor in that case has been assigned an effect, which indicates whether the factor aids in moving toward or away from violence, or is not important at all; and an influence, which indicates the degree to which an effect moves toward or away from violence. Here is a list of effects and a list of influences.

Effects

not present
present but no influence
toward
away

Influences

little
some
much

Effects and influences have been combined into factor codes, which have been assigned to each factor in each case. Here is how to get a list of factor codes:

TYPE COMMAND
list factor codes

MEANING	EFFECT	INFLUENCE		
TENDS TOWARDS VIOLENCE	TOWARD	LITTLE=6	SOME=5	MUCH=4
TENDS AWAY FROM VIOLENCE	AWAY	LITTLE=9	SOME=8	MUCH=7
PRESENT/NOT A FACTOR	PNF	SOME(ASSUMED)=3		
NOT PRESENT	NP	CODE=2		
INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION	NOINFO	CODE=1		

The user may wish to know factors in a case which have certain effects and/or influences. To do this, he uses the command "List Factors Having." The computer will ask for case, category, effect, and influence. The user must specify case and effect. He does not need to specify category and influence, however. He may simply hit the carriage return when the computer asks for category and for influence. Here are four examples of how to use this command.

(a) To list factors in the Laotian conflict which tend toward violence:

CASE= 1ao

CATEGORY=

EFFECT= toward

INFLUENCE=

- 1 NON-MILITARY CHANNELS FAIL.
- 3 TIME GROWS SHORT.
- 4 BELIEF THAT OTHER SIDE WILL NOT YIELD.
- 5 POLICE AND MILITARY MEASURES.
- 11 UNDERESTIMATE OF OWN SIDE.
- 17 USE OF IDEOLOGICAL ALLIES TO SUBVERT GOVERNMENT.
- 24 US NOT IMPARTIAL.
- 26 SUPERPOWER(S) NOT IMPARTIAL.
- 32 FEELING THAT OUTSIDE PARTY BROKE TACIT AGREEMENT.
- 34 CLASHES BEYOND CONTROL OF EITHER SIDE.
- 35 ENGAGEMENT IN REPRESSIVE ACTION.
- 36 INFLUENTIAL PARTY DOES NOT USE INFLUENCE.
- 40 SIMILAR SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS PROVIDE MODEL.
- 42 MILITARY BALANCE IN FAVOR OF SQ.
- 44 SQ MILITARILY SUPERIOR.
- 46 STRATEGIC VALUE OF DISPUTED AREA INCREASES.
- 49 MILITARY FORCE USED INSTEAD OF POLICE.
- 51 TROOPS SENT TO DISPUTED AREA TO MAINTAIN ORDER.
- 52 SQ REINFORCES ITS GARRISON IN DISPUTE AREA.
- 53 BOTH SIDES STRENGTHEN MILITARY FORCES.
- 54 INCREASED CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY MILITARY FORCES.
- 56 ONE SIDE'S MILITARY STRENGTH GROWS.
- 59 FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE SOUGHT.
- 64 UN TAKES NO ACTION.
- 67 REGIONAL ORGANIZATION TAKES NO ACTION.
- 81 SQ ECONOMICALLY DEPENDENT.
- 82 NSQ ECONOMICALLY DEPENDENT.
- 90 POLICY INCREASES IN MILITARY.
- 91 NEGOTIATIONS ONLY IF CLAIM ACCEPTED.
- 95 FEAR OF MORE EXTREME ACTION LATER.
- 98 INDIVIDUALS WITH PERSONAL STAKES IN CONFLICT.
- 104 NSQ BELIEVES IT CAN WIN POLITICALLY.
- 106 BELIEF THAT VIOLENCE SPURS DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS.
- 110 ONE SIDE KEEPS ROLE COVERT.
- 118 NSQ BELIEVES IT WILL SUCCEED.
- 119 SQ CALCULATES SUCCESS.
- 124 LITTLE INFORMATION AVAILABLE.
- 126 INCIDENTS INCREASE IN SERIOUSNESS AND NUMBER.
- 127 INFLUENCE DUE TO PROXIMITY AND NATIONAL POWER.
- 128 REPRESSION OF POLITICAL GROUPS.
- 130 MILITARY PRESENCE PART OF LONG RANGE GOALS.
- 131 ENCOURAGEMENT OF REBELLIOUS GROUPS IN REGION.
- 132 FOMENTING REVOLT WITHIN OTHER SIDE.
- 134 MILITARY POSTS IN DISPUTED TERRITORY.
- 135 BORDER GARRISONS REINFORCED.
- 137 INCREASED INCIDENTS ALONG BORDERS.
- 138 ACCELERATION OF BORDER POSTS BUILD UP.

(b) To list factors in the Laotian conflict which tend much toward violence:

TYPE COMMAND

list factor having

CASE= lao

CATEGORY=

EFFECT= toward

INFLUENCE= much

- 24 US NOT IMPARTIAL.
- 40 SIMILAR SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS PROVIDE MODEL.
- 51 TROOPS SENT TO DISPUTED AREA TO MAINTAIN ORDER.
- 52 SQ REINFORCES ITS GARRISON IN DISPUTE AREA.
- 53 BOTH SIDES STRENGTHEN MILITARY FORCES.
- 54 INCREASED CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY MILITARY FORCES.
- 56 ONE SIDE'S MILITARY STRENGTH GROWS.
- 59 FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE SOUGHT.
- 91 NEGOTIATIONS ONLY IF CLAIM ACCEPTED.
- 106 BELIEF THAT VIOLENCE SPURS DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS.
- 110 ONE SIDE KEEPS ROLE COVERT.
- 118 NSQ BELIEVES IT WILL SUCCEED.
- 127 INFLUENCE DUE TO PROXIMITY AND NATIONAL POWER.
- 128 REPRESSION OF POLITICAL GROUPS.
- 130 MILITARY PRESENCE PART OF LONG RANGE GOALS.
- 131 ENCOURAGEMENT OF REBELLIOUS GROUPS IN REGION.
- 132 FOMENTING REVOLT WITHIN OTHER SIDE.
- 134 MILITARY POSTS IN DISPUTED TERRITORY.
- 135 BORDER GARRISONS REINFORCED.
- 137 INCREASED INCIDENTS ALONG BORDERS.
- 138 ACCELERATION OF BORDER POSTS BUILD UP.

(c) To list factors in the Laotian conflict, in category 4 (military-strategic) which tend toward violence:

TYPE COMMAND

list factors having

CASE= lao

CATEGORY= 4

EFFECT= toward

INFLUENCE=

- 42 MILITARY BALANCE IN FAVOR OF SQ.
- 44 SQ MILITARILY SUPERIOR.
- 46 STRATEGIC VALUE OF DISPUTED AREA INCREASES.
- 49 MILITARY FORCE USED INSTEAD OF POLICE.
- 51 TROOPS SENT TO DISPUTED AREA TO MAINTAIN ORDER.
- 52 SQ REINFORCES ITS GARRISON IN DISPUTE AREA.
- 53 BOTH SIDES STRENGTHEN MILITARY FORCES.
- 54 INCREASED CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY MILITARY FORCES.
- 56 ONE SIDE'S MILITARY STRENGTH GROWS.
- 59 FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE SOUGHT.

(d) To list factors in the Laotian conflict, in category 4 (military-strategic) which tend much toward violence:

TYPE COMMAND
List factors having
CASE= lao
CATEGORY= 4
EFFECT= toward
INFLUENCE= much

- 51 TROOPS SENT TO DISPUTED AREA TO MAINTAIN ORDER.
- 52 SQ REINFORCES ITS GARRISON IN DISPUTE AREA.
- 53 BOTH SIDES STRENGTHEN MILITARY FORCES.
- 54 INCREASED CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY MILITARY FORCES.
- 56 ONE SIDE'S MILITARY STRENGTH GROWS.
- 59 FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE SOUGHT.

If there are no factors which fit the criteria specified by the user, the computer will print:

NO FACTORS FIT THESE CRITERIA

Let us sum up the discussion of factors. Factors are conditions, events, or actions occurring in any given conflict. The factors are divided by phase--144 in phase 1; 141 in phase 2; and 197 in phase 3. Factors in each phase are further subdivided into eleven categories:

- Previous or General Relations Between Sides
- Great Power Involvement
- External Relations Generally
- Military-Strategic
- International Organization, Legal, Opinion
- Ethnic-Minorities, refugees
- Economic
- Internal Political
- Characteristics of One Side
- Communication and Information
- Actions or Controls in the Disputed Area

Each factor has an effect (toward or away from violence, or not relevant) and an influence (little, some, much) assigned to it in each case in which it appears, and a factor code which specifies the type of effect and influence each factor in each case has.

LIST CASES HAVING

Suppose the user would like to know which cases have certain factors? You may want to know, for instance, which cases have a single factor, or which cases have factors in a given category. This command lists the cases which have the factor(s) you specify. The computer will ask for the category and the factor number--you must specify one or the other. Here are two examples:

(a) To list cases having factor number 52 (Status Quo reinforces its garrison in dispute area):

TYPE COMMAND

list cases having

CATEGORY=

TYPE FACTOR NUMBER 52

EFFECT= toward

INFLUENCE=

ADEH (SOUTH YEMEN)	1963-67
ALGERIA-MOROCCO	1962-63
ARAB-ISRAELI WAR	1967
BAY OF PIGS	1961
CYPRUS (COMMUNAL)	1963
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-HAITI	1965
EL SALVADOR-HONDURAS	1969-
GREEK INSURGENCY	1944-49
GUYANA-VENEZUELA	1970
INDIA-CHINA BORDER	1954-62
INDIA-PAKISTAN	1965-66
IRAQ (KURDS)	1958-63
KASHMIR	1947-49
LAOS	1959-62
MOROCCO-SPAIN	1956-
MUSCAT & OMAN	1957-
NICARAGUA-COSTA RICA	1955-56
NICARAGUA-HONDURAS	1957-60
NIGERIA (BIAFRA)	1967-70
PALESTINE	1947-49
SINAI	1950
SYRIA-TURKEY	1956-57
TRIESTE	1945-54
WEST TIRIAK	1957-62
YEMEN	1962-29

(b) To list cases having factors in category 4 (military-strategic):

TYPE COMMAND
 List cases having
 CATEGORY= 4
 TYPE FACTOR NUMBER
 EFFECT= toward
 INFLUENCE=

ADEN (SOUTH YEMEN)	1963-67
ALGERIA	1954-62
ALGERIA-MOROCCO	1962-63
ANGOLA	1961
ARAB-ISRAELI WAR	1967
BAY OF PIGS	1961
BOLIVIA	1967
CONGO (KATANGA)	1960-63
CUBA	1952-59
CYPRUS (COMMUNAL)	1963
CYPRUS (ENIOSIS)	1954-59
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	1965
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-HAITI	1963
ECUADOR-USA	1963-
EL SALVADOR-HONDURAS	1969-
GHANA-UPPER VOLTA	1964-66
GREEK INSURGENCY	1944-49
GUATEMALA	1954
GUINEA-IVORY COAST	1966-67
GUINEA-PORTUGUESE GUINEA	1970
GUYANA-VENEZUELA	1970
INDIA-CHINA BORDER	1954-62
INDIA-PAKISTAN	1965-66
INDONESIA-MALAYSIA	1963-65
INDONESIAN WAR OF INDEPE	1945-4
IRAQ (KURDS)	1958-63
KASHMIR	1947-49
KUWAIT-IRAQ	1961-63
LAOS	1959-62
LEBANON	1957-58
MALAYAN EMERGENCY	1948-60
MOROCCO-MAURITANIA	1957-70
MOROCCO-SPAIN	1956-
MUSCAT & OMAN	1957-
NICARAGUA-COSTA RICA	1955-56
NICARAGUA-HONDURAS	1957-60
NIGERIA (BIAFRA)	1967-70
PALESTINE	1947-49
PANAMA	1964
PHILIPPINES (HUKS)	1946-54
QUEMOY-HATSU	1954-58
SINAI	1956
SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA-KENYA	1960-64
SOUTH TYROL	1957-69
SOVIET-IRAN	1945-46
SUEZ	1956
SYRIA-TURKEY	1956-57
TRIESTE	1945-54
VENEZUELA	1960-63
WEST IRIAN	1957-62
YEMEN	1962-20

COMPARE

The compare command is a key feature of CASCON that enables you to determine which cases in the data base are most "similar" to the case with which you are working. You can then display and list information from the relevant cases for a wide variety of purposes, such as to determine if you are overlooking important factors or remedial policy measures. Furthermore, your historical knowledge of actions taken (and their results) in these cases can act as a guide to possible action in the current case.

Cases are compared on the basis of these two assumptions:

- (a) Two cases seem similar if they have present the same factors and if these factors have the same effects (toward, away, etc. from intensified conflict)
- (b) Two cases seem similar if the same effects are not present in them. The crucial similarity is in factors, not cases.

Thus, actually the factors in each case are compared to the factors in the user-selected case. These factors are compared using three statistical measures: an information statistic, a comparability statistic, and a distance statistic.

Information*

The information statistic indicates the amount of confidence to place in the results of the other two statistics (comparability and distance), based on the number of factors for which there is information available. That is, there are n number of factors that could be present in each phase, from the 482 factors. The information statistic tells you the proportion of factors about which there is some information in both cases. Recall the factor codes:

*The mathematical formula used to calculate the information statistic is:

$I_{A,B} = \frac{T_{A,B}}{n}$ where $T_{A,B}$ is the number of factors for which there is information in both cases and n is the total number of factors in the phase.

1	<u>no information</u>
2	not present
3	present but no influence
4	much toward
5	some toward
6	little toward
7	much away
8	some away
9	little away

The information statistic tells you the proportion of factors which are not coded one in both the case which you have selected for comparison, and each case which is selected from the data base for comparison with your case.

The information statistic can be represented as follows:

$$I = \frac{\text{\# of factors for which there is information in both cases}}{\text{total number of factors in the phase}}$$

The information statistic ranges from 0 to 1. If the information statistic approaches 0, this suggests that there are few factors in both cases which have information (coded other than "1"). If the information statistic approaches 1, this suggests that there is information (codes "2" - "9") for most factors in the particular phase for both cases.

Let us give an example. In phase 3 there are 197 factors that may be present in a case. However, the historian coding the case data cannot determine whether 30 factors from this list are present in the India-Pakistan conflict, and whether 20 other factors are present in the China-India Border War in phase 3. Thus, he codes "1" for each of these 50 factors, and there is no information for 50 factors from the two cases. The information statistic would be:

$$I = \frac{197 - 50}{197} = .75$$

The information statistic (.75) indicates that there is information for a good deal of the factors in the particular phase, for both cases.

To sum up, the information statistic ranges from 0 to 1, and tells you the proportion of factors in both cases which have information, i.e., have been coded 2 through 9 by the historian. In this sense, it is an indicator of how valid the statistics generated by the next two measures may be in your comparison.

Comparability*

The comparability statistic measures the proportion of factors which affect both cases being compared. Two cases are said to have comparable components if either or both:

- (a) have present many of the same factors and the values of these factors do not have opposite effects
- (b) have many of the same factors not present

This statistic can be represented as follows:

$$C = \frac{\# \text{ factors present in both cases} - \# \text{ factors present with opposite effects}}{\# \text{ factors for which there is information in both cases}} + \frac{\# \text{ factors not present in both cases}}{167 - .5(35)}$$

The comparability statistic ranges from 0 to 1. If the statistic approaches 0, it suggests that there are few factors which affect both cases being compared. If the statistic approaches 1, it suggests that there are few factors which affect one case and not the other.

Let us give an example. Suppose we are comparing the India-Pakistan conflict with the China-India Border war. Out of 197 possible factors present in phase 3 for both conflicts, there are 150 factors present in both cases, only 20 of which had opposite effects (e.g., tended toward conflict in one case and away from conflict in another). There are 15 factors in each case for which there is no information. In addition, there are 20 factors in the India-Pakistan case and 15 factors in the China-India case which are not present. The comparability statistic would be:

$$C = \frac{150 - 20 + .5(35)}{167 - .5(35)} = .98$$

*The mathematical formula used to calculate the comparability statistic is:
 $M_{A,B} = \frac{F_{A,B} - L_{A,B} + \lambda N_{A,B}}{T_{A,B} - (1-\beta)N_{A,B}}$ where $F_{A,B}$ is the number of factors present in both cases; $L_{A,B}$ is the number of factors present with opposite effects; $N_{A,B}$ is the number of factors not present in both cases; $T_{A,B}$ is the number of factors for which there is information in both cases; λ is a coefficient equal to 1; β is a coefficient equal to .5.

The comparability statistic (.98) indicates that there are few factors which affect one case and not the other.

To sum up, the comparability statistic ranges from 0 to 1, and tells you the proportion of factors which affect both cases being compared. In this sense, it is an indicator of how valid the statistic generated by the distance measure may be in your comparison.

Distance*

The distance statistic measures the degree of similar factors and similar effects of those factors in both cases being compared. In computing the distance statistic, the computer uses values from the "use vector" in place of corresponding factor code values. The values for the use vector are typed in by the user (see below). The system's standard use vector compared to the factor codes is:

<u>Use Vector</u>	<u>Factor Code</u>	<u>Meaning</u>
0	1	No information
0	2	Not present
0	3	Present, no influence
-1	4	Much influence, toward violence
-1	5	Some influence, toward violence
-1	6	Little influence, toward violence
1	7	Much influence, away from violence
1	8	Some influence, away from violence
1	9	Little influence, away from violence

* *The mathematical formula used to compute the distance statistic is:

$$D_{A,B} = \frac{\sum |USE(VAL(i,A)) - USE(VAL(i,B))|}{F_{A,B} \cdot \text{Max}} \quad \text{where } F_{A,B} \text{ is the number of factors}$$

present in both cases; $USE(VAL(i,A))$ is the value coded for the i^{th} factor of case A replaced by the corresponding value from the USE vector; and Max is the maximum difference between two values in the USE vector.

The system use vector gives positive weight (1) to any factor coded "away from violence" and negative weight (-1) to any factor coded "toward violence". Factors coded "no information," "not present," or "present, no influence" are placed in between at zero. You may, however, insert your own use vector, for which directions are given below. For example, suppose you want to weight factors having "much influence toward violence" more heavily than other factors. Then your use vector might be: 0,0,0,-4,-2,-1,1,1,1, (this is how you type in the use vector).

The distance statistic can be represented as follows:

$$D = \frac{\text{Use vector value for factor } x \text{ in case 1} - \text{use vector value for factor } x \text{ in case 2}}{\frac{\# \text{ of factors present in both cases}}{\text{maximum difference between two values in the use vector}}}$$

The distance statistic ranges from 0 to 1. If the statistic approaches 0, this suggests that the two cases being compared have almost exactly the same factors present, and that these factors have almost exactly the same effects and influences. If the statistic approaches 1, this suggests that the two cases have few similarities in factors or effects. Cases with high average factor value difference tend to be dynamically different; that is, they tend to have the same factors, but these factors contribute different effects (toward or away from violence) or degrees of influence (much, some, little). Cases with low average factor value difference tend to have the same factors, and these factors make similar contributions to the level of violence.

Let us give an example. Suppose we are comparing the India-Pakistan conflict with the China-India Border war. We are interested in knowing the distance between the two cases in phase 2, particularly in terms of factors which tend much toward violence. Thus we assign the following use vector: 0,0,0,-6,-3,-1,1,1,1, for the comparison. Recall that there are 197 factors in phase 3, and 150 of these factors are present in both cases. Thus, the distance statistic would be:

$$D = \frac{\text{Use vector value for each factor India-Pakistan} - \text{Use vector value for each factor China-India}}{150 \cdot 6}$$

To sum up, the distance statistic ranges from 0 to 1, and tells what the degree of similarity is between the case you are using and the case being compared.

Two Examples of Compare

You may use compare to compare cases in the data base, or you may compare a case that you have entered with other cases in the data base. The computer will ask you to specify case, category, group, and use vector. You may want to compare your selected case with cases in a specific group, e.g., internal, interstate, or colonial conflicts, or you may want to compare your case with all other cases. If you wish to do the latter, simply hit the carriage return when asked for category. In addition, you may wish to compare cases in terms of the factors in a particular category, e.g., military-strategic. If you do not wish to specify category, simply hit the carriage return. You must specify a case and the use vector. Here is an example of how to compare a case in the data base with other cases in the data.

```
TYPE COMMAND
compare
CASE= LAO
GROUP= internal
CATEGORY= 4
USE= 0,0,0,-4,-1,-1,1,1,1,
```

CASE NAME	INFORMATION	COMPARABILITY	DISTANCE
LAOS	1959-62	1.000	0.0
MUSCAT & OMAN	1957-	1.000	0.813
IRAQ (KURDS)	1958-63	0.900	0.800
YEMEN	1962-29	0.900	0.742
NIGERIA (BIAFRA)	1967-70	1.000	0.758
CONGO (KATANGA)	1960-63	1.000	0.579
GUATEMALA	1954	0.900	0.533
CUBA	1952-59	0.900	0.548
CYPRUS (COMMUNAL)	1963	1.000	0.389
BOLIVIA	1967	0.900	0.419
LEBANON	1957-58	0.900	0.375
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	1965	0.900	0.267
GREEK INSURGENCY	1944-49	0.900	0.353
VENEZUELA	1960-63	0.900	0.313
MALAYAN EMERGENCY	1948-60	0.900	0.241
PHILIPINES (HUKS)	1948-54	0.900	0.267

USER CASES

ENTER

The **enter** command may be used to enter new cases and to modify previously entered ones. Once a new case has been entered, it may be used in list, display, and compare commands. The 52 cases in the standard CASCON data base may not be modified.

The **enter** command is specified by typing "enter" when the system asks "type command". The computer then asks "Is this a new or current case?" You respond with "new" if you wish to enter a new case. If "current" is specified, the program will refer to the most recently restored (see below) user case or the case most recently entered, whichever came last.

The system then asks, "Do you wish to enter directly or sequentially?" The user must specify "direct" or "sequential". Once either mode has been entered, there is no way to change it except by reissuing the "enter" command. Note that after each of these questions, CASCON will tell you how to print out a definition of any of these terms. An example of this call is:

TYPE COMMAND
enter

IS THIS A NEW OR CURRENT CASE?
new

DO YOU WISH TO ENTER DIRECTLY OR SEQUENTIALLY?
direct

7

Sequential Entry Mode

This mode is useful for entering new cases. After the user has specified "sequential", CASCON responds with each of the following lines and waits for a response for each. To stop the requests for descriptors, type a carriage return.

TYPE VALUES FOR THE FOLLOWING:

NAME=

STATUS QUO SIDE=

NON STATUS QUO SIDE=

PHASE I DATES=

etc. for other phases.

The program then asks:

"TYPE VALUES FOR THE FOLLOWING FACTORS (PHASE n):

1:

2:

etc. For each factor number, enter the value for this factor, or you can enter many values per line by using the method of entering factors described below for DIRECT mode. "end", "end-of-file" or carriage return will return you to command mode. An example of entering a new case follows:

TYPE COMMAND

enter

IS THIS A NEW OR CURRENT CASE?

IF YOU WANT A DEFINITION OF "NEW" OR "CURRENT", TYPE "/"
new

DO YOU WISH TO ENTER DIRECTLY OR SEQUENTIALLY?

IF YOU WANT A DEFINITION OF "DIRECTLY" OR "SEQUENTIALLY", TYPE "/"
sequential

TYPE VALUES FOR THE FOLLOWING:

NAME= bangla desh

STATUS QUO SIDE= west pakistan

NON STATUS QUO SIDE= east pakistan

PHASE I DATES= 11/1970-3/1971

PHASE II DATES= 3/1971-3/27/1971

PHASE III(1) DATES= 3/27/1971-6/16/1971

PHASE III(2) DATES= 6/16/1971-12/5/1971

PHASE III(3) DATES= 12/5/1971-12/16/1971

TYPE VALUES FOR THE FOLLOWING FACTORS (PHASE 1):

1= 2

2= 2

3= 5

4= 4

5= 2

6= 7

7= 7

8= 2

9= 5

10= 4

11=

TYPE COMMAND

Direct Entry Mode

This mode is useful for modifying already entered cases. After the user has specified "direct", CASCON responds "DO YOU WISH TO MODIFY DESCRIPTORS?". If the user responds "yes", the program will type each descriptor line title, one at a time, and ask "DO YOU WISH TO CHANGE?". Whenever the user responds "yes", the program asks for a new descriptor. If the user responds "no" or carriage return, the program asks if the next descriptor is to be changed. To show how to modify descriptors:

TYPE COMMAND
enter

IS THIS A NEW OR CURRENT CASE?
IF YOU WANT A DEFINITION OF "NEW" OR "CURRENT", TYPE "/"
current

DO YOU WISH TO ENTER DIRECTLY OR SEQUENTIALLY?
IF YOU WANT A DEFINITION OF "DIRECTLY" OR "SEQUENTIALLY", TYPE "/"
direct

DO YOU WISH TO MODIFY DESCRIPTORS?

yes

NAME = "BANGLA DESH"

DO YOU WISH TO CHANGE? no

STATUS QUO SIDE = "WEST PAKISTAN"

DO YOU WISH TO CHANGE?

NON STATUS QUO SIDE = "EAST PAKISTAN"

DO YOU WISH TO CHANGE?

PHASE I DATES = 11/1970-3/1971

DO YOU WISH TO CHANGE? yes

PHASE I DATES= 11/23/1970-3/3/1971

PHASE II DATES = 3/1971-3/27/1971

DO YOU WISH TO CHANGE?

PHASE III(1) DATES = 3/27/1971-6/16/1971

DO YOU WISH TO CHANGE?

PHASE III(2) DATES = 6/16/1971-12/5/1971

DO YOU WISH TO CHANGE?

PHASE III(3) DATES = 12/5/1971-12/16/1971

DO YOU WISH TO CHANGE?

Direct Entry Mode

This mode is useful for modifying already entered cases. After the user has specified "direct", CASCON responds "DO YOU WISH TO MODIFY DESCRIPTORS?" If the user responds "yes", the program will type each descriptor line title, one at a time, and ask "DO YOU WISH TO CHANGE?" Whenever the user responds "yes", the program asks for a new descriptor. If the user responds "no" or carriage return, the program asks if the next descriptor is to be changed. To show how to modify descriptors:

TYPE COMMAND
enter

IS THIS A NEW OR CURRENT CASE?
IF YOU WANT A DEFINITION OF "NEW" OR "CURRENT", TYPE "/"
current

DO YOU WISH TO ENTER DIRECTLY OR SEQUENTIALLY?
IF YOU WANT A DEFINITION OF "DIRECTLY" OR "SEQUENTIALLY", TYPE "/"
direct

DO YOU WISH TO MODIFY DESCRIPTORS?

yes

NAME = "BANGLA DESHI"
DO YOU WISH TO CHANGE? no
STATUS QUO SIDE = "WEST PAKISTAN"
DO YOU WISH TO CHANGE?
NON STATUS QUO SIDE = "EAST PAKISTAN"
DO YOU WISH TO CHANGE?
PHASE I DATES = 11/1970-3/1971
DO YOU WISH TO CHANGE? yes

PHASE I DATES= 11/23/1970-3/3/1971
PHASE II DATES = 3/1971-3/27/1971
DO YOU WISH TO CHANGE? yes

PHASE II DATES= 3/3/1971-3/27/1971
PHASE III(1) DATES = 3/27/1971-6/10/1971
DO YOU WISH TO CHANGE?
PHASE III(2) DATES = 6/10/1971-12/5/1971
DO YOU WISH TO CHANGE?
PHASE III(3) DATES = 12/5/1971-12/16/1971
DO YOU WISH TO CHANGE?

The program then asks "TYPE FACTOR NUMBER AND ITS VALUE". The user may then respond in several different ways:

- 1) Type a factor number and its value.

TYPE FACTOR NUMBER AND ITS VALUE

12 5

TYPE FACTOR NUMBER AND ITS VALUE

8 7

- 2) Type a factor number, space, and a series of factor values separated by semicolons.

For example, to set the values of factors 1 through 5 to 3, 5, 7, 9, and 2 respectively, the user could type:

1 3;5;7;9;2

- 3) Type a factor number, space, factor value, semicolon and repeat this sequence as often as necessary. For example, to set the same factor values as above, the user could type:

1 3;2 5;3 7;4 9;5 2

Instead of a space, the user can use a minus sign, equals sign, or comma. Thus the above example could also have been entered:

1=3;2,5;3-7;4=9;5,2

Typing "end" at any point stops the factor entering process and returns control to command mode.

SAVE

A user case which has been previously entered may be filed for later use, even for a subsequent CASCON session. The user types "save casename" where casename is the name of the case to be saved. Or, alternatively, the user may say just "save", and then the program responds "ENTER YOUR CASE NAME:" to which the user responds with casename. The program then asks for "3-LETTER CODE FOR THIS CASE:" to which the user types the case code, and "GROUP=" to which the user enters the group "internal", "interstate", "colonial" or none of these. An example follows:

TYPE COMMAND

save

ENTER YOUR CASE NAME: bangla desh

3-LETTER CODE FOR THIS CASE: bgd

GROUP= internal

If a case with the same name has already been saved, the program will type:
 "THAT CASE IS ALREADY SAVED. DO YOU WISH TO OVERWRITE THE SAVED CASE?"
 User responds either "yes" or "no." Note "catalog" may be used at any time
 to see which user cases have been saved.

RESTORE

This command retrieves a previously saved user case and makes it active and available for use in CASCON. Up to 10 cases may be active at a time. The most recently restored case is considered the "current" case, but all restored cases will be used in commands such as "list cases" or "compare". Thus several user cases can be compared with each other. The user can specify either "restore casename", or "restore", in which case the program asks "ENTER YOUR CASE NAME:". If the case was never saved, the program types "CASE HAS NOT BEEN SAVED." Here is an example of restore:

TYPE COMMAND
 restore
 ENTER YOUR CASE NAME: bangla desh
 CASE "BANGLA DESH" IS NOW CURRENT

CATALOG

If user specifies "catalog", a catalog of all user saved cases is printed, for example:

TYPE COMMAND
 catalog
 5 CASES HAVE BEEN SAVED:
 PAK-INDIA/BD(HUQ) CODE=PIN GROUP=INTERSTATE
 PAK-BANG.DESH(HUQ) CODE=PBD GROUP=INTERNAL
 INDIA-PAK(KAKI.I) CODE=IPK GROUP=INTERSTATE
 PAK-B.D. (KAKI.I) CODE=PAR GROUP=INTERNAL
 BERLIN 1961 CODE=B61 GROUP=INTERSTATE

Cases which have been saved are stored in a disk file named CASCOND under the user's sign-on ID. Each user can create his own CASCOND file containing his own saved user cases and store it under his own user ID.

CURRENT

When the user types "current", the program tells the user which case is considered the current case and which cases have been restored. For example:

```
TYPE COMMAND
current
RESTORED CASES ARE:
BANGLA DESH
CURRENT CASE IS:
BANGLA DESH
```

CLEAR

User types "clear". This command clears out all user cases that have been restored since the last clear command. If the user has not restored any cases, the command is ignored. This command does not change the saved cases.

DISPLAY

This command is used to display information in a specific case. The user types "display", after which the program asks for the user to enter the case he wants displayed. Then the program asks "Do you wish to display the precis, the case descriptors, values of factors in a specific category, single factor, or all factor values in shortened form?" You type preci, desc, cate, fact, or all, depending on which you wish to display. This sentence is typed by the program only the first time display is requested in each run to eliminate unnecessary printing.

Precis

If you type "precis" after issuing the "display" command, the program will respond with a short summary of the case.* These summaries are verbal descriptions of the background of the particular dispute, and of what occurred in each phase of the dispute.

*There are currently 2 precis implemented. Others will be added at a later date.

Descriptors

If you ask for "descriptors" the program responds by listing the particular descriptors of the case. The descriptors include the names of the status quo side and the non-status quo side, and the dates of all the phases in the conflict. A full list of case descriptors is in Appendix D .

display

CASE= iwi

TYPE: CASE, DESC, CATE, FACT, OR ALL.

desc

NAME

INDONESIA

1945-1949

STATUS QUO SIDE

DUTCH GOVERNMENT

NON STATUS QUO SIDE

INDONESIAN NATIONALISTS

PHASE I DATES

-8/17/45

PHASE II DATES

8/17/45-LATE 10/45

PHASE III(1) DATES

LATE 10/45-10/14/46

PHASE III(2) DATES

7/21/47-1/19/48

PHASE III(3) DATES

12/19/48-8/1/49

PHASE IV(1) DATES

10/14/46-7/21/47

PHASE IV(2) DATES

1/19/48-12/19/48

PHASE IV(3) DATES

8/1/49-12/27/49

REGION

EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

Category

If you ask for "category" the computer will print out all factors, effects, and influences in a particular case, in a specific category, e.g., military-strategic. If you type a carriage return, factor values in all categories are displayed. Here is an example:

TYPE COMMAND
 display
 CASE= bgd

DO YOU WISH TO DISPLAY THE ENTIRE CASE, THE
 DESCRIPTORS, CATEGORIES, SINGLE FACTOR, OR ALL FACTORS?
 TYPE: CASE, DESC, CATE, FACT, OR ALL

cate
 CATEGORY= 1

PREVIOUS OR GENERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SIDES

FACTOR	EFFECT	INFLUENCE
3 RESISTANCE ABSORBS MOST NON-COMMUNIST ELEMENTS.	TOWARD	SOME
4 POLITICAL CONTROL BY OTHER SIDE.	TOWARD	MUCH
6 PREVIOUS AGREEMENT FOR FUTURE SETTLEMENTS.	AWAY	MUCH
7 FRIENDLY RELATIONS SOUGHT.	AWAY	MUCH
9 SUSPICION OF INTENTIONS.	TOWARD	SOME
10 OPPOSITION TO FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN OTHER SIDE.	TOWARD	MUCH
CATEGORY=		

Factor

If you ask for "factor" the program will ask for the factor number
 and will display the effect and influence values for that particular factor.
 Here is an example:

```
display
CASE= you
TYPE: CASE, DESC, CATE, FACT, OR ALL
fact
TYPE FACTOR NUMBER: 136
EFFECT=TOWARD  INFLUENCE=LITTLE
TYPE FACTOR NUMBER: 137
EFFECT=AWAY    INFLUENCE=LITTLE
TYPE FACTOR NUMBER: 50
EFFECT=TOWARD  INFLUENCE=SOME
TYPE FACTOR NUMBER: 40
EFFECT=UP      INFLUENCE=NONE
TYPE FACTOR NUMBER: 42
EFFECT=UP      INFLUENCE=NONE
TYPE FACTOR NUMBER:
```

All

If you type "all", the program will ask for the category, and then respond with a heading listing phase, category, and case and then the factor code values in grid format for the category. To type all factors, type a carriage return when asked for the category. This is the shortest, most efficient form for listing factor values. Here is an example:

```
display
CASE= bgd
TYPE: CASE, DESC, CATE, FACT, OR ALL
all
CATEGORY= 1
```

PHASE=1 CATEGORY=1 CASE=CURR

0	2	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
10	1		1	5(23)	4(27)	2	7(3)	7(3)	2	5(23)	4(27)
				1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

The number in parentheses after each factor value is the corresponding number in another more exact scale of factor values.

	away		present no influence			toward		
much	some	little	.	.	.	little	some	much
7	8	9		3		6	5	4
3	7	11		15		19	23	27

ENDING CASCON

End or Stop

Either the "end" or "stop" command causes the current run of CASCON to be terminated. The user may then sign off the machine. Here is an example:

```
TYPE COMMAND
end
#EXECUTION TERMINATED
#
```

MTS

This command causes program control to return to the MTS system without unloading CASCON. Thus, CASCON can be restarted by typing "\$restart".

QUICK REFERENCE SHEET

<u>Command</u>	<u>Computer Asks</u>	<u>You type</u>
List commands	--	
List definitions	--	
Define	TYPE TERM TO BE DEFINED:	Term to be defined
List cases	GROUP=	interstate, internal, or colonial, or carriage return
List factor categories	--	
List factors	CATEGORY=	Category number (1-11) or first 4 letters of category
List factors long text	TYPE FACTOR NUMBER	Factor Number (Appendix E)
List measures	TYPE FACTOR NUMBER	Factor Number (Appendix E)
List factor codes	--	--
List factors having	CASE= CATEGORY= EFFECT= INFLUENCE=	Case Abbreviation Category Number or first 4 letters (optional) toward or away much, some, little (optional)
List cases having	CATEGORY= TYPE FACTOR NUMBER	Category number or first 4 letters Factor Number (Appendix E) (either category or factor must be specified)
Compare	CASE= GROUP# CATEGORY= USE VECTOR=	Case Abbreviation interstate, internal, or colonial (optional) Category number or first 4 letters (optional) (e.g.) 0,0,0,-1,-1,-1,1,1,1,

To get out of most commands, hit the attention key.

To get out of list factors long text and list measures, hit carriage return

If you do not want to specify an option, such as category, hit the carriage return when the computer asks for that option.

<u>Command</u>	<u>Computer Asks</u>	<u>You type</u>
Save	ENTER YOUR CASE NAME: 3-LETTER CODE FOR THIS CASE: GROUP=	Name of the case you wish to save Case code (abbreviation) Internal, interstate, colonial
Restore	ENTER YOUR CASE NAME:	Name of case you wish to restore
Catalog	--	--
Current	--	--
Clear	--	--
Display	CASE= TYPE:PREC,DESC,CATE, FACT, OR ALL	Case abbreviation You type one of these
Prec	--	--
Desc	--	--
Cate	CATEGORY=	Category number (1-11) or first 4 letters
Fact	FACTOR NUMBER=	Factor number
All	CATEGORY=	Category number (1-11) or first 4 letters.

APPENDIX A
CASCON COMMANDS

This appendix contains a complete list of commands, with a brief description of each.

COMMAND	FUNCTION
LIST CASES	PRINTS A LIST OF ALL THE CASE NAMES AND THEIR DATES.
LIST FACTOR CATEGORIES	PRINTS A LIST OF THE FACTOR CATEGORIES.
LIST FACTORS	PRINTS SHORTENED TEXT OF FACTORS CATEGORIES SPECIFIED.
LIST FACTOR LONG	PRINTS FULL TEXT OF FACTORS SPECIFIED.
LIST MEASURES	PRINTS MEASURES LOGICALLY CORRESPONDING TO SPECIFIED FACTORS.
LIST PHASE	PRINTS THE CURRENT PHASE NUMBER.
LIST FACTORS HAVING	PRINTS ALL FACTORS WITHIN A SPECIFIED CASE WHICH HAVE A SPECIFIED EFFECT TOWARD OR AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE. THE SEARCH CAN BE OPTIONALY RESTRICTED TO A SPECIFIED CATEGORY AND/OR INFLUENCE.
LIST CASES HAVING	PRINTS ALL CASES WHICH HAVE A SPECIFIED FACTOR, OR ANY FACTORS WITHIN A SPECIFIED CATEGORY WHICH HAVE A SPECIFIED EFFECT AND, OPTIONALY, A SPECIFIED INFLUENCE.
LIST FACTOR CODES	PRINTS A TABLE OF EFFECTS AND INFLUENCES AND THEIR CORRESPONDING NUMERICAL VALUES.
DISPLAY	DISPLAYS PART OR ALL OF THE INFORMATION STORED FOR A SPECIFIED CASE.
ENTER	ENABLES THE USER TO CREATE OR MODIFY USER CASES.
SAVE NAME 1 NAME 2	STORES A COPY OF THE NEW OR CURRENT USER CASE ON DISK AFTER HE GIVES IT A NAME.
RESTORE NAME 1 NAME 2	RESTORES THE PREVIOUSLY SAVED NEW OR CURRENT CASE NAME 1 NAME 2 AND MAKES IT THE CURRENT USER CASE.

PHASE	RESETS THE PHASE TO THE ONE DESIRED (1,2, OR 3 IN THE PILOT CASCON SYSTEM).
DEFINE	PRINTS A DEFINITION FROM THE LIST OF DEFINITIONS.
COMPARE TO CASES	COMPARES USER CASE TO THE CASES IN THE DATA BASE. (SEE MANUAL FOR DETAILS).
END	CAUSES THE CURRENT OPERATION WITHIN CASCON TO BE TERMINATED (IF TYPED AT COMMAND LEVEL CAUSES THE CURRENT RUN OF CASCON TO BE TERMINATED).

APPENDIX B

CASCON DEFINITIONS

This appendix contains a complete list of definitions used in CASCON.

DISPUTE:	A QUARREL OR DISAGREEMENT OVER SOMETHING SUBSTANTIVE, OR THE EXISTENCE OF A DIVISIVE ISSUE BETWEEN TWO PARTIES. NEITHER OF THESE PARTIES HAS YET CONSIDERED, OR AT LEAST HAS NOT YET DEMONSTRATED WILLINGNESS TO RESORT TO MILITARY FORCE. THIS IS PHASE I OF THE ACIM MODEL. IF A DISPUTE (BUT NOT CONFLICT) SITUATION EXISTS AFTER HOSTILITIES, IT IS CALLED POST-HOSTILITIES DISPUTE. IT IS PHASE V OF THE MIT MODEL.
CONFLICT:	A DISPUTE IN WHICH AT LEAST ONE OF THE PARTIES HAS CONSIDERED OR DEMONSTRATED WILLINGNESS TO USE MILITARY FORCE TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTE BUT AS YET HAS NOT ACTUALLY DONE SO. THIS IS PHASE II OF THE MIT MODEL. IF A CONFLICT SITUATION EXISTS AFTER HOSTILITIES, IT IS CALLED POST-HOSTILITIES CONFLICT. THIS IS PHASE IV OF THE MIT MODEL.
HOSTILITIES:	A DISPUTE IN WHICH MILITARY FORCE IS ACTIVELY BEING EMPLOYED TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTE. THIS IS PHASE III OF THE MIT MODEL.
MILITARY FORCE:	INFILCTING CASUALTIES AND/OR DESTROYING PROPERTY IN A SYSTEMATIC WAY SO AS TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL GOAL.
PHASE:	AN IDENTIFIABLE STAGE IN THE COURSE OF A LOCAL CONFLICT. THE FIRST THREE PHASES IN THE MIT MODEL ARE DISPUTE, CONFLICT, HOSTILITIES.
FACTORS:	CONDITIONS, EVENTS, OR ACTIONS WITHIN A PHASE WHICH GENERATE PRESSURES THAT TEND EITHER TOWARD OR AWAY FROM MOVEMENT OF THE CONFLICT ACROSS A THRESHOLD INTO THE NEXT PHASE. IN PHASES I AND II, FACTORS THAT TEND TO KEEP THE LOCAL CONFLICT IN ITS CURRENT PHASE OR TEND TOWARD SETTLEMENT ARE FACTORS THAT TEND AWAY FROM VIOLENCE, I.E., VIOLENCE-MINIMIZING FACTORS. IN PHASES I AND II, FACTORS THAT TEND TO PUSH THE LOCAL CONFLICT TO THE NEXT PHASE ARE FACTORS TENDING TOWARD VIOLENCE, I.E., VIOLENCE-PROMOTING FACTORS. PHASE III PRESENTS A SPECIAL CASE. FACTORS THAT TEND TO INCREASE THE LEVEL OF HOSTILITIES OR TEND TO PROLONG THE HOSTILITIES ARE VIOLENCE-PROMOTING FACTORS, FACTORS THAT TEND TO LOWER THE LEVEL OF HOSTILITIES OR TERMINATE HOSTILITIES ARE VIOLENCE-MINIMIZING FACTORS.
TRANSITION:	MOVEMENT ACROSS AN INTER-PHASE THRESHOLD AS THE RESULT OF THE FACTOR-GENERATED PRESSURES DURING A PHASE.
THRESHOLD:	A CONVENIENT POINT OF DEMARCACTION IN TIME TO SEPARATE THE PHASES.
MEASURE:	A POLICY OR ACTION WHICH, IF TAKEN, MIGHT ALTER THE COURSE OF A LOCAL CONFLICT BY REINFORCING FACTORS THAT ARE VIOLENCE-MINIMIZING AND/OR OFFSETTING FACTORS THAT ARE VIOLENCE-PROMOTING.

CATEGORY -- A GROUPING OF FACTORS. CATEGORY NAMES CAN BE PRINTED BY THE 'LIST FACTOR CATEGORIES' COMMAND (EXPLAINED BELOW).

DIRECTLY -- ENTERING DIRECTLY ALLOWS YOU TO SPECIFY THE FACTOR NUMBER AND ITS VALUE FOR FACTORS ON WHICH YOU HAVE NEW INFORMATION.

SEQUENTIALLY -- ENTERING SEQUENTIALLY LISTS FACTOR NUMBERS AND ASKS YOU TO SPECIFY THEIR VALUE.

USER CASE -- USER-CREATED CASES (AS OPPOSED TO CASES IN THE DATA BASE) ARE CALLED USER CASES. THIS INCLUDES ALL NEW AND CURRENT CASES. THEY MUST BE SAVED EACH TIME (SEE BELOW).

NEW -- A USER CASE IS NEW IF THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT IT HAS HAD ANY INFORMATION ENTERED ABOUT IT.

CURRENT -- A USER CASE IS CURRENT IF DATA IS STILL BEING ENTERED ABOUT IT BUT THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME.

DATA BASE -- THE INFORMATION STORED WITHIN THE CASCON SYSTEM CONCERNING 27 PREVIOUS CASES.

DESCRIPTION -- AN ITEM OF DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION ABOUT A CASE. DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION INCLUDES THE NAME OF THE CASE, ITS DATES (IF PAST), THE NAMES OF THE STATUS-QUO AND NON-STATUS-QUO SIDES, AND THE DATES OF THE PREVIOUS PHASES, IF ANY.

EFFECT -- BY EFFECT IS MEANT THE KIND OF EFFECT THAT A FACTOR HAS WITH REGARD TO CHANGING THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN A PARTICULAR CASE. THERE ARE TWO KINDS OF EFFECTS (APART FROM NO INFORMATION, NOT PRESENT, AND PRESENT BUT NOT HAVING ANY INFLUENCE WITH REGARD TO THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE) -- TOWARD INCREASING THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE, AND AWAY FROM INCREASING THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE.

INFLUENCE -- THE DEGREE TO WHICH A SPECIFIED FACTOR HAS AN EFFECT TOWARD OR AWAY FROM INCREASED VIOLENCE. THERE ARE THREE INFLUENCES -- LITTLE, SOME, AND MUCH.

COMMAND LEVEL -- NAME GIVEN TO SITUATION WHEN CASCON IS AWAITING COMMAND FROM USER. CASCON PRINTS -- TYPE COMMAND

APPENDIX C
CASCON CASES

**This appendix contains a complete list of the 52 CASCON cases
and their case codes.**

CASE NAMES	DATES	CODE	GROUP
ADEN (SOUTH YEMEN)	1963-67	ADY	COLONIAL
ALGERIA	1954-62	ALG	COLONIAL
ALGERIA-MOROCCO	1962-63	ALM	INTERSTATE
ANGOLA	1961	ANG	COLONIAL
ARAB-ISRAELI WAR	1967	AIW	INTERSTATE
BAHRAIN	1970	BAH	COLONIAL
BAY OF PIGS	1961	BOP	INTERSTATE
BOLIVIA	1967	BOL	INTERNAL
CONGO (KATANGA)	1960-63	CON	INTERNAL
CUBA	1952-59	CUB	INTERNAL
CYPRUS (COMMUNAL)	1963	CYC	INTERNAL
CYPRUS (ENOSIS)	1954-59	CYE	COLONIAL
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	1965	DOM	INTERNAL
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-HAITI	1963	DRH	INTERSTATE
ECUADOR-USA	1963-	EUS	INTERSTATE
EL SALVADOR-HONDURAS	1969-	ESH	INTERSTATE
GHANA-UPPER VOLTA	1964-66	GUV	INTERSTATE
GREEK INSURGENCY	1944-49	GRI	INTERNAL
GUATEMALA	1954	GUА	INTERNAL
GUINEA-IVORY COAST	1966-67	GIC	INTERSTATE
GUINEA-PORTUGUESE GUINEA	1970	GPG	INTERSTATE
GUYANA-VENEZUELA	1970	GYV	INTERSTATE

CASE NAME	DATES	CODES	GROUP
INDIA-CHINA BORDER	1954-62	ICB	INTERSTATE
INDIA-PAKISTAN	1965-66	INP	INTERSTATE
INDONESIA-MALAYSIA	1963-65	INC	INTERSTATE
INDONESIAN WAR OF INDEPE	N 1945-4	IWI	COLONIAL
IRAQ (KURDS)	1958-63	IRK	INTERNAL
KASHMIR	1947-49	KAS	INTERSTATE
KUWAIT-IRAQ	1961-63	KUI	INTERSTATE
LAOS	1959-62	LAO	INTERNAL
LEBANON	1957-58	LEB	INTERNAL
MALAYAN EMERGENCY	1948-60	MAE	INTERNAL
MOROCCO-MAURITANIA	1957-70	MOM	INTERSTATE
MOROCCO-SPAIN	1956-	MOS	INTERSTATE
MUSCAT & OMAN	1957-	MUS	INTERNAL
NICARAGUA-COSTA RICA	1955-56	NCR	INTERSTATE
NICARAGUA-HONDURAS	1957-60	NIH	INTERSTATE
NIGERIA (BIAFRA)	1967-70	NIB	INTERNAL
PALESTINE	1947-49	PAL	COLONIAL
PANAMA	1964	PAN	INTERSTATE
PHILIPINES (HUKS)	1946-54	PHH	INTERNAL
QUEMOY-MATSU	1954-58	QUM	INTERSTATE
SINAI	1956	SIN	INTERSTATE
SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA-KENYA	1960-64	SEK	INTERSTATE
SOUTH TYROL	1957-69	STY	INTERSTATE

CASE NAME	DATES	CODES	GROUP
SOVIET-IRAN	1945-46	SOI	INTERSTATE
SUEZ	1956	SUE	INTERSTATE
SYRIA-TURKEY	1956-57	SYT	INTERSTATE
TRIESTE	1945-54	TRI	INTERSTATE
VENEZUELA	1960-63	VEN	INTERNAL
WEST IRIAN	1957-62	WIR	COLONIAL
YEMEN	1962-29	YEM	INTERNAL

APPENDIX D
CASCON DESCRIPTORS

This appendix contains a complete list of the descriptors for the 52 cases in CASCON.

CASCON II
DESCRIPTORS OF 52 DATA BASE CASES

NAME			(SHORT CODE)	(TYPE)
STATUS QUO SIDE	ADEN (SOUTH YEMEN)	1963-67	ADY	COLONIAL
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	UNITED KINGDOM			
PHASE 1 DATES	RIVAL NATIONALIST GROUPS			
PHASE 2 DATES	1/63-12/10/63			
PHASE 3 DATES	12/10/63-11/30/67			
PHASE 4 DATES	11/30/67			
NAME				
STATUS QUO SIDE	ALGERIA	1954-62	ALG	COLONIAL
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	FRANCE			
PHASE 1 DATES	FLN-ALN			
PHASE 2 DATES	1947-1954			
PHASE 3 DATES	EARLY 1954-10/31/54			
PHASE 4 DATES	11/1/54-3/18/62			
PHASE 5 DATES	3/19/62-7/3/62			
	7/4/62			
NAME				
STATUS QUO SIDE	ALGERIA-MOROCCO	1962-63	ALM	INTERSTATE
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	ALGERIA			
PHASE 1 DATES	MOROCCO			
PHASE 2 DATES	- 7/62			
PHASE 3 DATES	7/62-10/8/63			
PHASE 4 DATES	10/8/63-11/2/63			
	11/2/63-			
NAME				
STATUS QUO SIDE	ANGOLA	1961	ANG	COLONIAL
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	PORTUGAL			
PHASE 1 DATES	AFRICAN REBEL GROUPS			
PHASE 2 DATES	- EARLY 1950'S			
PHASE 3 DATES	EARLY 1950'S-2/3/61			
PHASE 4 DATES	2/3/61-FALL/61			
	FALL/61 -			
NAME				
STATUS QUO SIDE	ARAB-ISRAELI WAR	1967	AIW	INTERSTATE
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	ISRAEL			
PHASE 2 DATES	UAR			
PHASE 3 DATES	11/6/56-6/5/67			
PHASE 4 DATES	6/5/67-6/10/67			
	6/10/67-			
NAME				
STATUS QUO SIDE	BAHRAIN	1970	BAH	COLONIAL
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	UNITED KINGDOM(BAHRAIN)			
PHASE 1 DATES	IRAN			
PHASE 5 DATES	1/68-5/11/70			
	5/11/70			
NAME				
STATUS QUO SIDE	BAY OF PIGS	1961	BOP	INTERSTATE
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	CUBA			
PHASE 1 DATES	USA			
PHASE 2 DATES	1/1/59-3/60			
PHASE 3 DATES	3/60-4/15/61			
PHASE 4 DATES	4/15/61-4/19/61			
PHASE 5 DATES	4/19/61-			

		(SHORT CODE)	(TYPE)
NAME	BOLIVIA	1967	BOL INTERNAL
STATUS QUO SIDE	BOLIVIA		
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	CUBAN-LED INSURGENTS		
PHASE 1 DATES	4/52-1/66		
PHASE 2 DATES	1/66-3/23/67		
PHASE 3 DATES	3/23/67-10/67		
PHASE 4 DATES	10/67-		
NAME	CONGO (KATANGA)	1960-63	CON INTERNAL
STATUS QUO SIDE	CONGO REPUBLIC		
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	KATANGA PROVINCE		
PHASE 1 DATES	6/30/60-7/20/60		
PHASE 2 DATES	7/20/60-9/13/61		
PHASE 3 DATES	9/13/61-1/15/63		
PHASE 4 DATES	1/15/63-1/23/63		
PHASE 5 DATES	1/23/63-		
NAME	CUBA	1952-59	CUB INTERNAL
STATUS QUO SIDE	BATISTA GOVERNMENT		
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	CASTRO OPPOSITION		
PHASE 1 DATES	1946-3/10/52		
PHASE 2 DATES	3/10/52-12/2/56		
PHASE 3 DATES	12/2/56-1/1/59		
PHASE 5 DATES	1/59-		
NAME	CYPRUS (COMMUNAL)	1963-	CYC INTERNAL
STATUS QUO SIDE	TURKISH CYPRIOTS		
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	GREEK CYPRIOTS		
PHASE 1 DATES	1960-11/30/63		
PHASE 2 DATES	11/30/63-12/21/63		
PHASE 3 ₁ DATES	12/21/63-10/64		
PHASE 4 ₁ DATES	10/64-11/15/67		
PHASE 3 ₂ DATES	11/15/67-11/16/67		
PHASE 4 ₂ DATES	11/16/67-		
NAME	CYPRUS (ENOSIS)	1954-59	CYE COLONIAL
STATUS QUO SIDE	UNITED KINGDOM		
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	CYPRUS		
PHASE 1 DATES	- 7/52		
PHASE 2 DATES	7/52-4/1/55		
PHASE 3 DATES	4/1/55-2/11/59		
PHASE 4 DATES	2/11/59-		

		(SHORT CODE)	(TYPE)
NAME	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC		
STATUS QUO SIDE	BOSCH & PRD	1965	DOM
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	MILITARY JUNTA		INTERNAL
PHASE 1 DATES	1962-9/63		
PHASE 2 DATES	9/25/63-4/24/65		
PHASE 3 DATES	4/24/65-8/31/65		
PHASE 4 DATES	8/31/65 -		
NAME	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC-HAITI	1963	
STATUS QUO SIDE	HAITI		DRH
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	DOMINICAN REPUBLIC		INTERSTATE
PHASE 1 DATES	4/11/63-4/28/63		
PHASE 2 DATES	4/28/63-9/25/63		
PHASE 5 DATES	9/25/63-		
NAME	ECUADOR-USA	1963-	
STATUS QUO SIDE	USA		EUS
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	ECUADOR		INTERSTATE
PHASE 1 DATES	1963-3/12/71		
PHASE 2 DATES	3/12/71-		
NAME	EL SALVADOR-HONDURAS	1969-	
STATUS QUO SIDE	HONDURAS		ESH
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	EL SALVADOR		INTERSTATE
PHASE 1 DATES	4/69-6/24/69		
PHASE 2 DATES	6/24/69-7/15/69		
PHASE 3 DATES	7/15/69-7/22/69		
PHASE 4 DATES	7/22/69-		
NAME	GHANA-UPPER VOLTA	1964-66	
STATUS QUO SIDE	UPPER VOLTA		GUV
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	GHANA		INTERSTATE
PHASE 1 DATES	SPRING 1963-7/64		
PHASE 2 DATES	7/64-2/66		
PHASE 5 DATES	2/66-		
NAME	GREEK INSURGENCY	1944-49	
STATUS QUO SIDE	GOVERNMENT		GRI
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	GREEK COMMUNIST PARTY		INTERNAL
PHASE 1 DATES	- 3/10/44		
PHASE 2 DATES	3/10/44-2/46		
PHASE 3 DATES	2/46-10/49		
PHASE 4 DATES	10/49-		

		(SHORT CODE)	(TYPE)
NAME	GUATEMALA	1954	GUA INTERNAL
STATUS QUO SIDE	GUATEMALA		
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	CASTILLO ARMAS EXILES		
PHASE 1 DATES	1951-LATE 1953		
PHASE 2 DATES	LATE 1953-6/54		
PHASE 3 DATES	6/18/54-7/1/54		
PHASE 4 DATES	7/1/54-		
NAME	GUINEA-IVORY COAST	1966-67	GIC INTERSTATE
STATUS QUO SIDE	IVORY COAST		
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	GUINEA		
PHASE 1 DATES	2/24/66-3/10/66		
PHASE 2 DATES	3/10/66-9/25/67		
PHASE 5 DATES	9/25/67-		
NAME	GUINEA-PORTUGUESE GUINEA	1970	PGP INTERSTATE
STATUS QUO SIDE	GUINEA		
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	PORTUGUESE GUINEA		
PHASE 1 DATES	1963-11/16/70		
PHASE 2 DATES	11/16/70-11/22/70		
PHASE 3 DATES	11/22/70-11/28/70		
PHASE 4 DATES	11/28/70-		
NAME	GUYANA-VENEZUELA	1970	GYV INTERSTATE
STATUS QUO SIDE	GUYANA		
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	VENEZUELA		
PHASE 1 DATES	1962-2/19/70		
PHASE 2 DATES	2/19/70-6/20/70		
PHASE 5 DATES	6/20/70-		
NAME	INDIA-CHINA BORDER	1954-62	ICB INTERSTATE
STATUS QUO SIDE	INDIA		
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	CHINA		
PHASE 1 DATES	- 6/29/54		
PHASE 2 DATES	6/29/54-9/8/62		
PHASE 3 DATES	9/8/62-11/21/62		
PHASE 4 DATES	11/21/62-		
NAME	INDIA-PAKISTAN	1965-66	INP INTERSTATE
STATUS QUO SIDE	INDIA		
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	PAKISTAN		
PHASE 2 DATES	1949-8/5/65		
PHASE 3 DATES	8/5/65-9/22/65		
PHASE 4 DATES	9/23/65-1/10/66		

(SHORT
CODE) (TYPE)

NAME	INDONESIAN-MALAYSIAN CONFRONTATION	1963-65	IMC	INTERSTA
STATUS QUO SIDE	MALAYSIA			
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	INDONESIA			
PHASE 1 DATES	- 1/63			
PHASE 2 DATES	1/63-4/12/63			
PHASE 3 DATES	4/12/63-10/1/65			
PHASE S DATES	- 10/1/65			
NAME	INDONESIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE	1945-49	IWI	COLONIAL
STATUS QUO SIDE	NETHERLANDS			
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	INDONESIAN NATIONALISTS			
PHASE 1 DATES	- 8/17/45			
PHASE 2 DATES	8/17/45-LATE 10/45			
PHASE 3 ₁ DATES	LATE 10/45-10/14/46			
PHASE 4 ₁ DATES	10/14/46-7/21/47			
PHASE 3 ₂ DATES	7/21/47-1/19/48			
PHASE 4 ₂ DATES	1/19/48-12/19/48			
PHASE 3 ₃ DATES	12/19/48-8/1/49			
PHASE 5 DATES	8/1/49-12/27/49			
PHASE S DATES	12/27/49			
NAME	IRAQ (KURDS)	1958-63	IRK	INTERNAL
STATUS QUO SIDE	IRAQ			
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	KURDS			
PHASE 1 DATES	- 7/58			
PHASE 2 DATES	7/58-8/61			
PHASE 3 ₁ DATES	8/61-2/10/63			
PHASE 4 ₁ DATES	2/10/63-6/10/63			
PHASE 3 ₂ DATES	6/10/63-			
NAME	KASHMIR	1947-49	KAS	INTERSTATE
STATUS QUO SIDE	INDIA			
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	PAKISTAN			
PHASE 1 DATES	- 10/24/47			
PHASE 2 DATES	10/24/47-10/27/47			
PHASE 3 DATES	10/27/47-1/1/49			
PHASE 4 DATES	1/1/49-			
NAME	KUWAIT-IRAQ	1961-63	KUI	INTERSTATE
STATUS QUO SIDE	KUWAIT			
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	IRAQ			
PHASE 1 DATES	6/19/61-6/26/61			
PHASE 2 DATES	6/26/61-1963			
PHASE 5 DATES	1963-			

(SHORT CODE) (TYPE)

NAME	LAOS	1959-62	LAO	INTERNAL
STATUS QUO SIDE	LAOTIAN NEUTRALISTS			
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	RIGHT & LEFT FACTIONS			
PHASE 1 DATES	1957-1/59			
PHASE 2 DATES	1/59-5/24/59			
PHASE 3 DATES	5/24/59-6/24/62			
PHASE 4 DATES	6/24/62-			

NAME	LEBANON	1957-58	LEB	INTERNAL
STATUS QUO SIDE	GOVERNMENT			
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	UNITED NATIONAL FRONT			
PHASE 1 DATES	1943-6/57			
PHASE 2 DATES	6/57-5/8/58			
PHASE 3 DATES	5/8/58-10/14/58			
PHASE 4 DATES	10/14/58-			

NAME	MALAYAN EMERGENCY	1948-60	MAE	INTERNAL
STATUS QUO SIDE	GOVERNMENT			
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	MALAYAN COMMUNIST PARTY			
PHASE 1 DATES	- 3/48			
PHASE 2 DATES	3/48-6/48			
PHASE 3 DATES	6/48-7/31/48			
PHASE 4 DATES	7/31/60-			

NAME	MOROCCO-MAURITANIA	1957-70	MOM	INTERSTATE
STATUS QUO SIDE	MAURITANIA			
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	MOROCCO			
PHASE 1 DATES	1957-61			
PHASE 2 DATES	1961-63			
PHASE 5 DATES	1963-2/27/70			
PHASE S DATES	2/27/70			

NAME	MOROCCO-SPAIN	1956-	MOS	INTERSTATE
STATUS QUO SIDE	SPAIN			
NON STATUS QUO	MOROCCO			
PHASE 1 DATES	1956-8/19/57			
PHASE 2 DATES	8/19/57-11/57			
PHASE 3 DATES	11/57-3/58			
PHASE 4 DATES	3/58-			

NAME	MUSCAT & OMAN	1957-	MUS	INTERNAL
STATUS QUO SIDE	SULTANATE OF OMAN(MUSCAT & OMAN)			
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	IMAMATE OF OMAN			
PHASE 1 DATES	1955-MID 7/57			
PHASE 2 DATES	MID 7/57-7/24/57			
PHASE 3 DATES	7/24/57-8/23/57			
PHASE 4 DATES	8/23/57-			

		(SHORT CODE) (TYPE)		
NAME	NICARAGUA-COSTA RICA	1955-56	NCR	INTERSTATE
STATUS-QUO SIDE	COSTA RICA			
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	NICARAGUA			
PHASE 1 DATES	1948-1954			
PHASE 2 DATES	1954-1/11/55			
PHASE 3 DATES	1/11/55-1/20/55			
PHASE 4 DATES	1/20/55-1/9/56			
PHASE 5 DATES	1/9/56-			
NAME	NICARAGUA-HONDURAS	1957-60	NIH	INTERSTATE
STATUS QUO SIDE	HONDURAS			
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	NICARAGUA			
PHASE 1 DATES	1912-4/19/57			
PHASE 2 DATES	4/19/57-5/3/57			
PHASE 3 DATES	5/3/57-5/7/57			
PHASE 4 DATES	5/7/57-1960			
PHASE 5 DATES	1960-			
NAME	NIGERIA	1967-70	NIB	INTERNAL
STATUS QUO SIDE	NIGERIA			
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	EASTERN REGION OF NIGERIA (BIAFRA)			
PHASE 1 DATES	1/66-5/30/67			
PHASE 2 DATES	5/30/67-7/6/67			
PHASE 3 DATES	7/6/67-1/12/70			
PHASE 4 DATES	1/12/70-1/15/70			
PHASE 5 DATES	1/15/70-			
NAME	PALESTINE	1947-49	PAL	COLONIAL
STATUS QUO SIDE	ARAB STATES			
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	PALESTINIAN JEWS (ISRAEL)			
PHASE 1 DATES	1917-11/29/47			
PHASE 2 DATES	11/29/47-5/15/48			
PHASE 3 DATES	5/15/48-1/49			
PHASE 4 DATES	1/49-			
NAME	PANAMA	1964	PAN	INTERSTATE
STATUS QUO SIDE	USA			
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	PANAMA			
PHASE 1 DATES	- 1/9/64			
PHASE 2 DATES	1/9/64-4/3/64			
PHASE 5 DATES	4/3/64-			

NAME	PHILIPPINES (HUKS)	1946-54	PHH	INTERNAL
STATUS QUO SIDE	GOVERNMENT			
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	HUK INSURGENTS			
PHASE 1 DATES	- 4/42			
PHASE 2 DATES	4/42-5/46			
PHASE 3 DATES	5/46-5/54			
PHASE 4 DATES	5/54-			
NAME	QUEMOY-MATSU	1954-58	QUM	INTERSTATE
STATUS QUO SIDE	NATIONALIST CHINA			
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	CHINESE PEOPLES REPUBLIC			
PHASE 2 DATES	- 9/4/54			
PHASE 3 DATES	9/4/54-10/58			
PHASE 4 DATES	10/58-			
NAME	SINAI	1956	SIN	INTERSTATE
STATUS QUO SIDE	EGYPT			
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	ISRAEL			
PHASE 2 DATES	- 10/29/56			
PHASE 3 DATES	10/29/56-11/7/56			
PHASE 4 DATES	11/7/56 -			
NAME	SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA-KENYA	1960-64	SEK	INTERSTATE
STATUS QUO SIDE	ETHIOPIA-KENYA			
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	SOMALIA			
PHASE 1 DATES	- 7/60			
PHASE 2 DATES	7/60-1/64			
PHASE 3 DATES	1/64-4/64			
PHASE 4 DATES	4/64-			
NAME	SOUTH TYROL	1957-69	STY	INTERSTATE
STATUS QUO SIDE	ITALY			
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	AUSTRIA			
PHASE 1 DATES	1957-1/30/61			
PHASE 2 DATES	1/30/61-11/30/69			
PHASE 5 DATES	11/30/69-			
NAME	SOVIET-IRAN	1945-46	SOI	INTERSTATE
STATUS QUO SIDE	IRAN			
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	SOVIET-UNION			
PHASE 1 DATES	- 8/41			
PHASE 2 DATES	8/41-8/45			
PHASE 3 ₁ DATES	8/26-12/15/45			
PHASE 4 ₁ DATES	12/15/45-12/10/46			
PHASE 3 ₂ DATES	12/10/46-12/15/46			
PHASE 4 ₂ DATES	12/15/46-10/22/47			

		(SHORT CODE)	(TYPE)
NAME	SUEZ	1956	SUE
STATUS QUO SIDE	EGYPT		INTERSTATE
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	UK - FRANCE		
PHASE 1 DATES	MID-1950'S-7/56		
PHASE 2 DATES	7/56-10/31/56		
PHASE 3 DATES	10/31/56-11/7/56		
PHASE 4 DATES	11/7/56-12/23/56		
PHASE 5 DATES	12/23/56		
NAME	SYRIA-TURKEY	1956-57	SYT
STATUS QUO SIDE	SYRIA		INTERSTATE
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	TURKEY(USA)		
PHASE 1 DATES	10/56-8/57		
PHASE 2 DATES	8/57-11/57		
NAME	TRIESTE	1945-54	TRI
STATUS QUO SIDE	ITALY		INTERSTATE
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	YUGOSLAVIA		
PHASE 1 DATES	6/45-8/29/53		
PHASE 2 DATES	8/29/53-10/54		
PHASE 5 DATES	10/5/54-10/25/54		
PHASE 6 DATES	10/25/54-10/26/54		
NAME	VENEZUELA	1960-63	VEN
STATUS QUO SIDE	GOVERNMENT		INTERNAL
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	TERRORIST GROUPS		
PHASE 1 DATES	1958-9/59		
PHASE 2 DATES	9/59-10/60		
PHASE 3 DATES	10/60-12/63		
PHASE 4 DATES	12/63-		
NAME	WEST IRIAN	1962-63	WIR
STATUS QUO SIDE	NETHERLANDS		COLONIAL
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	INDONESIA		
PHASE 1 DATES	8/17/45-11/17/57		
PHASE 2 DATES	11/18/57-9/20/61		
PHASE 3 DATES	9/20/61-8/17/62		
PHASE 5 DATES	8/17/62-		
NAME	YEMEN	1962-63	YEM
STATUS QUO SIDE	ROYALISTS		INTERNAL
NON STATUS QUO SIDE	REPUBLICANS		
PHASE 1 DATES	- 10/62		
PHASE 2 DATES	10/62-11/62		
PHASE 3 ₁ DATES	11/62-8/65		
PHASE 4 ₁ DATES	8/65-12/66		
PHASE 3 ₂ DATES	12/66-3/69		
PHASE 4 ₂ DATES	3/69-		

APPENDIX E
CASCON FACTORS

This appendix contains (a) a list of the factors in full text; and
(b) a list of the factors in abbreviated text.

1 AREA OF DISPUTE WAS OBJECT OF COMPETING CLAIMS.
2 AGENTS OF ONE SIDE HAVE INFILTRATED AND UNDERMINED
3 POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF OTHER SIDE.
4 THE OPPOSITION IN THE DISPUTED AREA HAD MANAGED TO
5 LIQUIDATE OR ABSORB ANY POTENTIAL "MIDDLEGROUND."
6 ONE SIDE WAS CONTROLLED POLITICALLY BY THE OTHER.
7 ONE SIDE HAD PREVIOUSLY SUPPORTED THE OTHER, LEAVING A
8 LEGACY OF GOODWILL BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.
9 BOTH SIDES HAD PREVIOUSLY AGREED TO SETTLE FUTURE
10 DISPUTES PEACEABLY.
11 ONE SIDE SOUGHT FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE OTHER SIDE.
12 THE TWO SIDES TO THE DISPUTE WERE HISTORIC ENEMIES.
13 ONE SIDE SUSPICIOUS OF INTENTIONS OF OTHER SIDE.
14 ONE SIDE OPPOSED THE PRESENT FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE
15 OTHER SIDE.
16 ONE SIDE HAD BEEN HISTORICALLY DOMINANT IN REGION.
17 LEADERS OF ONE SIDE WERE NOSTALGIC OVER HISTORICAL
18 MEMORY OF LOST EMPIRE.
19 THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE HAD HAD SUCCESS IN DEALING WITH A
20 COMPARABLE THREAT IN ANOTHER COUNTRY.
21 REVOLT IN DISPUTED AREA GAVE SUBSTANCE TO CHARGES THAT
22 IT DID NOT WANT TO BECOME PART OF "STATUS QUO" SIDE.
23 A PARTY LINKED TO A SUPERPOWER WAS THE STRONGEST FORCE
24 IN THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE.
25 ONE SIDE DID NOT OPENLY SUPPORT ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIONS
26 WITHIN THE OTHER SIDE.
27 ONE SIDE PREOCCUPIED WITH OTHER PROBLEMS, AND THUS
28 DELAYED NEGOTIATION OF DISPUTE.
29 NEW LEADER OF ONE SIDE IDENTIFIED THE EXCESSES OF THE
30 PREVIOUS REGIME WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE OTHER SIDE.
31 SINCE INDEPENDENCE, THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE FACED
32 SEPARATIST CHALLENGES AND FEARED THAT THE OTHER SIDE
33 MIGHT BECOME A MAGNET FOR THESE ELEMENTS.
34 THE LEADER OF THE DISPUTED AREA PROPOSED A DELAY UNTIL
35 THE SITUATION COOLED OFF.
36 A STRONG ALLY OF ONE SIDE HAD DEMONSTRATED ITS
37 WILLINGNESS TO USE FORCE IN THE REGION TO MAINTAIN ORDER.
38 A STRONG ALLY OF ONE SIDE WAS UNWILLING TO USE ITS FORCE
39 IN THE REGION.
40 GREAT POWER CONCERNS LED TO THE INTRODUCTION OF FOREIGN
41 TROOPS INTO THE TERRITORY OF ONE SIDE.
42 INVOLVED GREAT POWERS DID NOT ENCOURAGE CLOSE RELATIONS
43 BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES.
44 INVOLVED GREAT POWERS ENCOURAGED CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN
45 THE TWO PARTIES.
46 INCREASINGLY CLOSE ECONOMIC TIES BETWEEN THE "NON-STATUS
47 QUO" SIDE AND ONE GREAT POWER MADE POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT
48 OF FORMER AS BASE FOR LATTER'S PENETRATION IN THE REGION.
49 WHILE SUPPORT FROM ONE GREAT POWER FOR ONE SIDE WAS
50 INCREASING, LATTER'S PROXIMITY TO CLOSER GREAT POWER
51 TENDED TO ISOLATE THAT SIDE IN THE EVENT OF A SHOWDOWN.
52 ONE SIDE WAS RECEIVING MATERIAL SUPPORT FROM A GREAT
53 POWER ALLY.
54 HISTORIC RIVALRY MADE EACH GREAT POWER RELUCTANT TO SEE
55 INTRODUCTION OF THE OTHER'S FORCES IN THE AREA.
56 GREAT POWER DISPUTE LED TO COMPETITION FOR FAVOR OF ONE
57 SIDE'S LEADERSHIP
58 REALTIONS OF "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE WITH ONE GREAT POWER
59 HAD BECOME CLOSER, WHILE RELATIANS WITH ANOTHER HAD

COCLED.
 32 CNE SUPERPOWER'S INTEREST IN REMOVING OTHER'S MILITARY
 BASES COINCIDED WITH THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE'S DESIRES.
 33 RIVALRIES AMONG TWO GREAT POWER ALLIES OF "NON-STATUS
 QUO" SIDE MADE EACH UNWILLING TO RESTRAIN "NON- STATUS
 QUO" SIDE LEADERSHIP LEST OTHER ALLY PROFIT.
 34 MAJCR ALLIES OF THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE DID NOT FAVOR ITS
 POLICY TOWARD THE DISPUTED AREA.
 35 CNE SIDE'S ATTENTION WAS FOCUSED ON CONFLICT WITH AN
 OUTSIDE PARTY.
 36 NO PUFFER AREAS SEPARATED THE TWO SIDES.
 37 NATIONALIST HOPES IN THE DISPUTED AREA WERE STIMULATED
 BY CCCUPATION TROOPS.
 38 CNE SIDE SOUGHT TO GAIN SUPPORT FRCM OUTSIDE PARTY.
 39 ONE SIDE DID NCT SEEK EXTERNAL SUPPORT.
 40 CNE EXTERNAL PARTY HAD GIVEN BOTH SIDES MONEY AND
 MATERIAL SUPPORT.
 41 PRIMARY ALLY OF ONE SIDE DEPENDENT ON THE OTHER SIDE AND
 ITS ALLIES FOR MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT.
 42 AN OUTSIDE PARTY WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY CONTROLLED THE
 DISPUTED AREA HAD UNSUCCESSFULLY FIXED THE BORDER.
 43 BORDER HAD EARLIER BEEN SUCCESSFULLY FIXED.
 44 DISPUTE THREATENED STABILITY AND SECURITY OF THE WHOLE
 REGION.
 45 MAJCRITY GROUP OF ONE SIDE FAVORED UNION WITH
 CULTURALLY- SIMILAR COUNTRY.
 46 POLITICAL TURMCIL OF OUTSIDE PARTY INFECTED ITS BROTHERS
 IN CNE SIDE.
 47 A MILITARY RESISTANCE ORGANIZATION HAD BEEN FORMED TO
 FIGHT AN INVADER.
 48 CNE SIDE MISTRUSTED INDEPENDENT STATUS OF OTHER SIDE
 BECAUSE OF PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MILITARY BASES.
 49 THERE WERE NO FOREIGN MILITARY BASES.
 50 FORCES OF THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE IN THE DISPUTED AREA
 WERE HEAVILY DEPENDENT CN OUTSIDE LOGISTIC SUPPORT.
 51 "STATUS QUO" SIDE DID NOT HAVE MANY FORCES IN THE
 DISPUTED AREA.
 52 "STATUS QUO" SIDE HAD SUBSTANTIAL FORCES IN THE DISPUTED
 AREA.
 53 MILITARY SITUATION IN THE AREA CLFARLY IN FAVOR OF
 "STATUS QUO" SIDE.
 54 MILITARY SITUATION IN THE AREA CLEARLY IN FAVOR OF THE
 "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE.
 55 CNE SIDE HAS EXTENSIVE TRAINING AND/OR EXPERIENCE IN
 GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST TACTICS.
 56 A STRONG ALLY CF CNE SIDE HAD MILITARY FORCE IN THE
 REGION.
 57 "NCN-STATUS QUO" SIDE ABLE TO ACQUIRE LARGE STOCKS OF
 ARMS AND AMMUNITION AS A RESULT OF A PREVIOUS CONFLICT.
 58 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE HAD GENERAL MILITARY
 SUPERIORITY.
 59 THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE HAD GENERAL MILITARY SUPERIORITY.
 60 THE DISPUTED AREA WAS CF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO "STATUS
 QUO" SIDE.
 61 THE DISPUTED AREA WAS CF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO THE
 "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE.
 62 AN ACTIVE MILITARY FORCE EXWASTS WHICH IS AGAINST THE
 "NCN-STATUS QUO" SIDE ALTHOUGH NCT ALLIED WITH "STATUS
 QUO" SIDE.
 63 ONE SIDE MILITARILY WEAK AND POWERLESS TO RESIST.

64 BORDER BETWEEN SIDES WAS UNCERTAIN.
65 BORDER BETWEEN SIDES WAS CLEARLY DEFINED.
66 LEGAL STATUS OF DISPUTED AREA WAS AMBIGUOUS.
67 "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE CONCERNED WITH WORLD REACTION TO
ITS MOVES AGAINST THE OTHER SIDE.
68 WORLD OPINION FAVERED THE CAUSE OF THE "NON-STATUS QUO"
SIDE.
69 WORLD OPINION FAVERED THE CAUSE OF THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE.
70 ALREADY MUCH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION ACTIVITY TO
SETTLE THE DISPUTE PEACEFULLY.
71 THERE WAS NO INVOLVEMENT YET OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION.
72 ONE SIDE HAD SIGNED INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS THAT
PROHIBITED THREAT OR USE OF FORCE.
73 ACTION OF A REGIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION WAS WEAK.
74 ACTION OF A REGIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION WAS STRONG.
75 RACIAL DIVISIONS WITHIN THE DISPUTED AREA DIS-
ADVANTAGED THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE.
76 RACIAL DIVISIONS WITHIN THE DISPUTED AREA FAVERED THE
"NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE.
77 IMMIGRANTS FROM ONE SIDE TO DISPUTED AREA COMPETED WITH
THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION.
78 IMMIGRANTS FROM ONE SIDE TO DISPUTED AREA INCREASED
TENSION.
79 THE IMPENDING EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT HOMOGENEOUS
STATE PROVIDED FOCUS FOR ASPIRATIONS OF SIMILAR PEOPLE
LIVING ELSEWHERE.
80 ONE SIDE HAD ACCESS TO REFUGEES OR IRREGULAR FORCES OF
THE OTHER SIDE TO USE AS A PROXY FORCE.
81 AREAS ADJACENT TO "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE CONTAINED PEOPLE
WHO ASPIRED TO JOIN THEIR BRETHREN.
82 CONFLICT FOR SCARCE RESOURCES AMONG NOMADIC GROUPS
BROUGHT THEM INTO CONFLICT WITH THE NOMINAL SOVEREIGN OF
THE REGION.
83 LONG HISTORY OF DISTRUST BETWEEN ETHNIC GROUPS.
84 POPULATION IN DISPUTED AREA IS POORLY INTEGRATED.
85 LARGE AND POWERFUL PRESSURE GROUPS OF REFUGEES AND THEIR
SUPPORTERS WERE CREATED.
86 BOTH SIDES HAD ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS IN DEALING
WITH REFUGEES.
87 "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE DERIVED MUCH ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE
FROM OTHER SIDE.
88 "STATUS QUO" SIDE DERIVED MUCH ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE FROM
"NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE.
89 AREA IN DISPUTE IS ECONOMICALLY IMPORTANT TO BOTH SIDES.
90 ECONOMIC POLICY OF ONE SIDE WAS EXPLOITATIVE.
91 "STATUS QUO" SIDE WAS HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON EXTERNAL
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
92 "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE WAS DEPENDENT ON EXTERNAL ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE.
93 HISTORICALLY THE ONLY EFFECTIVE FORCE IN AREA WAS THE
"NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE.
94 "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE SOUGHT TO INTIMIDATE ITS POTENTIAL
BASE OF SUPPORT.
95 "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE ENVISIONED A POPULAR FRONT
APPROACH.
96 ONE SIDE SHIFTED FROM POPULAR FRONT APPROACH TO SEIZING
REVOLUTIONARY INITIATIVE.
97 POLITICAL PARTY IN "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE HAD CLOSE TIES
WITH PARTIES IN DISPUTED AREA.

98 MODERATE LEADERS OF "NCN-STATUS QUO" SIDE DO NOT WANT TO
APPEAR THE WEAKER CHAMPIONS FOR CHANGE.

99 CNE SIDE FEARED LOSS OF DISPUTED AREA WOULD LEAD TO LOSS
OF STATUS.

100 CNE SIDE WITNESSED SUCCESS OF OTHER GROUPS AGAINST THE
OPPOSING SIDE.

101 "STATUS QUO" SIDE MOVED TOWARD A GREATER DEGREE OF
SELF-GOVERNMENT FOR THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE.

102 "STATUS QUO" SIDE DENIED A GREATER DEGREE OF
SELF-GOVERNMENT FOR THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE.

103 ARMED FORCES OF DISPUTED AREA UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO
SUPPORT ITS GOVERNMENT.

104 INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES OF ONE SIDE INADEQUATE TO DEAL
WITH SITUATION IN DISPUTED AREA.

105 LEADERS OF ONE SIDE SHARED SAME POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AS
LEADERS IN DISPUTED AREA.

106 HEAD OF ONE SIDE HAD FAMILY TIES IN AREA OF DISPUTE.

107 THE LEADERS OF ONE SIDE WERE PREOCCUPIED WITH
CONSOLIDATING THEIR INTERNAL HEGEMONY AND RESTORING
ORDER.

108 LEADERS OF "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE DID NOT WANT TO
INTERVENE OVERTLY AGAINST THE OTHER SIDE.

109 LEADERS OF "STATUS QUO" SIDE DID NOT WANT TO INTERVENE
OVERTLY AGAINST THE OTHER SIDE.

110 THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE AVOIDED ANY DIRECT PROVOCATION

111 NOT ALL LEADERS OF THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE WERE
WILLING TO RESORT TO VIOLENCE.

112 ONE SIDE HAD BEEN FOCUSING ITS ATTENTION ON OTHER
DISPUTES.

113 BOTH SIDES EXTREMELY NATIONALISTIC.

114 ONE SIDE EXTREMELY NATIONALISTIC.

115 CNE SIDE, HAVING WON ITS INDEPENDENCE BY FORCE, REGARDED
AS FRAUDULENT ANY INDEPENDENCE WON BY AMICABLE AGREEMENT.

116 POLICY OF ONE SIDE WAS REPRESSIVE AND PROVIDED FEW
LEGITIMATE CHANNELS OF DISSENT FOR OTHER SIDE.

117 PERSONALITY AND STYLE OF LEADER OF ONE SIDE FAVORED
GRAND GESTURES.

118 THE POLICIES OF ONE SIDE CREATED THE IMPRESSION THAT IT
WAS ORIENTED TOWARD A NEIGHBORING GREAT POWER'S ENEMIES.

119 THE UNITY OF THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE SHAKEN BY A
LEADERSHIP CRISIS.

120 THE UNITY OF THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE SHAKEN BY A
LEADERSHIP CRISIS.

121 INTERNAL POLITICAL DIVISIONS WITHIN ONE SIDE LED ITS
RULING REGIME TO SEARCH FOR A UNIFYING ISSUE.

122 ONE SIDE CONSIDERED ITSELF TO HAVE A "MISSION" TO CARRY
OUT ITS POLICY.

123 ONE SIDE CONSIDERED ITSELF CULTURALLY SUPERIOR.

124 PUBLIC OPINION IN ONE SIDE SWITCHED FROM SUPPORT OF
OTHER SIDE TO OPPOSITION.

125 THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE WAS VERY COHESIVE.

126 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE WAS VERY COHESIVE.

127 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE'S BASE OF SUPPORT WAS BADLY
SPLIT.

128 THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE'S BASE OF SUPPORT WAS BADLY SPLIT.

129 MANY INDIVIDUALS ON ONE SIDE OWED ALLEGIANCE TO AN
OUTSIDE ORGANIZATION.

130 CNE SIDE, ALTHOUGH VASTLY OUTNUMBERED, HAD POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POWER AND MONOPOLIZED THE MATERIAL
BENEFITS OF THE AREA.

131 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE'S MAIN VEHICLE OF ACTION HITHERTO UNSUCCESSFUL.

132 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE'S MAIN VEHICLE OF ACTION HITHERTO SUCCESSFUL.

133 NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES DISRUPTED.

134 GOOD COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES WAS DISRUPTED.

135 LITTLE ACCURATE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE SIDES REGARDING SITUATION IN THE DISPUTED AREA.

136 ACCURATE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE SIDES REGARDING SITUATION IN THE DISPUTED AREA.

137 INCIDENTS IN THE DISPUTED AREA INCREASED IN SERIOUSNESS AND NUMBER.

138 THE PROXIMITY OF ONE SIDE TO THE DISPUTED AREA AND ITS GREATER POWER GAVE IT GREAT INFLUENCE.

139 CNE SIDE FOLLOWS A POLICY OF REPRESSION AGAINST POLITICAL GROUPS IN THE DISPUTED AREA.

140 CNE SIDE FOLLOWS A POLICY OF TOLERATION VIS A VIS POLITICAL GROUPS IN THE DISPUTED AREA.

141 CNE SIDE ENGAGING IN FomentING AND ENCOURAGING REBELLIOUS GROUPS IN THE REGION.

142 A MAJORITY OF THE RESIDENTS OF THE DISPUTED AREA REGISTER THEIR DESIRE FOR ACCESSION TO THE OTHER SIDE.

143 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" PARTY IS IN UNCHALLENGED CONTROL OF THE DISPUTED AREA.

144 THE "STATUS QUO" PARTY WAS IN UNCHALLENGED CONTROL OF THE DISPUTED AREA.

- 1 ONE SIDE FAILS TO ACHIEVE INFLUENCE OVER THE OTHER BY NON-MILITARY MEANS.
- 2 ONE SIDE SUCCEEDS IN ACHIEVING INFLUENCE OVER THE OTHER SIDE BY NON-MILITARY MEANS.
- 3 TIME GROWS SHORT DURING WHICH AN OPPORTUNITY CAN BE EXPLOITED.
- 4 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" PARTY BELIEVES THAT THE OTHER PARTY WILL NEVER YIELD TO ITS DEMANDS.
- 5 POLICE AND MILITARY MEASURES TAKEN BY ONE SIDE TO COUNTER POTENTIAL THREAT OF OTHER SIDE INCREASE LATTER'S DESIRE TO CHANGE THE STATUS QUO.
- 6 ONE SIDE AGREED TO PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS.
- 7 ONE SIDE REFUSES TO PARTICIPATE IN NEGOTIATIONS.
- 8 DEEP IDEOLOGICAL SPLIT DEVELOPES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.
- 9 THE TWO SIDES ARE NOT IDEOLOGICALLY DIVIDED.
- 10 DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS TAKE PLACE BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
- 11 ONE SIDE UNDERESTIMATES ITS OWN STRENGTH AND OVERESTIMATES THAT OF THE OTHER SIDE AND ITS ALLY.
- 12 REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH SIDE AGREE TO ARRANGE A MEETING OF THEIR LEADERS.
- 13 THE LEADERS OF ONE SIDE MAKE OVERTURES TO THE LEADER OF THE OTHER SIDE FOR A MEDIUS VIVENDI.
- 14 THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE TAKES STRONG MEASURES AGAINST THE NON-STATUS QUO SIDE AND ITS SUPPORTERS.
- 15 PUBLIC OPINION IN ONE SIDE AROUSED BY THE ACTION OF THE OTHER SIDE.
- 16 PUBLIC OPINION IN ONE SIDE IS INDIFFERENT.
- 17 ONE SIDE ACCUSED BY THE OTHER OF USING ALLIES TO SUBVERT ITS GOVERNMENT.
- 18 ONE SIDE DISCOUNTS THE THREAT OF THE OTHER SIDE'S ALLY TO INTERVENE.
- 19 MAJOR ALLY OF "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE STRONGLY PREFERS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

20 MAJOR ALLY OF "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE SHOWS NO PREFERENCE
FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.
21 U.S. PUBLIC OPINION IS GENERALLY MORE FAVORABLE TOWARD
THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE.
22 U.S. POLICY AT THIS TIME APPEARS TO BE FRIENDLY TO THE
AIMS OF THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE.
23 THE UNITED STATES IS IMPARTIAL IN THE CONFLICT AT THIS
STAGE.
24 THE UNITED STATES IS NOT IMPARTIAL IN THE CONFLICT AT
THIS STAGE.
25 OTHER SUPERPOWER(S) ARE IMPARTIAL IN THE CONFLICT AT
THIS STAGE.
26 OTHER SUPERPOWER(S) ARE NOT IMPARTIAL IN THE CONFLICT AT
THIS STAGE.
27 THE UNITED STATES URGES BOTH SIDES TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE
THROUGH DIRECT TALKS.
28 THE MAJOR ALLIES OF EACH SIDE AGREE THAT THE DISPUTED
AREA IS IN THE SPHERE OF INFLUENCE OF ONE OF THEM.
29 THE MAJOR ALLIES OF EACH SIDE ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT THAT
THE DISPUTED AREA IS IN THE SPHERE OF INFLUENCE OF ONE
OF THEM.
30 SPLITS WITHIN ONE SIDE ARE EXACERBATED BY IDEOLOGICAL
STRUGGLES WITHIN THE REGION.
31 THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE'S MAJOR ALLY IS DISTRACTED BY
OTHER CONFLICTS AND THUS GIVES RELATIVELY LOW PRIORITY
TO THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE.
32 ONE SIDE FEELS THAT AN OUTSIDE PARTY WITH MUCH INFLUENCE
IN DISPUTED AREA IS NOT FULFILLING PRIOR COMMITMENTS.
33 LEADERS OF A THIRD PARTY THAT IS ENGAGED IN A CONFLICT
WITH ONE SIDE OF THIS DISPUTE SEEK ASSISTANCE FROM THE
OTHER SIDE.
34 SOME OF THE CLASHES IN THE DISPUTED AREA INVOLVE PERSONS
NOT UNDER THE CONTROL OF EITHER SIDE.
35 ONE SIDE ENGAGED IN REPRESSIVE ACTION AGAINST NEIGHBOR
OF THE OTHER SIDE.
36 A THIRD PARTY IN A POSITION TO INFLUENCE BOTH SIDES DOES
NOT ATTEMPT TO STOP ONE SIDE FROM CARRYING OUT THIS
CONFLICT.
37 A THIRD PARTY IN A POSITION TO INFLUENCE BOTH SIDES DOES
ATTEMPT TO STOP ONE SIDE FROM CARRYING OUT THIS CONFLICT.
38 SETTLEMENT OF ANOTHER CONFLICT LEAVES THE "NON-STATUS
QUO" SIDE FREE TO CONCENTRATE ON THIS CONFLICT.
39 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE IS TIED UP IN ANOTHER CONFLICT.
40 SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS OF SIMILAR GROUPS ELSEWHERE PROVIDE A
MODEL FOR THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE.
41 NEUTRAL THIRD PARTY BELIEVED BY ONE SIDE TO BE A COVER
FOR THE OTHER SIDE.
42 THE MILITARY BALANCE IS SHARPLY IN FAVOR OF THE "STATUS
QUO" SIDE.
43 THE MILITARY BALANCE IS NOT IN FAVOR OF THE "STATUS QUO"
SIDE.
44 "STATUS QUO" SIDE HAS MILITARY SUPERIORITY IN THE
DISPUTED AREA.
45 "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE HAS MILITARY SUPERIORITY IN THE
DISPUTED AREA.
46 THE STRATEGIC INTEREST OF THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE IN THE
DISPUTED AREA INCREASES.
47 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE AGREED TO PLACE ITS MILITARY
FORCES UNDER THE COMMAND OF A NEUTRAL LEADER.
48 THERE IS A WEAK COUNTERVAILING MILITARY FORCE NEAR THE

DISPUTED AREA.

49 POLICE FORCES IN THE DISPUTED AREA ARE INADEQUATE AND REGULAR MILITARY FORCES ARE USED, THUS ALIENATING THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE.

50 ONE SIDE IS ABLE TO OBTAIN LARGE QUANTITIES OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION LEFT OVER FROM ANOTHER CONFLICT.

51 ONE SIDE SENDS TROOPS TO THE DISPUTED AREA.

52 THE STATUS QUO SIDE REINFORCED ITS GARRISON IN THE DISPUTED AREA.

53 BOTH SIDES STRENGTHEN THEIR MILITARY FORCES IN THE DISPUTED AREA.

54 ONE SIDE INCREASES ITS CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY MILITARY FORCES IN THE DISPUTED AREA.

55 BUDGET STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS PLACES A HIGH PRIORITY ON AVOIDING A SITUATION IN THE DISPUTED AREA THAT WOULD INTERFERE WITH GREAT POWER RELATIONSHIPS.

56 ONE SIDE'S MILITARY STRENGTH IS GROWING.

57 OPPOSITION PARTIES IN ONE SIDE URGE FIRMER POLICY TOWARD OTHER SIDE.

58 ONE SIDE INTERPRETES "ROUTINE" TROOP MOVEMENTS BY THE OTHER SIDE AS A THREAT.

59 IN EFFORT TO REDRESS MILITARY IMBALANCE IN THE AREA, ONE SIDE SEEKS FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE.

60 NO FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE IS SOUGHT.

61 ONE SIDE ABLE TO EXERCISE ONLY LIMITED CONTROL OVER ITS MILITARY FORCES.

62 THE UNITED NATIONS URGES THE PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT.

63 THE UNITED NATIONS TAKES ACTION OTHER THAN URGING THE PARTIES TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT.

64 THE UNITED NATIONS FAILS TO TAKE ACTION.

65 INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS EXIST TO WHICH ONE SIDE AND THE ALLIES OF THE OTHER ARE PARTIES, PROHIBITING INTERVENTION IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE OTHER SIDE.

66 REGIONAL ORGANIZATION TAKES ACTION.

67 REGIONAL ORGANIZATION FAILS TO TAKE ACTION.

68 THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL FLOW OF REFUGEES.

69 ONE SIDE REGARDS ITS INTERNAL TROUBLES WITH ETHNIC GROUPS AS HAVING BEEN INSPIRED BY THE OTHER SIDE.

70 SCALE OF CLASHES INCREASES BETWEEN ONE SIDE AND A DISSIDENT ETHNIC GROUP.

71 DISCONTENT INCREASES AMONG ONE SIDE'S ETHNIC BRETHREN WITHIN THE OTHER SIDE.

72 ONE SIDE IS COMMITTED TO PURSUE THE OBJECTIVE OF UNIFICATION OF ALL MEMBERS OF THE SAME ETHNIC GROUP.

73 THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY GROUPS IN THE DISPUTED AREA ARE GUARANTEED.

74 THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY GROUPS IN THE DISPUTED AREA ARE NOT GUARANTEED.

75 MANY ON ONE SIDE SEEKING PARTICULAR GOAL ARE LINKED ETHNICALLY WITH PEOPLE IN A NEIGHBORING COUNTRY THAT HAS ACHIEVED THE SAME GOAL.

76 MINORITY GROUP IN "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE IS NOT IN FAVOR OF CHANGING STATUS QUO.

77 THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF THE DISPUTED AREA TO BOTH SIDES INCREASES.

78 THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF THE DISPUTED AREA TO ONE SIDE INCREASES.

79 THE DISPUTED AREA DOES NOT HAVE IMPORTANT ECONOMIC VALUE.

80 ECONOMIC POLICY OF ONE SIDE IS EXPLOITATIVE.

81 "STATUS QUO" SIDE IS DEPENDENT ON EXTERNAL ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE.
82 "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE IS DEPENDENT ON EXTERNAL ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE.
83 CPPPOSITION PARTIES IN CNE SIDE ARE PRESSING FOR MORE
RAPID ACHIEVEMENT OF THE GOAL THAT WOULD ALTER THE
STATUS QUO.
84 IN THE DISPUTED AREA POPULAR SENTIMENT IS OVERWHELMINGLY
FOR A CHANGE IN THE STATUS QUO.
85 DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION OF ONE SIDE CAUSES A
HEIGHTENING OF PUBLIC ATTENTION TO THE DISPUTE.
86 POLITICAL OPPOSITION EXISTS TO GOVERNMENT IN POWER'S
POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE OTHER SIDE.
87 PUBLIC OPINION HARDENS AGAINST THE OTHER SIDE.
88 STATUS QUO SIDE AGREED TO SUBMIT THE DISPUTED QUESTION
TO A PLEBISCITE.
89 "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE AGREES TO SUBMIT THE DISPUTED
QUESTION TO A PLEBISCITE.
90 CNE SIDE'S POLICY INCREASES IN MILITANCY.
91 ONE SIDE'S POSITION IN THE DISPUTE HARDENS TO THE POINT
WHERE IT WOULD CONTEMPLATE NEGOTIATIONS ONLY IF THE
OTHER SIDE ACCEPTS ITS CLAIM.
92 CPPPOSITION PARTIES IN ONE SIDE ARE URGING THE USE OF
FORCE TO ACHIEVE THEIR SIDE'S GOAL.
93 ONE SIDE SHIFTS FROM DOWNGRADING THE DISPUTE TO
EXAGGERATING IT.
94 EXPERIENCE OF "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE PROVIDES THE
STRUCTURE, EXPERIENCE, AND MATERIAL MEANS TO CARRY ON
HOSTILITIES.
95 ONE SIDE BELIEVES THAT UNLESS ACTION IS TAKEN SOON, MORE
EXTREME ACTION WILL NEED TO BE TAKEN.
96 HUMANITARIAN MOTIVES MAKE ACTION SEEM URGENT.
97 TIES OF ONE SIDE'S LEADER TO THE DISPUTED AREA MAKE
ACTION SEEM URGENT.
98 INDIVIDUALS WITH PERSONAL STAKE IN STATUS QUO ARE
INVOLVED IN INFLAMMATORY INCIDENTS.
99 "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE DEVELOPS A STRATEGY WHICH WAS
SUCCESSFUL IN OTHER CONFLICTS.
100 "STATUS QUO" SIDE DEVELOPS A STRATEGY WHICH WAS
SUCCESSFUL IN OTHER CONFLICTS.
101 IF CNE SIDE REVERSES ITS PLANNED ACTION, THERE IS FEAR
THAT THOSE DIRECTLY INVOLVED WILL CARRY ON ANYWAY
WITHOUT CONTROLS.
102 OFFICIAL AUTHORITY OF CNE SIDE IS DIVIDED ON THE
QUESTION OF WHETHER TO DEAL WITH THE OTHER SIDE
UNYIELDINGLY OR MODERATELY.
103 ONE SIDE FEARS THAT IF IT YIELDS TO THE DEMANDS OF THE
OTHER SIDE, OTHER PARTIES WILL MAKE SIMILAR DEMANDS AND
CAUSE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION.
104 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE BELIEVED THAT IT CAN WIN
THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS.
105 THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE BELIEVES IT CAN WIN THROUGH
POLITICAL MEANS.
106 THE LEADERS OF ONE SIDE BELIEVE THAT A LIMITED AMOUNT OF
VIOLENCE WILL GIVE WEIGHT AND URGENCY TO DIPLOMATIC
EFFORTS.
107 STATUS QUO SIDE CONCERNED OVER WORLD OPINION.
108 "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE CONCERNED OVER WORLD OPINION.
109 AID RECEIVED BY CNE SIDE INCREASES PROSPECT OF ITS
BECOMING A BASE FOR PENETRATION IN THE REGION.

110 CNE SIDE WISHES TO KEEP ITS ROLE COVERT OR INDIRECT.
111 ONE SIDE IS ABLE TO OBTAIN A PROXY FORCE TO CARRY OUT
ITS POLICY.
112 ONE SIDE HAS SECTIONAL AND ETHNIC DIVISIONS.
113 MEMBERS OF ONE SIDE ARE AGITATED BY POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENTS IN OTHER AREAS OF THE REGION.
114 THE BASE OF SUPPORT FOR THE "NCN-STATUS QUO" SIDE WAS
DIVIDED ALONG RELIGIOUS LINES.
115 THE BASE OF SUPPORT FOR THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE IS DIVIDED
ALONG RELIGIOUS LINES.
116 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE IS SPLIT ALONG ETHNIC AND
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES.
117 THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE IS SPLIT ALONG ETHNIC AND CULTURAL
DIFFERENCES.
118 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE CALCULATES THAT ITS ACTION
WILL BE SUCCESSFUL.
119 THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE CALCULATES THAT ITS ACTION WILL BE
SUCCESSFUL.
120 FOR THE FIRST TIME POLITICAL GROUPS BEGIN TO EMERGE ON
ONE SIDE.
121 OPPCSITION PARTIES IN "STATUS QUO" SIDE URGE THAT IT
CONCEDE TO THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE'S DEMANDS.
122 NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES
DISRUPTED.
123 GOOD COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.
124 LITTLE ACCURATE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE SIDES
REGARDING SITUATION IN THE DISPUTED AREA.
125 ACCURATE INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE SIDES IN THE
DISPUTED AREA.
126 INCIDENTS IN THE DISPUTED AREA INCREASED IN SERIOUSNESS
AND NUMBER.
127 THE PROXIMITY OF ONE SIDE TO THE DISPUTED AREA AND ITS
GREATER POWER GAVE IT GREAT INFLUENCE.
128 CNE SIDE FOLLOWS A POLICY OF REPRESION AGAINST
POLITICAL GROUPS IN THE DISPUTED AREA.
129 CNE SIDE FOLLOWS A POLICY OF TOLERATION VIS-A-VIS
POLITICAL GROUPS IN THE DISPUTED AREA.
130 ONE SIDE USES ITS MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE DISPUTED AREA
TO PURSUE LONG-HELD LONG-RANGE IDEOLOGICAL, POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, AND STRATEGIC GOALS.
131 CNE SIDE ENGAGING IN FOMENTING AND ENCOURAGING
REBELLIOUS GROUPS IN THE REGION.
132 CNE SIDE CHARGES THAT THE OTHER HAS FOMENTED A REVOLT
WITHIN ITS TERRITORY.
133 A MAJORITY OF THE RESIDENTS OF THE DISPUTED AREA
REGISTER THEIR DESIRE FOR ACCESSION TO THE OTHER SIDE.
134 EACH SIDE ESTABLISHES MILITARY POSTS IN TERRITORY
CLAIMED BY THE OTHER.
135 BOTH SIDES TO THE DISPUTE REINFORCE THEIR BORDER
GARRISONS.
136 ONE SIDE TO THE DISPUTE REINFORCES ITS BORDER GARRISONS.
137 MINOR INCIDENTS OCCUR ALONG THE BORDER BETWEEN THE TWO
SIDES.
138 CNE OR BOTH QUICKEN THE PACE OF BUILDING BORDER POSTS
AND EXTENDING THEM INTO TERRITORY CLAIMED BY THE OTHER.
139 CNE SIDE REFUSES TO INTERVENE IN DISPUTED AREA UNLESS
LEADER IN THAT AREA ACCEED TO ITS DEMANDS.
140 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" PARTY IS IN UNCHALLENGED CONTROL OF
THE DISPUTED AREA.
141 THE "STATUS QUO" PARTY IS IN UNCHALLENGED CONTROL OF THE
DISPUTED AREA.

Full Factors, Phase 3

- 1 "STATUS QUO" SIDE REMOVES LEADER OF OTHER SIDE WHO COULD HAVE RESTRAINING INFLUENCE.
- 2 ONE SIDE WARNS OTHER THAT ANY OFFENSIVE ACTION IN THE DISPUTED AREA WILL RESULT IN WAR.
- 3 LEADER ON ONE SIDE HEEDS WARNING THAT HARSH MEASURES WILL RESULT IN ACTION BY THE OTHER SIDE.
- 4 LEADER OF ONE SIDE DESIRES TO AVOID WAR WITH OTHER SIDE.
- 5 BOTH SIDES APPEAR TO HAVE LIMITED OBJECTIVES IN THE HOSTILITIES.
- 6 ONE OR BOTH DO NOT APPEAR TO HAVE LIMITED OBJECTIVES IN THE HOSTILITIES.
- 7 THE SIDES AND THEIR SUPPORTERS ARE WILLING TO SEEK A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.
- 8 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE INDICATES A WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS AN END TO HOSTILITIES.
- 9 NEGOTIATIONS AMONG SIDES ARE GOING ON.
- 10 LEADER ON ONE SIDE ANNOUNCES A CEASE FIRE.
- 11 LEADER ON ONE SIDE CALLS FOR A SUMMIT MEETING OF INVOLVED PARTIES.
- 12 THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE MAKES SOME CONCESSIONS TO THE OTHER SIDE.
- 13 THE DANGERS OF ALL-OUT WAR WHICH BOTH SIDES WANTED TO AVOID ARE INCREASED WHEN HOSTILITIES SPILL OUT OF THE DISPUTED AREA.
- 14 HOSTILITIES HAVE NOT YIELDED ANY SIGNIFICANT ADVANCE TOWARD THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE'S GOAL.
- 15 "STATUS QUO" SIDE IS RALLYING SUPPORT OF SOME MEMBERS OF THE OTHER SIDE.
- 16 NEITHER SIDE MAKES AN EFFORT TO PENETRATE DEEPLY INTO THE OTHER'S TERRITORY.
- 17 ONE OR BOTH SIDES TRY TO PENETRATE DEEPLY INTO THE OTHER'S TERRITORY.
- 18 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE IS UNSUCCESSFUL IN ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH A RIVAL GOVERNMENT TO THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE.
- 19 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE IS SUCCESSFUL IN ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH A RIVAL GOVERNMENT TO THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE.
- 20 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE HAS ACHIEVED ITS PRIMARY GOALS.
- 21 A GREAT POWER'S DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT OF ONE SIDE ENCOURAGES LATTER TO CONTINUE THE STRUGGLE.
- 22 GREAT POWER GIVES STATUS QUO SIDE SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.
- 23 GREAT POWER GIVES "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.
- 24 MAJOR POWERS MOVE TO SUPPLY THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE WITH ARMS AND EQUIPMENT TO REDRESS IMBALANCE.
- 25 MAJOR POWERS MOVE TO SUPPLY THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE WITH ARMS AND EQUIPMENT TO REDRESS IMBALANCE.
- 26 GREAT POWER INTEREST IN THE AREA INCREASES.
- 27 A GREAT POWER URGES ONE SIDE TO AVOID ACTION THAT MIGHT DEVELOP INTO A FULL-SCALE WAR.
- 28 ARRIVAL OF ARMS IN ONE SIDE RAISES THE PROSPECT OF A WIDER WAR.
- 29 STRONG SUPERPOWER DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT TO "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE.
- 30 GREAT POWER SUPPORTER OF "STATUS QUO" SIDE CONTEMPLATES INTERVENTION.
- 31 GREAT POWER SUPPORTER OF "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE CONTEMPLATES INTERVENTION.
- 32 A GREAT POWER INDICATES GROWING INTEREST IN TERMINATION

OF HOSTILITIES AND NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.
 33 GREAT POWERS TAKE COMMON STAND OF INSISTING ON A CEASE
 FILE AND AVOIDANCE OF INTENSIFICATION.
 34 THE PRESTIGE OF A SUPERPOWER IS PERCEIVED AS BEING
 COMMITTED TO SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT.
 35 GREAT POWER SUPPORTER OF "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE REFUSES
 TO ASSURE THAT SIDE OF ASSISTANCE.
 36 GREAT POWER SUPPORTER OF "STATUS QUO" SIDE REFUSES TO
 ASSURE THAT SIDE OF ASSISTANCE.
 37 A SUPERPOWER APPEARS TO BE NEUTRAL ON THE CONFLICT.
 38 A SUPERPOWER IS FEARFUL THAT THE CONFLICT WILL GROW INTO
 A MUCH WIDER WAR.
 39 ONE SIDE RECEIVES ASSISTANCE FROM ONE OF ITS SUPPORTERS.
 40 COUNTRIES ON WHOM THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE IS DEPENDENT
 ARE UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO FURTHER SUPPORT.
 41 COUNTRIES ON WHOM THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE IS DEPENDENT ARE
 UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO GIVE FURTHER SUPPORT.
 42 USE OF FORCE BY ONE SIDE ALIENATES POTENTIAL ALLIES.
 43 ARMED FORCES OF SUPPORTERS OF BOTH SIDES DO NOT BECOME
 INVOLVED.
 44 ARMED FORCES OF SUPPORTERS OF BOTH SIDES BECOME INVOLVED.
 45 SUPPORTER OF ONE SIDE THREATENS UNILATERAL INTERVENTION.
 46 OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION PROVIDE TRAINING
 FACILITIES AND BASES OF OPERATION FOR THE "NON-STATUS
 QUO" SIDE.
 47 OTHER STATES IN THE REGION GIVE MATERIAL SUPPORT TO
 "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE.
 48 EXTERNAL PRESSURES FOR TERMINATION DEVELOP ALMOST AS
 SOON AS FIGHTING BREAKS OUT.
 49 AFTER MAJOR ALLY OF ONE SIDE RELINQUISHED ITS ROLE, THAT
 SIDE WAS ABLE TO OBTAIN ANOTHER ALLY.
 50 AFTER MAJOR ALLY OF ONE SIDE RELINQUISHED ITS ROLE, THAT
 SIDE WAS NOT ABLE TO OBTAIN ANOTHER ALLY.
 51 OUTSIDE PARTIES CARRY OUT THEIR THREAT TO HALT MILITARY
 ASSISTANCE TO BOTH SIDES.
 52 BOTH SIDES SOMEWHAT DEPENDENT FOR ASSISTANCE ON OUTSIDE
 PARTY THAT PRESSES FOR AN END TO HOSTILITIES.
 53 DESPITE MILITARY VICTORY, ALLY OF ONE SIDE UNWILLING TO
 ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE DEFINITIVE SOLUTION.
 54 MAJOR ALLY OF ONE SIDE RESPONDS TO ATTACKS WITH LARGE
 REINFORCEMENTS.
 55 PROLONGED OR INTENSIFIED HOSTILITIES MAY BRING INTO
 OPERATION A MUTUAL SECURITY AGREEMENT OF WHICH ONE SIDE
 IS A MEMBER.
 56 "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE FEARFUL OF INTENTIONS OF POTENTIAL
 ALLY.
 57 TROOPS OF INTERESTED PARTIES WHICH ARE PRESENT IN
 DISPUTED AREA FORM A PEACEKEEPING FORCE.
 58 THE SCOPE OF ONE SIDE'S ALLY'S MILITARY MISSION HAS
 EXPANDED FROM ITS INITIAL ROLE OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT TO
 ADVICE ON MILITARY OPERATIONS.
 59 MODERATING THIRD-PARTY FORCES IN THE DISPUTED AREA BEGIN
 TO PHASE OUT.
 60 MILITARY ACTION BY ONE SIDE BRINGS ITS TROOPS INTO
 COMBAT WITH ALLIES OF THE OTHER SIDE.
 61 MOVE BY ONE SIDE AGAINST THE OTHER SIDE'S SUPPLY LINES
 RISKS PRECIPITATING A RETALIATING MOVE.
 62 FOREIGN OFFICERS IN ONE SIDE'S ARMED FORCES THREATEN TO
 WITHDRAW IF THAT SIDE ENGAGES IN CONTINUED MILITARY
 ACTIVITIES.

63 NEITHER SIDE IS ABLE TO OBTAIN A DECISIVE MILITARY VICTORY AT THE LEVEL OF COMMITMENT AND RISK EACH WAS WILLING TO ACCEPT.

64 AS ONE SIDE'S ARMED FORCES GROW RAPIDLY, THE QUALITY OF TRAINING HAS BEEN SACRIFICED.

65 "STATUS QUO" SIDE'S FORCES OFFER INEFFECTIVE RESISTANCE AND ARE UNABLE TO STOP OR DEFLECT ATTACK OF "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE.

66 FORCE IS BEING USED, NOT WITH THE EXPECTATION OF MILITARY VICTORY, BUT TO ADD STRENGTH TO DIPLOMACY BY THREATENING INTENSIFICATION TO A WIDER WAR.

67 COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF ONE SIDE'S ARMY ADVISES AGAINST MORE MILITARY ACTIVITY.

68 AS A MILITARY FORCE, ONE SIDE NEVER SUCCEEDED IN MOVING BEYOND TERRORISM AND ISOLATED GUERRILLA "POCKETS."

69 ONE SIDE UNABLE TO CUT OFF SUPPLY OF ARMS TO OTHER SIDE.

70 ONE SIDE RESORTS TO GUERRILLA WARFARE.

71 THE TERRAIN IS NOT SUITABLE FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE.

72 RELATIVELY UNCONTROLLABLE MILITARY AND PARA-MILITARY UNITS ACT ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE.

73 MILITARY ACTIVITY OF ONE SIDE PROVES MORE EFFECTIVE THAN IN THE PAST, THUS DISCOURAGING OTHER SIDE FROM BELIEVING IT COULD WIN A MILITARY VICTORY.

74 MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES REMAINS HEAVILY IN FAVOR OF ONE OF THEM.

75 ONE SIDE HAS VERY WEAK MILITARY FORCES.

76 ONE SIDE CONTINUES TO HAVE OVERWHELMING MILITARY PREPONDERANCE IN THE AREA.

77 FORCES OF ONE SIDE IN THE AREA OUTNUMBER OTHER SIDE AND WERE BETTER TRAINED, LED, EQUIPPED, AND SUPPLIED FOR THE TERRAIN IN WHICH THE FIGHTING OCCURS.

78 THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE HAS THE MILITARY ADVANTAGE.

79 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE HAS THE MILITARY ADVANTAGE.

80 RAIDS BY ONE SIDE INTO TERRITORY OF OTHER SIDE FAIL TO INFILTRATE MILITARY DAMAGE.

81 ONE SIDE FINDS IT NECESSARY TO COMMIT MORE TROOPS THAN HAD BEEN ANTICIPATED.

82 MILITARILY THE HOSTILITIES ARE INCONCLUSIVE.

83 THE MANNER IN WHICH FIGHTING BREAKS OUT SUGGESTS THAT NEITHER SIDE PLANNED A MAJOR MILITARY OPERATION AT THAT TIME AND HOSTILITIES ARE LARGEMLY ACCIDENTAL.

84 ONE SIDE FEELS THAT A CEASE FIRE IN PLACE WOULD LEAVE THE OTHER SIDE'S TROOPS TOO CLOSE.

85 "STATUS QUO" SIDE USES ITS SUPERIOR MILITARY POWER TO WIN MILITARY VICTORY.

86 "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE USES ITS SUPERIOR MILITARY POWER TO WIN MILITARY VICTORY.

87 STATES WITH GREATEST INFLUENCE ON THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE ARE CONSTRAINED FROM EXERTING PRESSURE BY LARGER STRATEGIC CONCERNS.

88 CONCERNS THAT LEAD TO THE INITIAL INTERVENTION BY ONE SIDE REMAINED, BUT THE FORCES COMMITTED WERE UNABLE TO SECURE THEIR OBJECTIVES.

89 THE STRATEGIC INTERESTS OF ONE SIDE THAT LEAD TO ITS INTERVENTION IN HOSTILITIES CONTINUE TO BE IMPORTANT.

90 ONLY A SMALL PROPORTION OF EACH SIDE'S FORCES ARE ENGAGED.

91 A LARGE PROPORTION OF EACH SIDE'S FORCES ARE ENGAGED.

92 THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF ONE SIDE INCREASES.

93 THE MILITARY TACTICS PURSUED BY THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE

TEND TO RESTRICT THE SCALE AND SCPE OF HOSTILITIES AT THIS TIME.

94 ARMS AVAILABLE TO "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE ARE PRIMITIVE AND FEW, ALSO TRAINING AND ORGANIZATION ARE WEAK.

95 HOSTILITIES HAVING BROKEN OUT ALMOST ACCIDENTALLY, NEITHER SIDE IS IN A PCSITCN TO FOLLOW UP.

96 THE UNITED NATIONS BEGINS TO ASSERT ITSELF STRONGLY.

97 THE UNITED NATIONS DOES NOT ASSERT ITSELF STRONGLY.

98 THE UNITED NATIONS MAINTAINS PRESSURE FOR AN IMMEDIATE CEASEFIRE WITHOUT POLITICAL PRECONDITIONS.

99 THE UNITED NATIONS IS ACTIVELY SEEKING A POLITICAL FORMULA TO END THE HOSTILITIES.

100 LEADERSHIP OF "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE IS ANXIOUS TO TAKE THE CONFLICT TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

101 LEADERSHIP OF THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE IS ANXIOUS TO TAKE THE CONFLICT TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

102 THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL URGES RESTRAINT ON BOTH SIDES.

103 ONE SIDE WITHDRAWS FROM INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.

104 SECURITY MEMBERS FAVOR CESSION OF HOSTILITIES AND NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

105 A GREAT POWER VETOES UNITED NATION SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION CALLING ON ADVERSARIES TO RESPECT EACH OTHER'S INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

106 SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTS A RESOLUTION DEMANDING A CEASE FIRE.

107 THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY DECLINES TO PLACE THE QUESTION ON ITS AGENDA.

108 THE UNITING FOR PEACE RESOLUTION ENABLES THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO BE CONVENED IN VERY SHORT ORDER.

109 GENERAL ASSEMBLY FAVORS END TO HOSTILITIES.

110 THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY DISCUSSES THE CONFLICT BUT TAKES NO ACTION.

111 THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY CREATES AN INVESTIGATION BODY.

112 THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONDEMNS SUPPORTERS OF THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE.

113 A U.N. BODY CONDEMNS SUPPORTERS OF THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE.

114 UNITED NATIONS AGREES TO SEND A PEACEKEEPING FORCE TO THE DISPUTED AREA.

115 PLANS FOR A UNITED NATIONS FORCE ARE ELARORATED AND CONTINGENTS COMMITTED.

116 THE U.N. CREATES A U.N. FORCE TO PERFORM THE TASK FOR WHICH THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE CLAIMED ITS ACTION WAS UNDERTAKEN.

117 THE U.N. CREATES A BODY TO MAKE AN ON-THE-SPOT REPORT AND TO FACILITATE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS.

118 U.N. CEASE FIRE RESCLUTION RESULTS IN AGREEMENT BY ADVERSARIES ON CEASE FIRE.

119 BOTH SIDES AGREE TO HAVE THE UNITED NATIONS ASCERTAIN THE WISHES OF POPULATION IN DISPUTED AREA.

120 THE UNITED NATIONS PROVIDES A FOCUS FOR WORLD ATTENTION TO DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DISPUTED AREA.

121 DEBATE IN THE UN PROVIDES OPPORTUNITY FOR MANY STATES TO REGISTER THEIR INTEREST IN PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

122 REGIONAL ORGANIZATION OF WHICH ADVERSARIES ARE MEMBERS OFFERS TO MEDIATE THE CONFLICT.

123 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION BODY IS SLOW IN GETTING TO THE DISPUTED AREA.

124 REFUGEES FROM ONE SIDE RETURN TO CARRY OUT RAIDS.

125 VIOLENCE OCCURS BETWEEN ETHNIC GROUPS WITHIN COUNTRY SUPPORTING ONE SIDE.

126 RIOTS BETWEEN ETHNIC GROUPS IN ONE SIDE RAISE DOUBT ABOUT THE VIABILITY OF THAT SIDE.

127 ETHNIC RIVALRIES EXIST IN "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE.

128 ETHNIC RIVALRIES EXIST IN "STATUS QUO" SIDE.

129 BOTH SIDES ARE WORRIED ABOUT EFFECTS OF THEIR MILITARY ACTIVITY ON HOSTILE ETHNIC GROUPS IN DISPUTED AREA.

130 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE FACES ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AS A RESULT OF HOSTILITIES.

131 THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE FACES ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AS A RESULT OF HOSTILITIES.

132 GREAT POWER ALLY OF "STATUS QUO" SIDE THREATENS IT WITH CUT IN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

133 GREAT POWER ALLY OF "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE THREATENS IT WITH CUT IN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

134 GREAT POWERS THREATEN TO WITHDRAW ECONOMIC AID FROM BOTH SIDES UNLESS CEASEFIRE INSTITUTED.

135 THE NEED TO COUNTER THE OTHER SIDE'S ACTIVITIES WEAKENS THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND FINANCIAL SITUATION OF ONE SIDE.

136 ADVANCES BY ONE SIDE THREATEN IMPORTANT ECONOMIC RESOURCE AREA OF OTHER.

137 THE COSTS OF HOSTILITIES FOR BOTH SIDES ARE BECOMING BURDENSOME, ESPECIALLY IN TERMS OF OTHER DESIRED GOALS.

138 PUBLIC OPINION ON ONE SIDE RALLIES IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE OTHER SIDE.

139 PUBLIC OPINION COMES TO FAVOR THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE.

140 PUBLIC OPINION COMES TO FAVOR THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE

141 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE CREATES A RIVAL GOVERNMENT.

142 THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE THAT INTERNAL UNREST WILL BE TRIGGERED BY CONTINUATION OF HOSTILITIES.

143 INTERNAL UNREST IS LIKELY TO BE TRIGGERED BY CONTINUATION OF HOSTILITIES.

144 HEAVY DOMESTIC PRESSURE BEING GENERATED IN THE NON-STATUS QUO SIDE TO CEASE HOSTILITIES.

145 OPPOSITION IN ONE SIDE TO DOMESTIC POLICY INCREASES AS THE SCALE OF VIOLENCE RISES.

146 LEADERS OF ONE SIDE ASSURE OTHER SIDE THAT NONE OF FORMER'S REGULAR FORCES WILL BE USED TO OVERTHROW LATTER.

147 "STATUS QUO" SIDE MOVES TO COUNTER VIOLENCE BY ARRESTS AND STRONG REPRISALS.

148 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE WINS POLITICAL CONCESSIONS.

149 FROM TIME TO TIME EXTREMIST POLITICAL GROUPS IN BOTH SIDES GAIN CONTROL OVER POLICY.

150 ONE SIDE IS ABLE TO DRAMATIZE ITS POSITION BY AN INTERNATIONAL INCIDENT.

151 "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE'S PURSUIT OF ITS GOALS BY PEACEFUL MEANS HAS ACHIEVED NO SUCCESS.

152 "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE'S PURSUIT OF ITS GOALS BY PEACEFUL MEANS HAS ACHIEVED SUCCESS.

153 ONE SIDE FEELS A GREAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FATE OF ITS PROXY FORCES.

154 SOME MILITARY OFFICERS ON ONE SIDE BELIEVED THAT A MILITARY SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM IS POSSIBLE.

155 OPPOSITION WITHIN THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE REACHES INTO HIGH LEVELS OF THE MILITARY.

156 DESPITE ONE SIDE'S HOPES TO KEEP ITS ROLE COVERT, ITS PRIME ROLE IN THE MILITARY ACTION WAS WIDELY ASSUMED.

157 SPLITS WITHIN ONE SIDE BECOME OPEN RIFTS.

158 THERE IS EMERGING WITHIN ONE SIDE A COALITION IN OPPOSITION TO THE PARTY IN POWER.

159 CNE SIDE IDEOLOGICALLY COMMITTED TO PROLONGING THE FIGHT
160 AS LONG AS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST LINE DICTATED.
161 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE'S MILITARY AND TERRITORIAL
162 OBJECTIVES APPEAR TO BE LIMITED.
163 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE'S MILITARY AND TERRITORIAL
164 OBJECTIVES DO NOT APPEAR TO BE LIMITED.
165 THE MAIN THRUST OF CNE SIDE'S POLICY IS TO ISOLATE THE
166 OTHER SIDE FROM ITS BASE OF SUPPORT.
167 PROLONDATION OF HOSTILITIES ERODES RESOURCES OF ONE SIDE.
168 THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE MISINTERPRETS THE NATURE OF EVENTS
169 IN DISPUTED AREA.
170 ONE SIDE BECOMES OVER-CONFIDENT AND TRIES TO SEEK A
171 MILITARY SOLUTION.
172 "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE RESORTS TO GUERRILLA WAR.
173 INITIAL MISSION OF CNE SIDE CONCEIVED AS BEING LIMITED
174 AND FOR HUMANITARIAN REASON.
175 SPLITS OCCUR IN THE LEADERSHIP OF ONE SIDE.
176 UNITY OF ONE SIDE IS REINFORCED BY ACTION BY MEMBERS OF
177 THAT SIDE AGAINST SUSPECTED DISLOYAL COMPATRIOTS.
178 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE'S HOPE FOR FUTURE POLITICAL
179 GAINS IS NOT FULFILLED.
180 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE IS NOT PREPARED TO ACT
181 INDEPENDENTLY.
182 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE DENIES ANY CONNECTION WITH THE
183 HOSTILITIES.
184 ACTIONS OF COUNTRY SUPPORTING ONE SIDE GIVE SUBSTANCE TO
185 THAT COUNTRY'S THREAT TO INTERVENE.
186 PUBLIC OPINION IN "STATUS QUO" SIDE FAVORS A NEGOTIATED
187 SETTLEMENT.
188 THERE IS AN IDEOLOGICAL SPLIT AMONG THE SUPPORTERS OF
189 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE.
190 THERE IS AN IDEOLOGICAL SPLIT AMONG THE SUPPORTERS OF
191 THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE.
192 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE LACKS THE SUPPORT IT THOUGHT
193 IT HAD IN THE DISPUTED AREA.
194 THE "STATUS QUO" SIDE LACKS THE SUPPORT IT THOUGHT IT
195 HAD IN THE DISPUTED AREA.
196 COMMUNICATIONS ARE FREQUENT BETWEEN THE ADVERSARIES.
197 COMMUNICATIONS ARE POOR BETWEEN THE ADVERSARIES.
198 COMMUNICATIONS ARE INADEQUATE BETWEEN POLITICAL LEADER
199 OF CNE SIDE AND ITS MILITARY FORCES IN THE FIELD.
200 CNE SIDE LACKS ACCURATE INFORMATION ON MAGNITUDE OF
201 FORCES NEEDED TO CARRY OUT ITS ARMED POLICY.
202 SOME OFFICERS IN ARMED FORCES OF BOTH SIDES ARE CITIZENS
203 OF AN OUTSIDE PARTY AND THEREFORE PROVIDE A CHANNEL OF
204 COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE OPPOSING FORCES.
205 INITIAL HOSTILITIES FAIL TO DELAY CHANGE IN STATUS QUO.
206 GEOGRAPHY OF DISPUTED AREA MAKES IT DIFFICULT TO PREVENT
207 ONE SIDE FROM BRINGING IN REINFORCEMENTS.
208 PRACTICAL GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITS IN THE DISPUTED AREA MAKE
209 EXTENDED OPERATIONS DIFFICULT.
210 ONE SIDE HAD A SANCTUARY IN AN AREA WHOSE TERRAIN MADE
211 IT DIFFICULT FOR OTHER SIDE TO REACH.
212 THE GEOGRAPHIC ISOLATION OF THE DISPUTED AREA COMPELS
213 THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE TO CONDUCT HOSTILITIES AT
214 RELATIVELY LOW LEVEL.
215 THE NATURE OR LOCATION OF THE "NON-STATUS QUO" SIDE'S
216 ATTACK WEAKENS ITS CLAIM TO BE SUPPORTING GROUPS IN
217 DISPUTED AREA.
218 SUPPORTERS OF "STATUS QUO" SIDE IN THE DISPUTED AREA

191 : BEGAN TO TURN AGAINST THAT SIDE.
191 EACH SIDE CLAIMS THAT THE OTHER IS THE AGGRESSOR AND ITS
192 CWN ACTIONS SOLELY DEFENSIVE.
192 STRCNG INTERESTS OF ONE SIDE IN THE DISPUTED AREA ARE
193 THREATENED BY ACTIONS OF THE OTHER SIDE.
193 THERE IS UNITED OPPOSITION TO THE "NCN-STATUS QUO"
194 SIDE'S ACTION.
194 THE ADMINISTRATION IN AREA OF ONE SIDE NEAR DISPUTED
195 AREA IS UNABLE TO PREVENT MILITARY ACTIVITY.
195 ONE SIDE THINKS IT HAS PROOF OF THE OTHER SIDE'S
196 COMPLICITY IN MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE DISPUTED AREA.
196 RAIDS BY ONE SIDE INTO DISPUTED AREA ARE NOT SUCCESSFUL
197 EITHER IN CAUSING SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE OR PROVOKING LOCAL
197 UNREST.
197 FORCES OF ONE SIDE SUFFICIENT TO CONTROL RAIDING GROUPS
IN THE DISPUTED AREA.

Shortened Factors, Phase 1

1 COMPETING CLAIMS.
2 AGENT INFILTRATION OF ONE SIDE.
3 RESISTANCE ABSORBS MOST NON-COMMUNIST ELEMENTS.
4 POLITICAL CONTROL BY OTHER SIDE.
5 LEGACY OF GOODWILL BETWEEN SIDES.
6 PREVIOUS AGREEMENT FOR FUTURE SETTLEMENTS.
7 FRIENDLY RELATIONS SOUGHT.
8 SIDES HISTORIC ENEMIES.
9 SUSPICION OF INTENTIONS.
10 OPPOSITION TO FORM OF GOVERNMENT IN OTHER SIDE.
11 SENSITIVITY TO ACTIONS OF OTHER SIDE.
12 NOSTALGIA OF LOST EMPIRE.
13 SQ HAD PREVIOUS SUCCESS.
14 REVOLT IN DISPUTED AREA.
15 COMMUNIST PARTY IN NSQ STRONGEST.
16 NO OPEN SUPPORT FOR ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTION.
17 PREOCCUPATION WITH OTHER PROBLEMS.
18 PREVIOUS REGIME IDENTIFIED WITH OTHER SIDE.
19 NSQ HAS FACED SEPARATIST CHALLENGES.
20 LEADER OF AREA PROPOSES DELAY.
21 ALLY DEMONSTRATE WILL BE USE FORCE.
22 STRONG ALLY UNWILLING TO USE FORCE.
23 FOREIGN TROOPS INTRODUCED.
24 WEST DOES NOT ENCOURAGE RELATIONS.
25 GREAT POWER ENCOURAGES RELATIONS.
26 POSSIBILITY OF NSQ BECOMING SUBVERSION BASE.
27 NSQ ISOLATED FROM DIRECT SUPPORT.
28 NSQ RECEIVES SUPPORT PRIOR TO DISPUTE.
29 RELUCTANCE OF GREAT POWERS TO BECOME INVOLVED.
30 SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION FOR NSQ FAVOR.
31 NSQ RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST POWERS INCREASE.
32 SINO-SOVIET INTERESTS COINCIDE WITH NSQ'S.
33 NO SINO-SOVIET ALIGNMENT RESTRAIN NSQ'S.
34 SQ ALLIES DO NOT FAVOR ITS POLICY.
35 ATTENTION ON CONFLICT WITH OUTSIDE PARTY.
36 BUFFER STATES OCCUPIED.
37 NATIONALIST HOPES STIMULATED.
38 OUTSIDE SUPPORT SOUGHT.
39 ONE SIDE DID NOT SEEK SUPPORT.
40 BOTH SIDES HAD RECEIVED AID FROM SAME PARTY.
41 MAJOR ALLY OF NSQ DEPENDENT ON SQ.
42 BORDERS UNSUCCESSFULLY FIXED.
43 BORDER FIXED EARLIER.
44 STABILITY OF REGION THREATENED.
45 UNION WITH OTHER COUNTRY FAVORED.
46 OUTSIDE TURMOIL INFECTS ONE SIDE.
47 COMMUNIST CONTROLLED MILITARY RESISTANCE.
48 MILITARY BASES CAUSE MISTRUST.
49 NO FOREIGN MILITARY BASES.
50 SQ DEPENDS ON OUTSIDE LOGISTIC SUPPORT.
51 SQ HAS LITTLE FORCES IN AREA.
52 SQ SIDE HAD FORCES IN AREA.
53 MILITARY SITUATION FAVORS SQ.
54 MILITARY SITUATION FAVORS NSQ.
55 GUERRILLA AND TERRORIST TACTICS.
56 ALLY HAS MILITARY FORCE IN REGION.
57 NSQ ACQUIRES ARMS AND AMMUNITION.
58 NSQ SUPERIOR MILITARY.
59 SQ HAS MILITARY SUPERIORITY.

60 AREA OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO SQ.
61 AREA OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO ONE SIDE.
62 MILITARY FORCE EXISTS AGAINST NSQ.
63 ONE SIDE MILITARILY WEAK.
64 BORDER UNCERTAIN.
65 BORDER CLEARLY DEFINED.
66 AMBIGUOUS STATUS OF DISPUTED AREA.
67 NSQ CONCERNED WITH WORLD REACTION.
68 WORLD OPINION FAVORS NSQ.
69 WORLD OPINION FAVORS SQ.
70 INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY FOR SETTLEMENT.
71 WORLD ORGANIZATION NOT INVOLVED.
72 NSQ PART OF AGREEMENT PROHIBITING FORCE.
73 ACTION OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATION WEAK.
74 ACTION OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATION STRONG.
75 MEMBERSHIP OF NSQ RESTRICTED RACIALLY.
76 RACIAL DIVISIONS FAVOR NSQ.
77 IMMIGRANTS COMPETE WITH INDIGENOUS POPULATION.
78 IMMIGRANTS INTENSIFY DEMANDS.
79 EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT STATE.
80 SQ HAS ACCESS TO PROXY FORCES.
81 POPULAR ASPIRATION TO JOIN NSQ.
82 CONFLICT FOR SCARCE RESOURCES.
83 MUTUAL DISTRUST BETWEEN ETHNIC GROUPS.
84 POPULATION POORLY INTEGRATED.
85 POWERFUL INTERNAL REFUGEE GROUPS.
86 REFUGEES CAUSE SEVERE SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.
87 NSQ DERIVED ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE FROM SQ.
88 SQ GETS ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE FROM NSQ.
89 AREA OF ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE.
90 EXPLOITATIVE ECONOMIC POLICY.
91 SQ DEPENDS ON OUTSIDE ECONOMIC AID.
92 NSQ DEPENDENT ON EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE.
93 NSQ ONLY EFFECTIVE FORCE FOR LONG TIME.
94 NSQ INTIMIDATES ITS BASE OF SUPPORT.
95 NSQ ENVISIONED POPULAR SUPPORT.
96 COMMUNIST SEIZE REVOLUTIONARY INITIATIVE.
97 NSQ HAS COMMUNIST TIES WITH AREA.
98 NO ACTION BY MODERATE WITHIN NSQ.
99 FEAR OF LOSS OF STATUS.
100 ONE SIDE WITNESSED PREVIOUS DEFEAT OF OTHER SIDE.
101 SQ GIVES MORE SELF-GOVERNMENT TO NSQ.
102 SQ DENIES SELF-GOVERNMENT TO NSQ.
103 ARMED FORCES DO NOT SUPPORT RULER.
104 INADEQUATE INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES.
105 LEADERS SHARE POLITICAL IDEOLOGY.
106 FAMILY TIES TO DISPUTE AREA.
107 ONE SIDE OCCUPIED WITH INTERNAL ORDER.
108 NSQ DOES NOT WANT OVERT INTERVENTION.
109 NSQ DOES NOT WANT OVERT INTERVENTION.
110 NSQ AVOIDS DIRECT PROVOCATION.
111 NSQ DOES NOT FULLY AGREE ON VIOLENCE.
112 FOCUS ON OTHER DISPUTES.
113 EXTREME NATIONALISM.
114 ONE SIDE NATIONALISTIC.
115 DISTRUST OF AMICABLE INDEPENDENCE.
116 REPRESSIVE POLICY.
117 NSQ LEADER FAVORS GRAND GESTURES.
118 REGIME COMMUNIST-ORIENTED.
119 LEADERSHIP CRISIS IN NSQ.

120 LEADERSHIP CRISES IN SQ.
121 RULERS SEARCH FOR UNIFYING ISSUE.
122 "MISSION" TO BE CARRIED OUT.
123 CNE SIDE CONSIDERED ITSELF CULTURALLY SUPERIOR.
124 STRONG POPULAR FEELINGS AGAINST OPPOSIDE LEADER.
125 SQ VERY COHESIVE.
126 NSQ VERY COHESIVE.
127 NSQ BASE OF SUPPORT SPLIT.
128 SQ BASE OF SUPPORT SPLIT.
129 ALLEGIANCE OWNED TO OUTSIDE PARTY.
130 MINORITY SIDE MONOPOLIZED AREA BENEFITS.
131 NSC SO FAR UNSUCCESSFUL.
132 NSQ SUCCESSFUL SO FAR.
133 DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS DISPUTED.
134 COMMUNICATIONS WERE DISRUPTED.
135 LITTLE INFORMATION AVAILABLE.
136 ACCURATE INFORMATION AVAILABLE.
137 INCIDENTS INCREASE IN SERIOUSNESS AND NUMBER.
138 INFLUENCE DUE TO PROXIMITY AND NATIONAL POWER.
139 REPRESSION OF POLITICAL GROUPS.
140 TOLERATION OF POLITICAL GROUPS.
141 ENCOURAGEMENT OF REBELLIOUS GROUPS IN REGION.
142 DESIRE FOR ACCESION TO OTHER SIDE.
143 NSC IN CONTROL OF DISPUTED AREA.
144 SQ IN CONTROL OF DISPUTED AREA.

Shortened factors, Phase 2

- 1 NON-MILITARY CHANNELS FAIL.
- 2 NON-MILITARY CHANNELS SUCCEED.
- 3 TIME GROWS SHORT.
- 4 BELIEF THAT OTHER SIDE WILL NOT YIELD.
- 5 POLICE AND MILITARY MEASURES.
- 6 NON-STATUS QUO SIDE NEGOTIATES.
- 7 ONE SIDE REFUSES TO NEGOTIATE.
- 8 DEEP IDEOLOGICAL SPLIT.
- 9 BOTH SIDES NOT DIVIDED.
- 10 DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS.
- 11 UNDERESTIMATE OF OWN SIDE.
- 12 REPRESENTATIVES MEET.
- 13 OVERTURES FOR MODUS VIVENDI.
- 14 STRONG MEASURES AGAINST NON-STATUS QUO SIDE.
- 15 PUBLIC OPINION AROUSED.
- 16 PUBLIC OPINION INDIFFERENT.
- 17 USE OF IDEOLOGICAL ALLIES TO SUBVERT GOVERNMENT.
- 18 DISCOUNTING THREAT OF OPPONENT'S ALLY.
- 19 ALLY OF NSQ PREFERENCES PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.
- 20 NSQ ALLY INDIFFERENT TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.
- 21 US PUBLIC OPINION FAVORS NSQ.
- 22 US FRIENDLY TO NSQ.
- 23 US LACKS PARTIALITY.
- 24 US NOT IMPARTIAL.
- 25 SUPERPOWER(S) ARE IMPARTIAL.
- 26 SUPERPOWER(S) NOT IMPARTIAL.
- 27 US URGES SETTLEMENT.
- 28 ALLIES PLACE AREA IN ONE SPHERE OF INFLUENCE.
- 29 AREA NOT IN ONE SPHERE OF INFLUENCE.
- 30 SPLITS WITHIN NSQ MAGNIFIED.
- 31 WEAKNESS OF NSQ'S MAJOR ALLY.
- 32 FEELING THAT OUTSIDE PARTY PROKES TACIT AGREEMENT.
- 33 LEADERS OF THIRD SIDE SEEK REFUGE WITH ONE SIDE.
- 34 CLASHES BEYOND CONTROL OF EITHER SIDE.
- 35 ENGAGEMENT IN REPRESSIVE ACTION.

36 INFLUENTIAL PARTY DOES NOT USE INFLUENCE.
 37 INFLUENTIAL PARTY USES INFLUENCE.
 38 ANOTHER CONFLICT SETTLED.
 39 NSC PREOCCUPIED.
 40 SIMILAR SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS PROVIDE MODEL.
 41 THIRD PARTY BELIEVED TO BE COVER FOR SQ.
 42 MILITARY BALANCE IN FAVOR OF SQ.
 43 MILITARY BALANCE NOT IN FAVOR OF SQ.
 44 SQ MILITARILY SUPERIOR.
 45 MILITARY BALANCE FAVORS NSQ.
 46 STRATEGIC VALUE OF DISPUTED AREA INCREASES.
 47 NSC PLACES MILITARY FORCES UNDER NEUTRAL COMMAND.
 48 WEAK COUNTERVAILING FORCE NEAR AREA.
 49 MILITARY FORCE USED INSTEAD OF POLICE.
 50 ARMS LEFT OVER FROM PREVIOUS CONFLICT.
 51 TROOPS SENT TO DISPUTED AREA TO MAINTAIN ORDER.
 52 SQ REINFORCES ITS GARRISON IN DISPUTE AREA.
 53 BOTH SIDES STRENGTHEN MILITARY FORCES.
 54 INCREASED CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY MILITARY FORCES.
 55 AVOIDANCE OF GREAT POWER INVOLVEMENT.
 56 ONE SIDE'S MILITARY STRENGTH GROWS.
 57 FIRM POLICY TOWARDS OTHER SIDE IS URGED.
 58 "ROUTINE" TROOP MOVEMENTS INTERPRETED AS THREAT.
 59 FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE SOUGHT.
 60 FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE NOT SOUGHT.
 61 NSC EXERCISES LIMITED CONTROL OVER OWN FORCES.
 62 UN URGES SETTLEMENT.
 63 UN TAKES OTHER ACTION.
 64 UN TAKES NO ACTION.
 65 NON-INTERVENTION AGREEMENTS EXIST.
 66 REGIONAL ORGANIZATION TAKES ACTION.
 67 REGIONAL ORGANIZATION TAKES NO ACTION.
 68 SUBSTANTIAL FLOW OF REFUGEES.
 69 INTERNAL TROUBLES WITH ETHNIC GROUPS.
 70 CLASHES INCREASE WITH ETHNIC GROUPS.
 71 DISCONTENT AMONG ETHNIC GROUPS.
 72 UNIFICATION OF ALL MEMBERS OF SAME ETHNIC GROUP.
 73 MINORITY GROUPS' RIGHTS GUARANTEED.
 74 MINORITY GROUPS' RIGHTS NOT GUARANTEED.
 75 ETHNICAL LINK WITH SAME GOAL SEEKERS.
 76 MINORITY GROUP NOT IN FAVOR OF CHANGE.
 77 ECONOMIC VALUE OF AREA INCREASES.
 78 ECONOMIC VALUE INCREASING TO ONE SIDE.
 79 NO ECONOMIC VALUE.
 80 EXPLORATIVE ECONOMIC POLICIES.
 81 SQ ECONOMICALLY DEPENDENT.
 82 NSC ECONOMICALLY DEPENDENT.
 83 INTERNAL PRESSURES TO ALTER STATUS QUO.
 84 POPULAR SENTIMENT FOR CHANGE IN STATUS QUO.
 85 PUBLIC OPINION TO DISPUTE HEIGHTENS.
 86 POSITION TO OFFICIAL POLICY TOWARD OTHER SIDE.
 87 PUBLIC OPINION HEIGHTENS AGAINST OTHER SIDE.
 88 QUESTION SUBMITTED TO PLEBISCITE.
 89 NSQ AGREES TO PLEBISCITE.
 90 POLICY INCREASES IN MILITARY.
 91 NEGOTIATIONS ONLY IF CLAIM ACCEPTED.
 92 OPPOSITION PARTIES URGE USE OF FORCE.
 93 DISPUTE EXAGGERATED.
 94 NSC HAD RECENT EXPERIENCE.
 95 FEAR OF MORE EXTREME ACTION LATER.

96 HUMANITARIAN MOTIVES.
97 LEADER TIED TO DISPUTED AREA.
98 INDIVIDUALS WITH PERSONAL STAKES IN CONFLICT.
99 NSG SUCCESSFUL IN OTHER CONFLICTS.
100 PREVIOUS SQ STRATEGY SUCCESSFUL.
101 THOSE DIRECTLY INVOLVED ARE NOT UNDER CONTROL.
102 OFFICIAL SQ AUTHORITY DIVIDED.
103 FEAR OF SIMILAR DEMANDS BY OTHER GROUPS.
104 NSQ BELIEVES IT CAN WIN POLITICALLY.
105 SQ BELIEVES IN POLITICAL VICTORY.
106 BELIEF THAT VIOLENCE SPURS DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS.
107 SQ CONCERNED OVER WORLD OPINION.
108 NSG CONCERNED OVER WORLD OPINION.
109 PROSPECT OF ONE SIDE BECOMING SUBVERSION BASE.
110 ONE SIDE KEEPS ROLE COVERT.
111 PROXY FORCE USED.
112 SECTIONAL AND ETHNIC DIVISIONS.
113 AGITATION BY DEVELOPMENTS IN REGION.
114 NSQ BASE OF SUPPORT DIVIDED RELIGIOUSLY.
115 SQ BASE OF SUPPORT DIVIDED RELIGIOUSLY.
116 NSG SPLIT ALONG SEVERAL DIMENSIONS.
117 SQ SPLIT ETHNICALLY & CULTURALLY.
118 NSQ BELIEVES IT WILL SUCCEED.
119 SQ CALCULATES SUCCESS.
120 POLITICAL GROUPS EMERGE.
121 CPPCSITION IN SQ URGES CONCESSION TO NSQ.
122 DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS DISPUTED.
123 COMMUNICATIONS GOOD.
124 LITTLE INFORMATION AVAILABLE.
125 ACCURATE INFORMATION AVAILABLE.
126 INCIDENTS INCREASE IN SERIOUSNESS AND NUMBER.
127 INFLUENCE DUE TO PROXIMITY AND NATIONAL POWER.
128 REPRESSION OF POLITICAL GROUPS.
129 ONE SIDE TOLERATES POLITICAL GROUPS.
130 MILITARY PRESENCE PART OF LONG RANGE GOALS.
131 ENCOURAGEMENT OF REBELLIOUS GROUPS IN REGION.
132 FOMENTING REVOLT WITHIN OTHER SIDE.
133 DESIRE FOR ACCESSION TO OTHER SIDE.
134 MILITARY POSTS IN DISPUTED TERRITORY.
135 BORDER GARRISONS REINFORCED.
136 ONE SIDE REINFORCES BORDER.
137 INCREASED INCIDENTS ALONG BORDERS.
138 ACCELERATION OF BORDER POSTS BUILD UP.
139 SUBJECTING LEADER OF DISPUTE AREA TO DEMANDS.
140 NSQ IN CONTROL OF DISPUTED AREA.
141 SQ IN CONTROL.

Shortened Factors, Phase 3

- 1 SQ REMOVES LEADER OF NSQ.
- 2 CNE SIDE WARNS OTHER.
- 3 SQ HEEDS WARNING OF NSQ.
- 4 LEADER DESIRES TO AVOID WAR.
- 5 LIMITED OBJECTIVES.
- 6 OBJECTIVES NOT LIMITED.
- 7 NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT SOUGHT.
- 8 NSQ DISCUSSES END OF HOSTILITIES.
- 9 NEGOTIATIONS OCCUR.
- 10 LEADER CALLS FOR SUMMIT MEETING.
- 11 SUMMIT MEETING CALLED.
- 12 SQ MAKES CONCESSIONS.
- 13 DANGERS OF ALL-OUT WAR INCREASED.
- 14 NSG GAINS NO ADVANCE TOWARD GOAL.
- 15 SQ RALLIES SUPPORT OF NSQ MEMBERS.
- 16 NO DEEP PENETRATION OF OTHER SIDE'S TERRITORY.
- 17 DEEP PENETRATION TRIED.
- 18 NSQ FAILS TO ESTABLISH GOVERNMENT.
- 19 NSQ SETS UP RIVAL GOVERNMENT.
- 20 NSQ ACHIEVES PRIMARY GOALS.
- 21 GREAT POWER GIVES DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT.
- 22 GREAT POWER GIVES SQ ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.
- 23 NSQ GIVEN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.
- 24 MAJOR POWERS SUPPLY SQ WITH ARMS AND EQUIPMENT.
- 25 NSQ SUPPLIED WITH ARMS & EQUIPMENT.
- 26 US INTEREST INCREASES.
- 27 GREAT POWER URGES AVOIDANCE OF WAR.
- 28 SOVIET ARMS ARRIVE TO CNE SIDE.
- 29 SOVIET DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT TO NSQ.
- 30 GREAT POWER CONTEMPLATES INTERVENTION.
- 31 NSG SUPPORTER CONTEMPLATES INTERVENTION.
- 32 GREAT POWER INTERESTED IN SETTLEMENT.
- 33 US AND USSR TAKE COMMON STAND.
- 34 PRESTIGE OF US COMMITTED TO SETTLEMENT.
- 35 GREAT POWER REFUSES TO ASSURE ASSISTANCE.
- 36 SQ SUPPORTER REFUSES TO ASSURE AID.
- 37 SOVIETS SILENT AND NEUTRAL.
- 38 US FEARS WIDER WAR.
- 39 ASSISTANCE RECEIVED FROM SUPPORTERS.

40 COUNTRIES SUPPORTING NSQ DISCONTINUE SUPPORT.
41 SQ LOSES VITAL SUPPORT.
42 FORCE ALIENATES POTENTIAL ALLIES.
43 ARMED FORCES OF SUPPORTERS NOT INVOLVED.
44 ARMED FORCES OF SUPPORTER INVOLVED.
45 THIRD SIDE THREATENS INTERVENTION.
46 OTHER COUNTRIES PROVIDE FACILITIES FOR NSQ.
47 OTHER STATES SUPPORT NSQ.
48 EXTERNAL PRESSURES FOR TERMINATION.
49 NEW ALLY OBTAINED.
50 ALLY OF ONE SIDE LOST.
51 OUTSIDE PARTIES HALT MILITARY ASSISTANCE.
52 BOTH SIDES DEPENDENT ON SAME OUTSIDE PARTY.
53 ALLY UNWILLING TO IMPOSE SOLUTION.
54 ALLY REINFORCEMENTS.
55 MUTUAL SECURITY AGREEMENT EXISTS.
56 NSG FEARS POTENTIAL ALLY.
57 PEACEKEEPING FORCE EXISTS.
58 ALLY'S MILITARY MISSION EXPANDS.
59 THIRD-PARTY FORCES PHASE OUT.
60 TROOPS IN COMBAT WITH ALLIES OF OTHER SIDE.
61 NSG MOVES AGAINST SQ SUPPLY LINES.
62 FOREIGN MILITARY OFFICERS THREATEN TO WITHDRAW.
63 NO DECISIVE MILITARY VICTORY.
64 ARMED FORCES GROW RAPIDLY.
65 SQ OFFERS INEFFECTIVE RESISTANCE.
66 FORCE USED TO STRENGTHEN DIPLOMACY.
67 COMMANDER IN CHIEF AGAINST MORE MILITARY ACTION.
68 NO SUCCESS BEYOND TERRORISM.
69 ARMS SUPPLY NOT CUT.
70 GUERRILLA WARFARE.
71 TERRAIN NOT SUITABLE FOR GUERRILLA WARFARE.
72 UNCONTROLLABLE MILITARY AND PARA-MILITARY UNITS.
73 MILITARY ACTIVITY MORE EFFECTIVE THAN PAST.
74 MILITARY BALANCE FAVORS ONE SIDE.

75 WEAK MILITARY FORCES.
 76 OVERWHELMING MILITARY PREDOMINANCE.
 77 FORCES OF ONE SIDE SUPERIOR.
 78 SQ HAS MILITARY ADVANTAGE.
 79 NSQ HAS MILITARY ADVANTAGE.
 80 RAIDS INFILTRATE NO MILITARY DAMAGE.
 81 MORE TROOPS COMMITTED.
 82 HOSTILITIES INCONCLUSIVE.
 83 HOSTILITIES ACCIDENTAL.
 84 ONE SIDE'S TROOPS TO CLOSE.
 85 SQ WINS MILITARY VICTORY.
 86 NSQ WINS MILITARY VICTORY.
 87 NO INFLUENCE EXERTED OVER SQ.
 88 FORCES UNABLE TO SECURE OBJECTIVES.
 89 STRATEGIC INTERESTS CONTINUE IN IMPORTANCE.
 90 SMALL PROPORTION OF FORCES USED.
 91 LARGE PROPORTION OF FORCES USED.
 92 MILITARY STRENGTH INCREASES.
 93 SQ TACTICS RESTRICT HOSTILITIES.
 94 NSQ MILITARILY WEAK.
 95 HOSTILITIES ACCIDENTAL WITH NO FOLLOW-UP.
 96 UN ASSERTS ITSELF STRONGLY.
 97 UN UNASSERTIVE.
 98 UN PRESSURES FOR CEASEFIRE.
 99 UN ACTIVELY SEEKS SOLUTION.
 100 NSQ ANXIOUS TO TAKE CONFLICT TO UN.
 101 SQ ANXIOUS TO TAKE CONFLICT TO UN.
 102 UN SECRETARY GENERAL URGES RESTRAINT.
 103 WITHDRAWAL FROM INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.
 104 SECURITY COUNCIL FAVORS SETTLEMENT.
 105 VETO IN SECURITY COUNCIL.
 106 SECURITY COUNCIL DEMANDS CEASEFIRE.
 107 GENERAL ASSEMBLY KEEPS QUESTION OFF AGENDA.
 108 GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONVENES IN SHORT TIME.
 109 GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION TO END HOSTILITIES.
 110 UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY TAKES NO ACTION.
 111 UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY INVESTIGATES.
 112 UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONDEMNS NSQ SUPPORTERS.
 113 UN CONDEMNS SQ SUPPORTER.
 114 UN AGREES TO SEND PEACEKEEPING FORCE.
 115 UN PLANS ELABORATED.
 116 UN FORCE REPLACES NSQ FORCE.
 117 UN FACILITATES RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS.
 118 ADVERSARIES ACCEPT UN RESOLUTION.
 119 AGREEMENT TO UN DETERMINATION OF POPULAR WISH.
 120 UN FOCUSES WORLD ATTENTION ON DISPUTE.
 121 MANY STATES REGISTER INTEREST IN SETTLEMENT.
 122 REGIONAL ORGANIZATION MEDIATES.
 123 NEUTRAL BODY SLOW IN GETTING TO AREA.
 124 REFUGEES CARRY OUT RAIDS.
 125 VIOLENCE BETWEEN ETHNIC GROUPS.
 126 ETHNIC GROUP RIOTS.
 127 ETHNIC RIVALRIES WITHIN NSQ.
 128 ETHNIC RIVALRIES WITHIN SQ.
 129 WORRY OVER ETHNIC GROUPS.
 130 NSQ FACES ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.
 131 SQ FACES ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.
 132 SQ THREATENED WITH CUT IN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.
 133 NSQ THREATENED WITH CUT IN AID.
 134 SIDES THREATENED WITH AID WITHDRAWAL.

135 ACTIVITIES WEAKEN ECONOMY.
136 THREAT TO IMPORTANT ECONOMIC RESOURCES.
137 COSTS OF HOSTILITIES BURDENOME.
138 RALLY OF PUBLIC OPINION.
139 PUBLIC OPINION FAVORS SQ.
140 PUBLIC OPINION FAVORS NSQ.
141 NSQ CREATES RIVAL GOVERNMENT.
142 LITTLE CHANCE OF INTERNAL UNREST.
143 INTERNAL UNREST LIKELY.
144 DOMESTIC PRESSURE IN NSQ TO CEASE HOSTILITIES.
145 DOMESTIC OPPOSITION TO POLICY.
146 LEADERS OF NSQ ASSURE SQ.
147 SQ USES ARRESTS AND STRONG REPRISALS.
148 NSQ WINS POLITICAL CONCESSIONS.
149 EXTREMIST IN CONTROL FROM TIME TO TIME.
150 DRAMATIZATION BY INTERNATIONAL INCIDENT.
151 NSQ FAILS WITH PEACEFUL MEANS.
152 NSQ PEACEFULLY SUCCEEDS.
153 RESPONSIBILITY FOR FATE OF PROXY FORCE.
154 BELIEF THAT MILITARY SOLUTION IS POSSIBLE.
155 OPPOSITION REACHES MILITARY.
156 PRIME ROLE IN MILITARY ACTION ASSUMED.
157 SPLITS BECOME OPEN RIFTS.
158 COALITION IN OPPOSITION TO PARTY IN POWER.
159 COMMITMENT TO PROLONG FIGHTING.
160 NSQ HAS LIMITED OBJECTIVES.
161 NSQ OBJECTIVES NOT LIMITED.
162 ISOLATION FROM BASE OF SUPPORT.
163 HOSTILITIES ERODE RESOURCES OF SQ.
164 MISINTERPRETATION OF EVENTS.
165 OVERCONFIDENCE IN SEEKING MILITARY SOLUTION.
166 NSQ RESORTS TO GUERRILLA WAR.
167 HUMANITARIAN REASONS.
168 SPLITS IN NSQ LEADERSHIP.
169 ACTIONS REINFORCE UNITY.
170 NSQ HOPES NOT FULFILLED.
171 NSQ NOT PREPARED TO ACT INDEPENDENTLY.
172 NSQ USES POLITICAL MEANS.
173 SUBSTANCE GIVEN TO THREATS.
174 SQ PUBLIC OPINION FAVORS NEGOTIATIONS.
175 SPLIT AMONG NSQ SUPPORTERS.
176 IDEOLOGICAL SPLIT IN SQ.
177 NSQ LACKS SUPPORT.
178 SQ LACKS SUPPORT.
179 FREQUENT COMMUNICATIONS.
180 COMMUNICATIONS ARE POOR.
181 INADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS.
182 LACK OF ACCURATE INFORMATION.
183 OFFICERS ON BOTH SIDES CITIZENS OF THIRD SIDE.
184 CHANGE IN STATUS QUO NOT DELAYED.
185 DIFFICULTY TO PREVENT REINFORCEMENTS.
186 EXTENDED OPERATIONS DIFFICULT.
187 GEOGRAPHIC SANCTUARY.
188 NSQ HOSTILITIES AT LOW LEVEL.
189 NSQ CLAIM WEAKENED.

190 SQ SUPPORTERS TURN AGAINST IT.
191 CLAIM THAT ACTIONS ARE DEFENSIVE.
192 STRONG INTERESTS THREATENED.
193 UNITED OPPOSITION TO NSO.
194 FAILURE TO PREVENT MILITARY ACTIVITY.
195 PROOF OF MILITARY COMPLICITY.
196 RAIDS UNSUCCESSFUL.
197 FORCES SUFFICIENT TO CONTROL RAIDING GROUPS.

Factor Categories

- 1 Previous or General Relations Between Sides
- 2 Great Power Involvement
- 3 External Relations Generally
- 4 Military-Strategic
- 5 International Organization (UN, Legal, Opinion)
- 6 Ethnic (refugees, minorities)
- 7 Economic
- 8 Internal Political
- 9 Characteristics of one side
- 10 Communication and Information
- 11 Actions in Disputed Area

Factor Codes

- 1 no information
- 2 not present
- 3 present, no influence
- 4 much influence toward violence
- 5 some influence toward violence
- 6 little influence toward violence
- 7 much influence away from violence
- 8 some influence away from violence
- 9 little influence away from violence

APPENDIX F
CASCON MEASURES

This appendix contains a list of the measures that correspond to factors in CASCON.

Phase 1 Measures

- 1 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION OR ADJUDICATION TO SETTLE COMPETING CLAIMS ON BASIS OF WISHES OF POPULATION INVOLVED, WITH GUARANTEES FOR WHATEVER SETTLEMENT ARRIVED AT; THIRD-PARTY CONTROL UNTIL ISSUE SETTLED.
- 2 VIGOROUS MEASURES TO DESTROY THE STRUCTURE AND LEADERSHIP OF THE OTHER SIDE.
- 3 ACTIVE ASSISTANCE TO NON-COMMUNIST RESISTANCE GROUPS; DENIAL OF MATERIAL AND OTHER AID TO COMMUNIST-DOMINATED GROUPS.
- 4 RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION, EVEN IF IT LEADS MAJORITY TO OPT FOR INDEPENDENCE.
- 5 BUILDING ON THIS GOOD WILL BY STRIVING FOR SETTLEMENT BEFORE ITS DETERIORATION.
- 6 ENCOURAGING NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH THIRD-PARTY AUSPICES, MEDIATION, GOOD OFFICES, ETC.
- 7 ENCOURAGEMENT OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SIDES: BILATERAL AGREEMENTS CREATING MACHINERY FOR SETTLING DISPUTES.
- 8 ACTIVE MEASURES BY SUCCESSIVE LEADERS TO PROMOTE AMICABLE RELATIONS; BARRING SUCH MEASURES, THE PHYSICAL SEPARATION OF HOSTILE GROUPS BY PARTITION, OR BY REMOVING ALIEN MINORITIES.
- 9 MAKE MOTIVES OF BOTH SIDES EXPLICIT; USE THIRD-PARTY PRESENCE WHERE APPROPRIATE.
- 10 LARGE-SCALE ASSISTANCE TO FORCES ACTING AGAINST THE NON-STATUS QUO SIDE.
- 11 INITIATIVES BY DOMINANT SIDE TO RECTIFY THE CONSEQUENCES OF PAST ERRORS, MORE UNDERSTANDING OF AND LESS SENSITIVITY TOWARD DEVELOPMENTS IN THE OTHER SIDE.
- 12 ENCOURAGING MORE REALISTIC APPRAISAL OF PAST GRANDEUR; AGREEMENTS AMONG STATES TO ABANDON BORDER CLAIMS; INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF EXISTING BORDERS AGAINST FORCED CHANGE.
- 13 ANALYSIS OF LESSONS OF PAST EXPERIENCE, PARTICULARLY OF THE PRECONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS AND THE CHANCES AND CONSEQUENCES OF LOSSES AND GAINS.
- 14 IMPARTIAL FACT-FINDING TO DETERMINE EXTENT OF NON-STATUS QUO SIDE COMPLICITY; MEASURES TO REDUCE OR CONTROL DISSIDENTS IN DISRUPTED AREA.
- 15 INCREASE THE STRENGTH OF ANTI-COMMUNIST FORCES IN THE NON STATUS QUO SIDE; REDUCE THE STRENGTH OF RADICAL PARTIES IN THE DISRUPTED AREA, BY PROVIDING PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVES.
- 16 ENCOURAGE THE INTERVENING SIDE TO ABSTAIN, OR AT LEAST TO KEEP ITS INTERVENTION LOW-KEY AND UNACKNOWLEDGED.
- 17 HIGHER PRIORITY TO SETTLEMENT OF BORDER AND OTHER DISPUTES; THIRD-PARTY AUSPICES FOR NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT; THIRD-PARTY CONTROL PENDING SETTLEMENT.
- 18 RE-EXAMINATION OF RELATIONSHIPS WITH UNPOPULAR REGIMES.
- 19 STEPS TO FOSTER GREATER INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL STABILITY AND COHERENCE; CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRAMS TO ATTRACT NATIONAL SENTIMENTS.
- 20 PRESSURE ON BOTH SIDES TO ACCENT "STAND STILL" AGREEMENT, COUPLED WITH JOINT OR THIRD-PARTY ACTION TO DEAL WITH CAUSES OF INSTABILITY IN THE AREA.
- 21 INCREASE ORDER-MAINTAINING THIRD-POWER FORCE IN THE DISRUPTED REGION.
- 22 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
- 23 EFFORTS TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH GREAT POWER CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.
- 24 OBSTRUCTION OF GREAT POWER CONFLICTS (FROM LOCAL CONFLICT) SITUATIONS: ENCOURAGEMENT OF FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE SIDES.
- 25 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
- 26 DIRECT PRESSURE ON OUTSIDE POWER TO DESIST.
- 27 INCREASING THE THREAT OF DIRECT INVOLVEMENT BY DISTANT GREAT POWER, UNLESS WOULD CONTAIN MORE DANGEROUS CONFLICT.

28 SEEKING OTHER (E.G. MULTILATERAL OR NEUTRAL) MEANS TO MAINTAIN ORDER
TIGHTER CONTROL ON USE MADE OF ASSISTANCE GIVEN BY ALLY.
129 INTRODUCTION INTO DISPUTED AREA OF TROOPS OF STATES WITHOUT
HISTORIC INTEREST IN THE AREA.
130 PURPOSEFUL EFFORTS BY GREAT POWERS TO KEEP COLD WAR OUT OF
LOCAL CONFLICTS; GREAT POWER AGREEMENTS, TACIT OR FORMAL.
ON, "SPHERES OF ABSTENTION".
131 PURPOSEFUL EFFORTS BY GREAT POWERS TO KEEP COLD WAR OUT OF
LOCAL CONFLICTS; GREAT POWER AGREEMENTS, TACIT OR FORMAL.
ON, "SPHERES OF ABSTENTION".
32 REDUCE THE NEED FOR MILITARY BASES BY DEVELOPING SEA AND AIR
LIFT CAPABILITIES; TECHNOLOGICAL EFFORTS TO SUBSTITUTE ECONOMICALLY
FOR OIL AND OTHER IMPORTS.
33 IN THIS INSTANCE, MODERATE SINO-SOVIET DIFFERENCES.
34 ADOPTION OF MEANS, BILATERAL, BLDN PARTY, OR MULTILATERAL (SUCH
AS FACT-FINDING) TO REINFORCE THE INTERESTED GREAT POWERS'
DISFAVOR.
35 CREATE OR PERPETUATE DISTRACTIONS ELSEWHERE (UNLESS THIS IS
OUTWEIGHED BY RISKS ENTAILED IN EXACERBATING OTHER CONFLICTS).
36 SELF-DETERMINATION OR INDEPENDENCE FOR POTENTIAL BUFFER TO
ELIMINATE FOREIGN TROOPS.
37 PREVENTING OPEN AGITATION FOR NATIONALIST HOPES; ALTERNATIVELY,
BEING PREPARED TO PRESS FOR A SOLUTION THAT ACCOMMODATES THE
INTERESTS OF NON-STATUS QUO SIDE.
38 A MORE COHESIVE STRGNER GOVERNMENT IN THE OUTSIDE PARTY TO
RESIST SUCH INTERNAL PRESSURE.
39 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CCDED.
40 RESTRICTING MATERIAL ASSISTANCE TO STATUS QUO SIDE; CONTROL
OVER USE OF ASSISTANCE GIVEN TO ANY SIDE.
41 INCREASING THAT ALLY'S RELIANCE ON EXTERNAL SUPPORT; UTILIZATION
OF THE LEVERAGE SUCH HEAVY RELIANCE MAY PRODUCE FOR CONFLICT-
CONTROLLING PURPOSES.
42 SETTLEMENT OF BORDER CONFLICTS PRIOR TO OR SOON AFTER GRANT OF
INDEPENDENCE.
43 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CCDED.
44 MULTILATERAL ACTION TO CONTAIN EXPANSIONIST SIDE AND STRENGTHEN
POTENTIAL VICTIMS.
45 ACCOMMODATING THIS DESIRE, IF ACCCOMPANIED BY MEASURES TO PREVENT
MAYHEM; DEVELOPING AN ALTERNATIVE ALLEGIANCE TO THE SIDE ITSELF.
46 DEVELOPMENT OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE.
ALTERNATIVELY, DEPORTATION, IMMIGRATION RESTRICTIONS,
PHYSICAL SEPARATION, OR PARTITION.
47 ENCOURAGING RESISTANCE FORCES THAT ARE ANTI-COMMUNIST OR NON-
COMMUNIST.
48 REDUCE THE NEED FOR FOREIGN BASES BY DEVELOPING SEA AND AIR-LIFT
CAPABILITIES, AND TECHNOLOGICAL SUBSTITUTES FOR COMMODITIES SUCH
AS CIL.
49 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CCDED.
50 GREAT POWER ECONOMIC PRESSURE TO INFLUENCE THE STATUS QUO SIDE
FROM USING FORCE IN THE DISPUTED AREA.
51 GREAT POWERS PRESSURE TO KEEP MILITARY FORCES OF THE STATUS
QUO SIDE OUT OF THE DISPUTED AREA.
52 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CCDED.
53 ENCOURAGE MILITARY IMBALANCE WHERE FAVORS MORE THAN JUST SHORT
TERM CONFLICT CONTROL. SUPPLIERS OF MILITARY AID, PRESSURES
FROM FOR A MORE FLEXIBLE STAND.
54 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CCDED.
55 CREATE OR PERPETUATE DISTRACTIONS ELSEWHERE UNLESS THIS IS
HOSTILITIES END; CREATICN OF ALTERNATIVE OUTLET FOR ENERGIES
LEFT UNEMPLOYED AFTER PRIOR CONFLICTS.

56 INCREASE ORDER-MAINTAINING THIRD-POWER FORCE IN THE DISRUPTED REGION.

57 MEASURES TO CONTROL DISPOSITION OF ARMS LEFT OVER FROM PAST CONFLICTS, PARTICULARLY THOSE INVOLVING GREAT POWERS.

58 AGREEMENT AMONG ARMS SUPPLIERS NOT TO INTRODUCE ARMS INTO CONFLICT AREAS; INTERNATIONAL OR REGIONAL AGREEMENTS ON QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE RESTRICTIONS ON ARMS TRANSFERS.

59 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

60 INTERNATIONAL MEASURES TO ENSURE ACCESS BY BOTH SIDES TO VITAL RAW MATERIALS; DEVELOPMENT OF LONG-RANGE AIRLIFT AND SEA-BASED ALTERNATIVES TO MILITARY BASES.

61 REDUCE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF AREA BY USING SEA-BASED ALTERNATIVES TO LAND BASES, LONG-RANGE AIR-LIFT CAPABILITY, REASSESSMENT OF UTILITY OF RETAINING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INFLUENCE

62 LARGE-SCALE ASSISTANCE TO FORCES ACTING AGAINST THE NON-STATUS QUO SIDE.

63 STRENGTHENING WEAK SIDE MILITARILY TO RESIST USE OF FORCE.

64 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION OR ADJUDICATION OF BORDER CLAIMS; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS NOT TO SETTLE BORDER CONFLICTS BY FORCE.

65 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

66 INTERNATIONAL ACTION IN DISPUTED AREA, E.G. PLEBISCITES TO DETERMINE POPULAR WILL, WITH INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF IMPLEMENTATION OF POPULAR CHOICE OF AUTONOMY OR INDEPENDENCE; ARBITRATIONS; PROHIBITIONS AGAINST EMPLOYMENT OF FORCE.

67 STRENGTHEN THE LIKELIHOOD OF ADVERSE REACTION BY ACTION THROUGH REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OPPOSING UNILATERAL INTERVENTION; PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PRESSURE ON THE NON-STATUS QUO SIDE; CREATING AN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN THE DISPUTED AREA.

68 PROMOTING MORE ORDERLY, PEACEFUL CHANGE SO VIOLENCE IS NOT DEEMED A PREREQUISITE TO ITS ACHIEVEMENT.

69 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

70 STRONGER U.N. OR REGIONAL ORGANIZATION ACTION TO PRODUCE A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT; PROVISIONS FOR COMPULSORY SETTLEMENT METHODS.

71 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

72 CREATING OR STRENGTHENING ENFORCEMENT MACHINERY FOR SUCH PROHIBITIONS.

73 STRENGTHEN REGIONAL ORGANIZATION ACTION TO CONTAIN BOTH SIDES.

74 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

75 ENCOURAGE DISUNITY AMONG THE ETHNIC GROUPS (UNLESS OUTWEIGHED BY CREATION OF EXACERBATION OF OTHER CONFLICTS).

76 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

77 RESTRICTIONS ON IMMIGRATION INTO DISPUTED AREA, ESPECIALLY OF UNSKILLED LABOR THAT WILL COMPETE WITH INDIGENOUS POPULATION.

78 CREATION OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES IN THE STATUS QUO COUNTRY TO RELIEVE POPULATION PRESSURES.

79 MAKING GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE CONTINGENT ON PRIOR SETTLEMENT OF RELATED ETHNIC PROBLEMS DESIGNING A SETTLEMENT THAT AVOIDS THE PROBLEM OF RELATED PEOPLES, SUCH AS A FEDERATION; SPECIAL TREATY GUARANTEES OF POLITICAL BOUNDARIES COUPLED WITH AGREEMENTS ON NOMADIC AND MINORITY RIGHTS.

80 ENFORCEMENT OF NATIONAL LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS LIMITING ACTION OF REFUGEE GROUPS; NATIONAL DISPERSAL OF REFUGEES TO COUNTRIES AWAY FROM DISPUTED AREA.

81 MEASURES TO DISPERSE, RESETTLE, AND GRANT EQUITABLE TREATMENT TO RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC MINORITIES.

82 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENTIRE DISPUTED AREA THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE, PLUS IMAGINATIVE PLANNING AND TECHNOLOGICAL INVESTMENT IN LIMITED RESOURCES OF THE AREA. ALTERNATIVE-

LY, REGIONAL AGREEMENT FOR MUTUAL CONTROL OF NOMADIC LIFE.
83 SEPARATION OF ETHNIC GROUPS, BY INTERNATIONALLY SUPERVISED
AND PROTECTED POPULATION EXCHANGES.
84 DEVELOPMENT OF A MORE FULLY INTEGRATED AND JUST SOCIETY BASED ON
RACIAL EQUALITY OR, AT A MINIMUM, TOLERANCE, DEPORTATION
OF MINORITY GROUPS, OR PHYSICAL SEPARATION WITHIN THE DISPUTED
AREA, PARTITION.
85 OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE IN RESETTLING REFUGEES; STRENGTHEN INTERNAL
COHESION AND STABILITY OF EACH SIDE, TO RESIST EXTREMIST PRESSURE.
86 OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE IN RESETTLING REFUGEES; STRENGTHEN INTERNAL
COHESION AND STABILITY OF EACH SIDE, TO RESIST EXTREMIST PRESSURE.
87 INCREASING THE ECONOMIC STAKE IN THE EXISTING SITUATION OF
INDIVIDUALS ON THE NON-STATUS QUO SIDE.
88 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
89 INTERNATIONAL MEASURES TO ENSURE ACCESS BY BOTH SIDES TO VITAL
RAW MATERIALS; DEVELOPMENT OF LONG-RANGE AIRLIFT AND SEA-BASED
ALTERNATIVES TO MILITARY BASES.
90 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORM; APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
OF EQUITABLE TREATMENT; U.N. OR ILO INVESTIGATION OF CHARGES OF
FORCED LABOR; PRESSURE ON STATUS QUO SIDE TO REMEDY SUCH PRACTICES.
91 GREAT POWER ECONOMIC PRESSURE TO INFLUENCE THE STATUS QUO SIDE
FROM USING FORCE IN THE DISPUTED AREA.
92 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
93 MORE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO PREVENT DISPERSION OF WEAPONS LEFT
OVER FROM OTHER CONFLICTS, EFFECTIVE DISARMAMENT OF POTENTIALLY
HOSTILE CIVILIANS IN DISPUTED AREA.
94 ENCOURAGE IDEOLOGICAL SPLITS WITHIN THE BASE OF SUPPORT OF THE
NON-STATUS QUO SIDE, PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR THOSE WHO DO NOT
SUPPORT THE NON-STATUS QUO SIDE.
95 ENCOURAGE THE NON-STATUS QUO SIDE TO PURSUE ITS GOALS BY POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC RATHER THAN VIOLENT MEANS.
96 PROVIDE INCUCEMENTS - INCLUDING THREATS - TO THE NON-STATUS
QUO SIDE TO KEEP ITS COMPETITION FOR POWER POLITICAL-ECONOMIC
RATHER THAN MILITARY.
97 INCREASE THE STRENGTH OF ANTI-COMMUNIST FORCES IN THE NON STATUS QUO
SIDE REDUCE THE STRENGTH OF RADICAL PARTIES IN THE DISRUPTED
AREA, BY PROVIDING PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVES.
98 REPLACING OR ISOLATING MORE RADICAL LEADERS; TO BUILD PRESTIGE OF
99 DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVE GOALS FOR NATIONAL ASSERTIVENESS AND PRIDE
OF STATUS QUO SIDE.
100 CLEARER ENUNCIATION BY STATUS QUO SIDE OF THE POSITION IT WAS
DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN IN DISPUTED AREA; GREATER UNDERSTANDING
OF THAT SIDE'S CHARACTER; CARE THAT POSITION OF ACCOMMODATION IS
NOT INTERPRETED AS WEAKNESS.
101 (1) MORE EFFECTIVE ARTICULATION OF STATUS QUO SIDE'S PROMISES
AND THEIR COMMUNICATION TO THE OTHER SIDE.
102 (2) MORAL PRESSURE BY STATUS QUO SIDE'S ALLIES AND SUPPORTERS TO
CARRY OUT ITS PROMISES.
103 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
104 STRENGTHEN INTERNAL STABILITY OF DISPUTED AREA; DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNAL SECURITY CAPABILITY; ENCOURAGEMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT
IN DISPUTED AREA.
105 STRENGTHEN POLICE AND INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES IN THE WEAKER SIDE;
ASSISTANCE IN PACIFYING AND CONTROLLING DISPUTED AREA BY UNITED
NATIONS, OUTSIDE STATES, OR JOINTLY BY THE TWO ADVERSARIES.
106 GREATER POLITICAL DEMOCRACY IN DISPUTED AREA ACHED AT PLACING
IN POSITIONS OF LEADERSHIP MEN INTENT ON PEACEFUL RESOLUTION.
107 INSULATION OF MAJOR GOVERNMENT DECISIONS FROM PERSONAL QUALITIES.
ENCOURAGEMENT AND ASSISTANCE TO GOALS OF INTERNAL POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; CREATING INTERNAL THREATS AND DIVERSIONS

110

108 IF NECESSARY TO AVOID CONFLICT POLICY.
U.N. OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MACHINERY TO MAKE IT
MORE DIFFICULT TO ACT COVERTLY; REINFORCE DETERRENCE THROUGH
SPECIFIC THREATS OF COUNTER-ACTION.

109 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

110 JUINT OR RECIPROCAL STATEMENT EXPRESSING THE STATUS QUO SIDE'S
111 ENHANCING THE PRESTIGE OF MCRF MODERATE SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATION,
WHICH MAY REQUIRE ACCOMMODATING TO SOME OF THEIR DEMANDS.

112 DIVERTING ATTENTION ELSEWHERE BUT BEWARE OF CONFLICT-PROMOTING
ELSEWHERE; ENCOURAGING A REGIONAL SOLUTION.

113 DIVERSION OF NATIONALISTIC ENERGIES TO CONSTRUCTIVE CHANNELS;
BARRING THAT, INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO CONTAIN EXPANSIVE OR
AGGRESSIVE NATIONALISM.

114 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

115 PERSISTENCE IN PEACEFUL ACHIEVEMENT OF INDEPENDENCE.

116 FOSTERING POLITICAL DEMOCRACY.

117 ELIMINATION OR NEUTRALIZATION OF IRRESPONSIBLE LEADERS; EFFORTS
TO BUILD PRESTIGE OF MORE MODERATE ALTERNATIVES.

118 DISTINGUISH BETWEEN POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES, AND
SECURITY THREATS; COUNTERACT LATTER BY MEANS OTHER THAN
UNILATERAL FORCE.

119 ENCOURAGE AND EXPLOIT DIVISIONS WITHIN DISSIDENT GROUPS IF THEIR
COHESION WOULD PRODUCE GREATER VIOLENCE.

120 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

121 FOSTERING GREATER INTERNAL POLITICAL COHESIVENESS IN NON-STATUS
QUO SIDE BY DEVELOPMENT OF MORE POSITIVE UNIFYING NATIONAL GOALS.

122 OPPOSITION TO CONCEPT OF IMPERIALIST "MISSION", FOSTERING
UNDERSTANDING OF THE INEVITABILITY OF CHANGE.

123 EDUCATION OF DOMINANT SIDE TO THE VALUES OF DIVERSE CULTURES.

124 EDUCATION OF PUBLIC TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN AN IRRITATION AND A
THREAT; MEASURES TO OFFSET ACTIONS OF THE OTHER SIDE THAT CAUSED
CHANGE IN PUBLIC OPINION.

125 STRENGTHENING COHESIVENESS OF STATUS QUO SIDE.

126 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

127 ENCOURAGING SECTIONALISM.

128 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

129 DEVELOPMENT OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE.
ALTERNATIVELY, DEPORTATION, IMMIGRATION RESTRICTIONS,
PHYSICAL SEPARATION, OR PARTITION.

130 GREATER POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL EQUALITY FOR ALL THE PEOPLE
IN THE AREA, OR POLICIES AIMED AT DEVELOPING SUCH EQUALITY IN THE
SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME BY TRAINING, EDUCATING, AND CREATING
OPPORTUNITIES IN THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL LIFE OF THE
AREA.

131 COMPETE SUCCESSFULLY WITH NON-STATUS QUO SIDE BY REFORM AIMED
AT GRIEVANCES IT SEEKS TO EXPLORE.

132 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

133 CREATION OF NEUTRAL, U.N., OR OTHER CHANNELS FOR COMMUNICATION,
ALONG WITH GOOD OFFICE OR MEDIATION.

134 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

135 CREATE OR FOSTER RELIABLE CHANNELS TO CONVEY ACCURATE INFORMATION
ON SITUATION IN THE DISPUTED AREA.

136 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

137 A "STAND-STILL" AGREEMENT PENDING MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND/OR
CREATION OF A NEUTRALLY-PATROLLED DEMILITARIZED ZONE.

138 RENUNCIATION OF CONCEPT OF SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, AGREEMENT ON
"SYSTEMS OF ABSTENTION".

139 EITHER MORE EFFECTIVE SUPPRESSIONS, OR ACCOMMODATION OF DEMANDS
OF POLITICAL GROUPS WHILE ENSURING THEY ARE COMPATIBLE WITH ONE
ANOTHER.

140 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CCDED.
141 MEASURES TO CONTAIN ACTIVE SIDE AND STRENGTHEN RESISTANCE OF
SUBVERSION.
142 ACCCMODATION OF POPULAR DEMAND; ALTERNATIVELY ARRANGING FOR
EMIGRATION WITH INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE.
143 INTRODUCTION OF COUNTERFORCE APPROPRIATE TO DETER.
144 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CCDED.

Phase 2 Measures

- 1 MEASURES TO INCREASE ECONOMIC TIES AND INCENTIVES.
2 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
- 3 TIME-STRETCHING DEVICES: "STAND-STILL" AGREEMENTS, DIPLOMATIC
4 DELAYS, ARTICLE 33 PROCEDURES FOR PRELIMINARY ADJUSTMENT.
5 CLARIFICATION OF THE STATUS QUO SIDE POLICY; LIBERALIZATION OF
6 POLICY OF STATUS QUO SIDE.
7 LIMITING EMPLOYMENT OF POLICE AND OTHER REPRESSIVE MEASURES.
8 ENCOURAGE NEGOTIATIONS.
9 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
10 STEPS TO FOSTER TOLERANCE FOR DIVERSITY.
11 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
12 EFFORTS BY U.N. AND OTHER THIRD PARTIES TO INDUCE ALL SIDES TO
13 DISCUSS ISSUES AND SEEK PEACEFUL ACCOMMODATIONS; RENEWED EMPHASIS
14 ON ARTICLE 33 PROCEDURES.
15 CONCEALING ACTUAL STRENGTH; ACHIEVING ACTUAL BALANCE.
16 ENCOURAGE DIRECT RESTRICTIONS BETWEEN ADVERSARIES; THIRD-PARTY
17 AUSPICES FOR NEGOTIATIONS; TIME-STRETCHING DIPLOMATIC DEVICES TO
18 MAINTAIN STATUS QUO DURING NEGOTIATIONS.
19 INCREASES INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON THE OTHER SIDE TO NEGOTIATE.
20 INCREASING STATUS QUO SIDE'S CONTROL IN DISPUTED AREA.
21 ENSURING INTERNAL CONTROL TO AVOID BEING PRESSURED INTO PRECIPITATE
22 ACTION.
23 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
24 INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING TO ESTABLISH FACTS AND DETER EXTERNAL
25 INTERFERENCE.
26 INCREASING CREDIBILITY OF THREAT OF INVOLVEMENT OF THE OTHER
27 ENCOURAGE ACCOMMODATION TO MAJOR ALLY'S DEMANDS; ALTERNATIVELY
28 MAKE CLEAR DETERMINATION NOT TO YIELD TO DEMANDS IF THIS IS
29 DEEMED MORE CONFLICT PROMOTING.
30 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
31 U.S. PUBLIC EDUCATION TO GENERATE ACCURATE APPRAISAL OF THE
32 SIDES.
33 CLARIFICATION OF U.S. POLICY.
34 MORE VIGOROUS U.S. COUNTER PRESSURE IF NEEDED TO DETER.
35 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
36 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
37 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
38 STRONGER U.S. PRESSURE, POSSIBLY TIED TO ECONOMIC OR MILITARY
39 ASSISTANCE.
40 STRENGTHENING FORMALIZED AGREEMENT THAT PLACE CONFLICT AREA IN ONE
41 SPHERE.
42 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
43 WEAKEN REGIONAL CAPACITY TO MORALIZE AGAINST STATUS QUO SIDE
44 (UNLESS WOULD GENERATE GREATER CONFLICT).
45 SUBSTITUTE NEUTRAL OR U.N. FORCES FOR WEAK ALLY.
46 PRESSURE ON OUTSIDE PARTY TO CLARIFY AND ARTICULATE ITS INTENTIONS;
47 GREAT-POWER ENDORSEMENT OF OUTSIDE PARTY'S ANNOUNCEMENT.
48 REFUSAL TO SUCER OR HARHUR REFUGEES FROM AREAS OF CONFLICT.
49 ENCOURAGE IMPROVED DOMESTIC CONTROLS AND STRENGTHENED INTERNAL
50 SECURITY ON BOTH SIDES.
51 INTERNATIONAL ACTION, SUCH AS U.N., TO OBTAIN AND GUARANTEE
52 SELF-DETERMINATION FOR DISPUTED AREA.
53 PRESSURE BY A THIRD-PARTY IN A POSITION TO INFLUENCE BOTH SIDES

37 TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE PEACEFULLY.
 38 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
 39 DEMONSTRATE TO THAT SIDE THE COSTS OF ENGAGING IN ANOTHER CONFLICT.
 40 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
 41 AVOIDING CONFLICTS THAT STIMULATE IMITATORS; PREVENTING SUCH CONFLICTS FROM SUCCEEDING.
 42 MAKING EXPLICIT THIRD PARTY OR ALLY'S REFUSAL TO USE ITS FORCES TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO. EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION OF THE REFUSAL TO THE NON-STATUS QUO SIDE.
 43 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
 44 MAINTAINING MILITARY PREPONDERANCE.
 45 PROVIDE ADEQUATE GREAT-POWER OR THIRD-POWER COUNTERFORCE IN THE CONFLICT AREA, UNLESS WILL GENERATE A GREATER CONFLICT.
 46 MEASURES TO REDUCE RELIANCE ON LAND BASES (E.G. SEA-BASED ALTERNATIVES, LONG-RANGE AIR-LIFT CAPABILITIES.)
 47 SUBSEQUENT STEPS TO BREAK UP FORCES OF NON STATUS QUO SIDE, (UNLESS WILL GENERATE GREATER CONFLICT).
 48 STRENGTHENING MILITARY COUNTERFORCE FOR DETERRENCE: CONVEYING CLEAR INTENTIONS TO DETERRENCE.
 49 ENCOURAGE DEVELOPMENT OF ADEQUATE POLICE RIOT FORCES FOR INTERNAL SECURITY.
 50 MEASURES TO CONTROL DISPOSITION OF ARMS LEFT OVER FROM EARLIER CONFLICTS.
 51 NEUTRAL, THIRD-PARTY BORDER CONTROL; ENCOURAGE AGREEMENT ACT TO STATION ADVERSARY TROOPS IN DISPUTED AREA.
 52 ASSIST STATUS QUO SIDE IN MAINTAINING MILITARY PREPONDERANCE IN THE AREA.
 53 DISSUASION OR CONTAINMENT OF MORE MILITARY SIDE BY GREAT-POWER FORCE.
 54 ENCOURAGE TECHNOLOGICAL (E.G. AIRLIFT) SUBSTITUTES FOR LAND BASES, ROUTES, ETC.
 55 ENCOURAGING GREAT POWER ABSTENTION AGREEMENTS; DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVES TO BASES.
 56 UTILIZATION OF TIME-STRETCHING DEVICES TO DELAY THE GROWTH OF MILITARY STRENGTH AND INHIBIT ITS USE.
 57 ENSURING INTERNAL CONTROL TO AVOID BEING PRESSURED INTO PRECIPITATE ACTION.
 58 ADVANCE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON NATURE AND PURPOSE OF MANEUVERS; RESTRAINT IN UNDERTAKING MOVEMENTS IN TENSE AREAS THAT MIGHT BE MISCONSTRUED.
 59 GREAT-POWER AGREEMENT TO AVOID INTRODUCING DESTABILIZING WEAPONS INTO CONFLICT AREA.
 60 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
 61 ENHANCEMENT OF THE INTERNAL STABILITY AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY OF NON-STATUS QUO SIDE.
 62 EFFORTS BY U.N. AND OTHER THIRD PARTIES TO INDUCE ALL SIDES TO DISCUSS ISSUES AND SEEK PEACEFUL ACCOMMODATIONS; RENEWED EMPHASIS ON ARTICLE 33 PROCEDURES.
 63 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
 64 U.N. ACTION TO REDUCE OR COUNTER THE POSED THREAT BY EITHER SIDE OR BOTH SIDES AND DETER UNILATERAL ACTION.
 65 STRENGTHENING NON-INTERVENTION AGREEMENTS BY PROVISION FOR INSPECTION, FACT FINDING, AND SANCTIONS.
 66 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
 67 STRONGER ACTION BY REGIONAL ORGANIZATION TO REDUCE OR COUNTER THE THREAT OF ONE SIDE OR TO PLACE OBSTACLES IN THE WAY OF UNILATERAL ACTION BY THE OTHER SIDE.
 68 INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE IN HANDLING REFUGEES.
 69 U.N. OR THIRD-PARTY FACT-FINDING; BORDER PATROLS; RELOCATION AND RESETTLEMENT OR INTEGRATION OF ETHNIC GROUPS.

70 FOSTER GREATER INTERNAL SECURITY CAPABILITY ON PART OF THE STATUS QUO SIDE.

71 ENCOURAGE BETTER INTEGRATION OF ETHNIC GROUPS; BORDER CONTROLS TO LIMIT OUTSIDE HELP TO INTERNAL MINORITIES.

72 POLITICAL FEDERATION; RESETTLEMENT OF MINORITIES; TREATY GUARANTEES OF POLITICAL BOUNDARIES; AGREEMENTS ON NOMADIC AND MINORITY RIGHTS.

73 ENCOURAGE DEVICES TO FURTHER ENSURE SECURITY AND RIGHTS OF MINORITIES.

74 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

75 STRICT BORDER CONTROL TO MINIMIZE CONTACT.

76 MEASURES TO IMPROVE RELATIONS BETWEEN INTERNAL GROUPS; PHYSICAL SEPARATION OF GROUPS; RESETTLEMENT; PARTITION; (IF MINORITY POSITION LESSENS LIKELIHOOD OF CONFLICT, THIRD PARTY, U.N. OR OTHER GUARANTEES OF MINORITY RIGHTS).

77 CREATION OF JOINT COMPANIES TO DEVELOP RESOURCES, WITH AGREEMENT TO SHARE BENEFITS; FOSTER SEARCH FOR ALTERNATE SOURCES OF RESOURCES OUTSIDE DISPUTED AREA.

78 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

79 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

80 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

81 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

82 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

83 FOSTERING GREATER POLITICAL STABILITY WITHIN THE NON-STATUS QUO SIDE; ENCOURAGING MORE VARIED POLITICAL LIFE TO ABSORB ENERGIES FOCUSED ON ONE ISSUE.

84 ONCE HAVING ASCERTAINED POPULAR OPINION, ENCOURAGE DETERMINED EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT.

85 MEASURES TO INSULATE SENSITIVE FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES FROM DOMESTIC POLITICS.

86 STRENGTHEN OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT IN POWER AND ENCOURAGE A MORE LIBERAL POLICY TOWARDS THE NON-STATUS QUO, (UNLESS WOULD GENERATE GREATER CONFLICT).

87 STRENGTHENING MODERATE ELEMENTS; MAINTAINING GOOD INTERNAL CONTROL NEUTRAL SUPERVISION AND ADMINISTRATION OF PROPOSED PLURALIST POLIS GUARANTEES AS TO ITS FAIRNESS AND SUBSEQUENT IMPLEMENTATION.

88 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED. "NO"

89 DISSUASION OR CONTAINMENT OF MORE MILITARY SIDE BY GREAT-POWER FORCE.

90 INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE FOR A MORE FLEXIBLE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS FOSTERING GREATER POLITICAL STABILITY WITHIN THE NON-STATUS QUO SIDE; ENCOURAGING MORE VARIED POLITICAL LIFE TO ABSORB ENERGIES FOCUSED ON ONE ISSUE.

91 THIRD-PARTY MACHINERY FOR SETTLEMENT, PLUS GUARANTEES OF AN AGREED BOUNDARY AND SANCTIONS AGAINST EITHER SIDE'S REFUSAL TO COMPLY.

92 MEASURES BY GREAT POWER SUPPLIERS TO EXERT CONTROL OVER THE DISPOSITION OF ARMS FURNISHED TO RESISTANCE GROUPS.

93 UTILIZATION OF TIME-STRETCHING DEVICES TO DELAY THE GROWTH OF MILITARY STRENGTH AND INHIBIT ITS USE.

94 PRESSURE TO AVOID PRECIPITATE ACTION BASED ON EMOTION; NEUTRAL OR MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO ASSIST DISTRESSED ELEMENTS.

95 PRESSURE TO AVOID PRECIPITATE ACTION BASED ON EMOTION; NEUTRAL OR MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO ASSIST DISTRESSED ELEMENTS.

96 ISOLATION OR/DENIAL OF ARMS TO PRIVATE CITIZENS IN DISPUTED AREA WHO HAVE A PERSONAL STAKE IN MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO. DEMONSTRATE TO THAT SIDE THE FUTILITY OF THAT STRATEGY IN THIS CONFLICT.

97 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

98 WILLINGNESS TO CONTROL AND PHYSICALLY RESTRAIN, IF NECESSARY,

THOSE WHO ARE DIRECTLY INVOLVED.

102 ENHANCE THE POLITICAL CONSENSUS IN THE STATUS QUO GOVERNMENT; EDUCATION OF ITS PUBLIC ON ISSUES AT STAKE AND COSTS OF PROLONGED CONFLICT.

103 FOSTER GREATER INTERNAL POLITICAL AND SOCIAL COHESION WITHIN STATUS QUO SIDE.

104 ENCOURAGE CREATION OF GOVERNMENT REFLECTING ALL SEGMENTS OF POPULAR OPINION THAT ENABLES ALL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE NON-STATUS QUO PARTY, TO COMPETE IN OPEN POLITICAL FORUM.

105 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

106 REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE UNTIL VIOLENCE CEASES.

107 INCREASED CRITICISM OF NON-STATUS QUO SIDE'S ACTIONS; INTERNATIONAL REASSERTION OF THE OBLIGATION NOT TO TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION.

108 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED. "NO

109 AGREEMENT AMONG ARMS SUPPLIERS TO AVOID INTRODUCING ARMS TO CONFLICT AREA; ALTERNATELY, GUARANTEES FOR THE SECURITY OF OTHER SIDE IN THE CONFLICT AREA.

110 ENCOURAGING KEEPING ROLE COVERT.

111 STRENGTHENING THE OTHER SIDE INTERNALLY, BOTH POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY.

112 STRENGTHENING THE OTHER SIDE INTERNALLY, BOTH POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY.

113 ENCOURAGE STATUS QUO SIDE TO ACCOMMODATE TO LEGITIMATE DEMANDS.

114 ENCOURAGEMENT OF DISUNITY AMONG NON-STATUS QUO BASE OF SUPPORT.

115 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

116 ENCOURAGING DISUNITY WITHIN THE NON-STATUS QUO SIDE.

117 SIDE'S MAJOR ALLY, (UNLESS WOULD CREATE A MORE DANGEROUS CONFLICT)

118 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

119 ENCOURAGING ACCURATE ESTIMATES OF CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS WHERE SUCH WOULD MINIMIZE CONFLICT BY MISCALCULATION.

120 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

121 CREATION OF CHANNELS TO ACCOMMODATE POPULAR DEMANDS.

122 STRENGTHENING OPPOSITION WITHIN STATUS QUO SIDE, UNLESS WILL GENERATE CONFLICT.

123 CREATION OF NEUTRAL, U.N., OR OTHER CHANNELS FOR COMMUNICATION, ALONG WITH GOOD OFFICE OR MEDIATION.

124 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

125 CREATE OR FOSTER RELIABLE CHANNELS TO CONVEY ACCURATE INFORMATION ON SITUATION IN THE DISPUTED AREA.

126 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

127 A "STAND-STILL" AGREEMENT PENDING MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND/OR CREATION OF A NEUTRALLY-PATROLLED DEMILITARIZED ZONE.

128 RENUNCIATION OF CONCEPT OF SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, AGREEMENT ON "SYSTEMS OF ABSTENTION".

129 EITHER MORE EFFECTIVE SUPPRESSIONS, OR ACCOMMODATION OF DEMANDS OF POLITICAL GROUPS WHILE ENSURING THEY ARE COMPATIBLE WITH ONE ANOTHER.

130 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

131 STRENGTHENING GOVERNMENT IN THE DISPUTED AREA: OCCUPATION BY TROOPS NEUTRAL IN THIS CONFLICT.

132 MEASURES TO CONTAIN ACTIVE SIDE AND STRENGTHEN RESISTANCE OF SUBVERSION.

133 INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING TO DETERMINE FACTS AND DETER EXTERNAL SUBVERSION; NEUTRAL BORDER CONTROL TO ELIMINATE SANCTUARIES.

134 ACCOMMODATION OF POPULAR DEMAND; ALTERNATIVELY ARRANGING FOR EMIGRATION WITH INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE.

135 THIRD-PARTY FACT-FINDING AND SUPERVISION OF BORDER AREA.

136 NEUTRAL U.N., REGIONAL, OR THIRD-PARTY BORDER CONTROL.

137 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

138 THIRD-PARTY FACT-FINDING AND SUPERVISION OF BORDER AREA.

2138 A "STAND-STILL" AGREEMENT PENDING MEDIATION, ARBITRATION AND/OR
CREATION OF A NEUTRALLY-PATROLLED DEMILITARIZED ZONE.
2139 FAIT ACCOMPLI; OR INTERVENTION BY NEUTRAL THIRD-PARTY OR
U.N. FORCES.
2140 INTRODUCTION OF COUNTERFORCE APPROPRIATE TO DETER.
2141 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

Phase 3 Measures

- 1 ENCOURAGE GREATER STATUS QUO SIDE UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OF THE ADVERSARY, OF THE NATURE OF INTERNAL CONFLICT; MEETING LEGITIMATE DEMANDS.
- 2 EMPHASIZE VALIDITY OF THREAT.
- 3 INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO SECURE HUMANE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS.
- 4 FOSTER GREATER POLITICAL COHESIVENESS WITHIN LEADER'S SIDE; ENHANCE CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY ON THAT SIDE.
- 5 STRONG PRESSURE FROM ALL INFLUENTIAL THIRD PARTIES, STATES, THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
- 6 PRESSURES BY SUPPORTERS OF BOTH SIDES TO ACCEPT A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION.
- 7 FOSTER SEARCH FOR A FORMULA MEETING BASIC DEMANDS OF EACH SIDE.
- 8 INCREASE SUPPORT FROM INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND OTHER THIRD PARTIES FOR SOLUTIONS TO COMPETING TERRITORIAL CLAIMS; THREAT OF INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST SIDE NOT ACCEPTING AWARDS.
- 9 OFFER BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THIRD PARTIES TO SUPERVISE AND ENFORCE THE CEASE FIRE.
- 10 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
- 11 ENHANCE MORE GENERAL REFORM, INCLUDING ACCEPTANCE OF LEGITIMATE GOALS OF NON-STATUS-QUO SIDE.
- 12 URGENT EFFORTS FOR CEASE-FIRE, U.S. - SOVIET AGREEMENT NOT TO INTERVENE.
- 13 ARTICULATION OF THE LIMITED NATURE OF STATUS QUO SIDE GOALS; THIRD-PARTY ASSURANCES TO BOTH SIDES OF ASSISTANCE IF A MORE MASSIVE INVASION ATTEMPT WAS MADE.
- 14 URGE EARLY AND MORE EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION OF CHANGE TO THE NON-STATUS QUO SIDE; ENHANCE LIBERALIZATION POLICY OF STATUS QUO SIDE.
- 15 TO LIMIT THE GOALS AND STRATEGIES OF THE ADVERSARIES.
- 16 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
- 17 INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT NOT TO RECOGNIZE INSURGENT GOVERNMENTS BEFORE FREE ELECTIONS TO DETERMINE POPULAR WILL.
- 18 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
- 19 SEEK TO PERSUADE THE NON STATUS QUO SIDE TO AGREE TO CEASEFIRE.
- 20 DISCOURAGE GREAT POWER'S DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FOR ONE SIDE; OR PROVIDE OTHER SIDE WITH COMPARABLE SUPPORT.
- 21 CONTINUE BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO AID IN RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT.
- 22 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
- 23 ACCOMPANY WITH THREATS TO INTENSIFY HOSTILITIES, UNLESS WILL GENERATE GREATER CONFLICT.
- 24 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
- 25 TAKE EARLIER AND MORE VIGOROUS U.S. POLICY INITIATIVES.
- 26 CONTINUED PRESSURE BY GREAT POWER FOR MODERATION OF HOSTILITIES.
- 27 THREATENING TO INTENSIFY HOSTILITIES, IF LEADS TO SPEEDY TERMINATION, UNLESS WILL GENERATE WIDER CONFLICT.
- 28 WORK FOR JOINT U.S.-SOVIET APPROACH; GREAT POWER AGREEMENTS TO ABSTAIN FROM INVOLVEMENT; DETERRENCE OF SOVIET INTERFERENCE.
- 29 UNILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL DETERRENCE OF INTERVENTION.
- 30 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
- 31 FORMALIZE GREAT POWER INTEREST IN NEGOTIATING AND ENFORCING A CEASE-FIRE.

33 SUBSTANTIVE U.N. AND U.S.-SOVIET JOINT ACTION TO MOVE
SETTLEMENT OF THE UNDERLYING DISPUTE.
34 FIND EXPLICIT WAYS OF INDICATING U.S. DESIRE FOR TERMINATION OF
CONFLICT.
35 SEEK TO MAKE EXPLICIT INTENTION OF GREAT POWER NOT TO BAIL
OUT NON STATUS QUO SIDE.
36 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
37 ENCOURAGE SOVIET NEUTRALITY AND COMMUNICATION OF THEIR
NEUTRAL STAND.
38 URGENT DETERRENT ACTIONS INCLUDING THREAT OF OTHER GREAT
POWER INVOLVEMENT.
39 EXPLOIT THE ASSISTANT TO TERMINATE HOSTILITIES BY THREATENING
TO INTENSIFY THEM.
40 REINFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS PROHIBITING INTER-
VENTION.
41 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
42 MAXIMIZE PUBLICITY ON ACTION OF THAT SIDE, THROUGH NEUTRAL
AND BELIEVABLE CHANNELS, IF POSSIBLE BY NEUTRAL FACT-FINDING.
43 PRESSURES TO PREVENT THE INTRODUCTION OF MILITARY FORCES OF
INVOLVED NEIGHBORS.
44 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
45 EXPLOIT THREAT TO INTENSIFY HOSTILITIES AS INDUCEMENT TO
TERMINATE.
46 PRESSURE ON OTHER COUNTRIES TO REFRAIN FROM PROVIDING
TRAINING FACILITIES FOR THE NON STATUS QUO SIDE.
47 ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AGAINST INTERVENTION;
INSPECTION TO IDENTIFY AND HALT THE FLOW OF MATERIAL AID.
48 ARRANGE FOR STRONGER ACTION BY THIRD PARTIES, PARTICULARLY
THE UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.
49 ENCOURAGE EXPANDED ASSISTANCE BY NEW ALLY.
50 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.
51 RETAINING CONTROL OVER USE OF AVAILABLE WEAPONS BY RESTRICTING
AMMUNITION AND SPARE PARTS.
52 STRONGER PRESSURE BY OUTSIDE PARTY, PERHAPS WITH BACKING
OF MULTILATERAL ACTION.
53 EXPLORATION OF VICTORY BY INTERPOSITION OF NEUTRAL OR THIRD-
PARTY FORCES THAT WILL FOSTER SETTLEMENT.
54 RESTRICTING SIZE OF FORCES INTRODUCED INTO AREA OF HOSTILITIES
TO THOSE NEEDED FOR DEFENSE AGAINST ATTACK.
55 U.N. AND OTHER THIRD-PARTY PRESSURE FOR END TO HOSTILITIES.
ACCOMPANIED BY ACTION TOWARD EQUITABLE ACCOMMODATION OF
INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES.
56 CONTINUE BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE TO AID IN RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT.
57 CONSIDER USE OF NEUTRAL TROOPS IN CONFLICT AREA FOR POTENTIAL
PEACEKEEPING.
58 RESTRICTING OR ELIMINATING ASSISTANCE GIVEN BY ALLY.
59 SEEK CONTINUATION OF MEDIATING THIRD PARTY PRESENCE UNTIL
OR UNLESS NEUTRAL OR INTERNATIONAL FORCE COULD BE SUBSTITUTED.
60 RESTRICT THE STATIONING AND USE OF THIRD-PARTY FORCES IN CONFLICT ARE
61 INCREASE THE CREDIBILITY OF A COUNTER-MOVE BY THE STATUS QUO
SIDE.
62 ENCOURAGING DEPENDENCE ON OUTSIDE SOURCES FOR MAJOR HUMAN OR
MATERIAL COMPONENTS OF MILITARY FORCES, UNLESS GENERATES
POTENTIALLY GREATER CONFLICT.
63 REINFORCE LIMITS ON THE MILITARY CAPACITY OF BOTH SIDES.
64 DEVELOPMENT OF STRONGER GOVERNMENT FORCES.
65 FOSTER IMPROVED DEFENSIVE CAPABILITY FOR STATUS QUO SIDE.
66 KEEP ONE'S COOL IN THE FACE OF THREAT; ACCURATE INTELLIGENCE
ESTIMATES OF INTENTIONS.

67 FOSTER RELIABLE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERS.

68 DEPENDING ON WHICH WILL MINIMIZE CONFLICT, EITHER STRENGTHENING GUERRILLAS TO ACHIEVE MILITARY VICTORY; OR STRONG COUNTERACTION BY OTHER SIDE TO CRUSH AND ELIMINATE THE GUERRILLAS.

69 IMPROVED TECHNIQUES TO DETECT AND CONTROL SMALL ARMS FLOWS.

70 ACTION BY OTHER SIDE EITHER TO PREEMPT OR COME TO GUERRILLA AND ORGANIZATIONS.

71 RESTRICT SALE OR PROVISION OF ARMS TO THE NON STATUS QUO SIDE; RESTRICT EXTERNAL PROVISION OF MILITARY TRAINING AND ADVICE--UNLESS THIS GENERATES A GREATER CONFLICT.

72 URGENT MEASURES TO IMPROVE INTERNAL STABILITY AND GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL; INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES AS NECESSARY TO ASSIST TOWARD THIS END.

73 EMPHASIZE MEASURES THAT IMPRESS ON THE OTHER SIDE THE FUTILITY OF CONTINUING TO FIGHT.

74 SEEK TO OFFSET WITH OUTSIDE THREAT TO INTERVENE, OR INTERPOSITION OF INTERNATIONAL FACE OF PRESENCE.

75 KEEP THAT SIDE TOO WEAK TO INTERVENE.

76 CREATE COUNTERVAILING FORCE IN THE AREA; ENHANCE LEGAL AND PROPAGANDA RESTRAINTS ON USE OF GREAT POWER FORCE.

77 ASSIST IN STRENGTHENING AND DEFENSIVELY EQUIPPING FORCES OF OTHER SIDE TO INDUCE A STALEMATE.

78 FOSTER REALISTIC APPRECIATION OF ACTUAL MILITARY BALANCE; ENCOURAGE EFFORTS BY ARMS SUPPLIERS TO KEEP THE MILITARY BALANCE ON AS LOW A LEVEL AS POSSIBLE.

79 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CCDED.

80 RESTRICTING THE INTRODUCTION OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS INTO THE CONFLICT AREA.

81 MORE ADEQUATE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, PLUS GREATER AWARENESS OF THE POLITICAL IMPLICATION OF MILITARY MOVES.

82 ENCOURAGE BETTER INTELLIGENCE FOR MORE REALISTIC APPRAISAL OF THE ACTUAL MILITARY BALANCE TO SUBSTITUTE FOR A BATTLE FIELD TEST.

83 BETTER COMMAND AND CONTROL; BETTER INTELLIGENCE ON BOTH SIDES; NEUTRAL BORDER CONTROL, PERHAPS WITH A NEUTRALLY-PATROLLED BUFFER ZONE; A "HOT LINE" TYPE OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN POLITICAL LEADERS.

84 SEPARATION OF ADVERSARY FORCES BY NEUTRAL U.N. FORCFS.

85 STEPS TO MAINTAIN STATUS QUO SIDE'S MILITARY SUPERIORITY, UNLESS GENERATES A GREATER CONFLICT.

86 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CCDED.

87 STEPS TO REDUCE STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS, E.G. TECHNOLOGICAL SUBSTITUTES FOR BASES; GREAT POWER ABSTENTION AGREEMENTS.

88 SEEK INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE OF THOSE OBJECTIVES.

89 SEEK INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEE FOR LEGITIMATE INTERESTS FOR WHICH SIDE IS FIGHTING.

90 THREATS FROM MAJOR SUPPLIERS OF ECONOMIC, MILITARY, AND POLITICAL SUPPORT TO RETAIN LIMITS AND TERMINATE HOSTILITIES.

91 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CCDED.

92 INTRODUCTION OF COUNTERVAILING FORCE OR PRESENCE, PREFERABLY INTERNATIONAL.

93 WEAKENING GOVERNMENT COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE AND CAPABILITIES, WHEN THIS IS CONFLICT-LIMITING.

94 RESTRICT SALE OR PROVISION OF ARMS TO THE NON STATUS QUO SIDE; RESTRICT EXTERNAL PROVISION OF MILITARY TRAINING AND ADVICE--UNLESS THIS GENERATES A GREATER CONFLICT.

95 BETTER COMMUNICATION BETWEEN ADVERSARIES.

96 IMPRESSING ON ADVERSARIES THE STRENGTH OF WORLD OPINION BEHIND THE U.N. ACTION.

97 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CCDED.

98 U.N. PRESSURE ON BOTH SIDES TO AGREE TO PROCEDURES AND IF

99 POSSIBLE OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.
 VIGOROUS PURSUIT OF U.N. ACTION AIMED AT COUPLING A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT WITH PROCEDURES AND POLICIES TO MEET EACH SIDE'S PERCEIVED VITAL INTERESTS.

100 ENCOURAGE EARLIER AND MORE VIGOROUS U.N. ACTION.
 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

101 FOSTER STRONGER U.N. PRESSURE FOR AN INITIATIVE IN WAYS IN WHICH THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES CAN BE ACCOMMODATED.

102 STRONG PRESSURE TO RETAIN THAT SIDE'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE U.N.; INSISTENCE ON CONTINUED U.N. ROLE DESPITE WITHDRAWAL.

103 RAPID U.N. ACTION TO EXPLOIT COUNCIL'S CONFLICT CONTROLLING SENTIMENT; ATTENTION TO SETTLEMENT OF SUBSTANTIVE DISPUTE.

104 UTILIZING GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO AUTHORIZE STRONGER U.N. ACTION.

105 SUSTAIN PRESSURE BY GREAT POWERS AND IF NECESSARY ACTUALLY TERMINATE AID.

106 VIGOROUS ACTION TO SEIZE U.N. OF CASE IN ORDER TO INTRODUCE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE IN THE CONFLICT AREA.

107 UTILIZE U.N.'S EVOLVING FLEXIBILITY; EXPLORE TECHNIQUES TO ENHANCE IT STILL FURTHER.

108 COUPLE U.N. CONDEMNATION WITH THREAT OF SANCTIONS.

109 SPONSORSHIP OF UNAMBIGUOUS U.N. RESOLUTIONS AND ACTION.

110 SUPPORTING THE AUTHORITY OF THE U.N. INVESTIGATING COMMISSION.

111 THREAT OF U.N. SANCTIONS AGAINST OPENLY INTERVENING.

112 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

113 ENCOURAGE EARLIER U.N. COGNIZANCE AND ACTION.

114 ENCOURAGEMENT OF MAXIMUM U.N. ROLE IN PEACEMAKING.

115 COUPLE U.N. CONDEMNATION WITH THREAT OF SANCTIONS.

116 ENDOW U.N. COMMITTEE WITH ADDITIONAL POWERS (TO CONCENTRATE, TO RECOMMEND, ETC.).

117 U.N. SANCTIONS AGAINST CEASE-FIRE VIOLATION.

118 PROMPT ACTION TO IMPLEMENT; GUARANTEE OF SETTLEMENT BASED ON RESULTS OF U.N. PLEBISCITE, WITH SANCTIONS AGAINST VIOLATION.

119 UTILIZE PUBLIC ATTENTION TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON STATUS QUO SIDE TOWARD REFORM.

120 VIGOROUS EARLY ENLISTMENT OF U.N. INTEREST AND ACTION.

121 ENCOURAGE VIGOROUS AND UNIFIED PRESSURE BY REGIONAL ORGANIZATION ON SUPPORTERS OF BOTH SIDES TO COOPERATE IN FINDING A SOLUTION.

122 IMPROVED PROCEDURES AND LOGISTICS FOR RAPID MOVEMENT INTO PLACE OF U.N. MEDIATING MACHINERY AND PRESENCE.

123 DISPERSAL OR RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES.

124 FOSTER FEAR OF SPREAD TO OTHER LOCI OF CONFLICT IN THE AREA.

125 MEASURES TO INCREASE RACIAL INTEGRATION AND SOCIAL COHESION WITHIN THAT SIDE.

126 EXACERBATE DISUNITY WITHIN THE NON STATUS QUO SIDE, IF THAT IS CONFLICT-MINIMIZING IN THE LONG AS WELL AS SHORT RUN.

127 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED. ETH

128 EXPLOIT CONFLICT - LIMITING CONCERN OF BOTH SIDES; MEASURES TO DISPERSE, RESETTLE, OR INTEGRATE REFUGEES.

129 INCREASING AND STIMULATING THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF HOSTILITIES.

130 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

131 underscore threat by great power ally to withdraw aid unless CONFLICT-LIMITING POLICIES ADOPTED.

132 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

133 SUSTAIN PRESSURE BY GREAT POWERS AND IF NECESSARY ACTUALLY TERMINATE AID.

134 MAJOR EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE IN ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION AND IN DEVELOPING INTERNAL SECURITY CAPABILITY.

135 MAKE CLEAR OTHER SIDE'S INTENTION TO INTERVENE TO PROTECT VITAL ECONOMIC RESOURCES.

137 INCREASE THE ECONOMIC AND OTHER COSTS FOR BOTH SIDES OF CONTINUED HOSTILITIES.

138 STRENGTHENING PUBLIC OPPOSITION.

139 EXPLORE SUPPORT OF PUBLIC OPINION THROUGH NEWS MEDIA.

140 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

141 INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT TO WITHHOLD RECOGNITION FROM INSURGENT GOVERNMENT.

142 REINFORCE INTERNAL STABILITY AND CONTROL AS CONFLICT-PREVENTIVE.

143 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

144 STRENGTHEN INTERNAL OPPOSITION IN NON-STATUS-QUO GOVERNMENT; TO TOPPLE LATTER.

145 WORK TO INCREASE EFFECTIVENESS OF OPPOSITION.

146 PUBLICIZE AND HOLD NON-STATUS QUO SIDE TO PLEDGE.

147 MORE EFFECTIVE POLICE ACTION PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE; REFORM MEASURES.

148 NEUTRAL GUARANTEE OF CONCESSIONS AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION.

149 URGENT MEASURES TO IMPROVE INTERNAL STABILITY AND GOVERNMENTAL CONTROL; INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES AS NECESSARY TO ASSIST TOWARD THIS END.

150 KEEP NEWS COVERAGE IN BALANCE; FOCUS ATTENTION ON NEED FOR REFORM.

151 U.N. AND OTHER THIRD-PARTY PRESSURE FOR END TO HOSTILITIES. ACCCOMPANIED BY ACTION TOWARD EQUITABLE ACCOMMODATION OF INTERESTS OF ALL PARTIES.

152 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

153 INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO PREVENT INHUMANE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS

154 OUTSIDE PRESSURES NOT TO EXTEND HOSTILITIES INCLUDING U.N. OR THIRD-PARTY BORDER CONTROLS OR OTHER CONFLICT - INHIBITING PRESENCE.

155 STRENGTHENING LIBERAL OPPOSITION WITHIN STATUS QUO SIDE.

156 ENCOURAGE MAINTAINING PRETENSE OF COVERT ROLE.

157 MEASURES TO INCREASE INTERNAL COHESION.

158 STRENGTHENING FORCES OF THE COALITION AGAINST THE PARTY IN POWER, UNLESS THIS GENERATES A GREATER CONFLICT.

159 MEASURES TO ENCOURAGE NATIONALISM AMONG COMMUNIST PARTIES AND DISSENSE IN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT.

160 URGE CLEAR STATEMENT BY NON-STATUS QUO SIDE OF NATURE AND LIMITS OF ITS TERRITORIAL OBJECTIVES; ARRANGE INDICATIONS OF FORCEFUL ACTION BY THIRD PARTIES IF THESE ARE EXCEEDED.

161 THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

162 IF CONFLICT TERMINATING ENCOURAGE EMPHASIS ON MILITARY MEASURE

163 SEEK MEASURES TO INCREASE ECONOMIC COSTS AND ENHANCE OTHER GOALS, UNLESS WILL GENERATE GREATER CONFLICT.

164 GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE AND STRUCTURE OF INTERNAL CONFLICTS; BETTER INTELLIGENCE ON THE OBJECTIVES OF ADVERSARIES

165 IMPROVED INFORMATION TO CORRECT MISCALCULATIONS OF ADVERSARY'S STRENGTH.

166 DISCOURAGE STATUS QUO SIDE HOPES OF DECISIVE VICTORY, UNLESS THIS WILL GENERATE A GREATER CONFLICT.

167 CLEAR ARTICULATION OF THE HUMANITARIAN NATURE OF OBJECTIVES; USE OF NEUTRAL THIRD-PARTY FORCES FOR NON-POLITICAL, HUMANITARIAN OBJECTIVES.

168 ENCOURAGING DIVISIONS WITHIN THE NON-STATUS QUO SIDE BY EMPHASIZING IDEOLOGICAL, HISTORICAL, AND LINGUISTIC DIVISIONS, IF SUCH POLICY IS CONFLICT-LIMITING.

169 MEASURES TO PROTECT POTENTIALLY FRIENDLY POPULATION FROM REPRISALS.

170 KEEPING CONFLICT IN THE POLITICAL AREA WHILE CLOSING OFF ALTERNATIVE PATHS INCLUDING RESORT TO FORCE BY ENHANCED INTERNAL SECURITY CAPABILITY.

171 SEEK TO BREAK UP ANY COALITION ACTING AGAINST STATUS QUO SIDE.
172 ENCOURAGE KEEPING CONFLICT IN THE POLITICAL ARENA.
173 EXPLOIT THREAT TO INTENSIFY HOSTILITIES AS INDUCEMENT TO TERMINATE.

174 ENCOURAGE EARLY AND ACCURATE READING BY THE GOVERNMENT OF PUBLIC OPINION IN STATUS QUO SIDE.

175 ENCOURAGING DIVISIONS WITHIN THE NON-STATUS QUO SIDE BY EMPHASIZING IDEOLOGICAL, HISTORICAL, AND LINGUISTIC DIVISIONS, IF SUCH POLICY IS CONFLICT-LIMITING.
THIS MEASURE NOT YET CODED.

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THE BERLIN CRISES:
MODELLING AND MANAGING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

by
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Abstract of

THE BERLIN CRISES: MODELLING AND MANAGING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

by

Raymond Tanter


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The three goals of this study are: (1) to explain the level and heterogeneity of East-West conflictive intensity on the basis of three attributes--alliance, conflict, and phase; (2) to explain East-West conflictive intensity on the basis of two parameters--event/interaction and organizational processes--within the context set by the alliance, conflict, and phase attributes; and (3) to infer from the explanations some implications for conflict modelling and management in other situations. Table 1 contains the 5 concepts of the overall model in the study.

Table 1 about here

What extent do two actors in a conflict respond to each other's prior behavior relative to their own prior behavior? International system analysis often assumes that actors respond to each other, i.e., an event/interaction process; foreign policy analysis often assumes that actors respond to their own prior behavior, i.e., an organizational process. The present study combines these two approaches and provides quantitative estimates of interaction and organization parameters. In addition, the study presents the results of a comparison of two conflicts over Berlin: the 1948-1949 Blockade and the 1961 Wall conflicts. The study compares these two confrontations in terms of the effects that alliance (East vs. West), conflict (1948-1949 vs. 1961), and phase (pre-crisis, crisis, post-crisis; or intensification, reduction) have on: (1) average conflictive intensity over time;

Table 1
THE MODEL OF THE STUDY



and (2) degree of variability in conflictive intensity over time.

In short, there are five concepts that form the explanatory model. Interaction and organization parameters are the principal foci of interest; alliance, conflict, and phase are three additional attributes that constitute a basis for the comparative analysis. Chapter 1--Theoretical Orientation--lays the main rationale for specifying the model, i.e., for stating conditions under which interaction or organization parameters should be higher in relation to each other. For example, during the most intense phase of a conflict or as a conflict intensifies, interaction should dominate organization. At the beginning and end of a conflict, or as it declines in intensity, organization should dominate interaction. In other words, interdependence between actors should increase with intensification; independence should increase with reduction.

Chapter 2, Historical Overview, sets the context of the two Berlin conflicts. The overview presents various interpretations to explain East-West confrontations in the 1948-1949 Blockade, as well as the 1958-1961 Ultimatum and Wall. For example, one interpretation is that Western behavior in the Berlin conflict of 1948-1949 was characterized by more action and reaction than in the 1958-1961 conflict, partly because of the role of NATO in the latter conflict. That is, the formation of NATO should have placed more constraints on the action-reaction tendencies. The behavior of the East in the two conflicts should be somewhat less sensitive to its own formal alliance in contrast to NATO. That is, the behavior of the East still should be more a result of its own prior behavior than the actions of the West in both Berlin conflicts. In the second conflict, however, there should be some increase in the East's action-reaction patterns due to the role of WTO as a constraint on Soviet optimizing behavior. Soviet behavior also may have been tempered in the interval between 1949 and 1961 by other factors. For example, there might have been an increase in bargaining among different

actors within the Soviet decision-making process. In any event, the historical overview yielded a basis for a number of competing hypotheses regarding the relative magnitude of interaction and organization estimates.

Chapter 3, Research Design, provides the procedures for testing hypotheses in terms of: (1)"data making" procedures; (2) aggregation of data and time; (3) modelling--comparisons within and between conflicts; (4) modelling--estimating event/interaction and organizational processes; and (5) threats to valid inference. Regarding data making, the study uses a conflict indicator and scaling scheme developed by Walter Corson to count the frequency of conflictive events and to estimate their intensities.

The New York Times is the principal data source for coding international conflictive events. The study concludes that the Times is the most adequate single public source for East-West information, and that the Times should produce information relatively comparable to private (i.e., government) sources for major East-West confrontations such as the Berlin conflicts.

A first step in data aggregation is to sum the event intensities for a given unit of time--a three or a one day period, and then divide by the frequency of events during this time. A second step is to aggregate these averages for three and then for two phases. The historical record helped in the selection of the cutting points for the three phases (pre-crisis, crisis, post-crisis). Given the beginning of the pre-crisis and the end of the post-crisis determined by the historical record, a two phase typology was constructed--intensification and reduction. The dividing line between the two phases is the period of peak intensity for both East and West.

The modelling of the study has two aspects: (1) comparisons within and between conflicts; (2) estimating interaction and organization parameters. Regarding comparisons, one question concerns the extent to which differences in

Figure 1

Three-Way Analysis of Variance Design

Berlin Conflicts

1948-1949 Conflict			1961 Conflict			
Alliance	Phase			Phase		
	Pre-crisis	Crisis	Post-crisis	Pre-crisis	Crisis	Post-crisis
WTO						
NATO						

conflictive action intensity are due to alliance, conflict and phase, operating either separately or in combination. Analysis of variance addressed the significance of the differences. Regression analysis estimated the magnitude of the interaction and organization coefficients. Most relevant threats to internal validity were ruled out by assumption or built into the design explicitly. The external validity of the study, however, may not be as high as the internal validity.

Figure 1 about here

Chapter 4 presents the first of the modelling results. Three-way analysis of variance permitted the assessment of the effects on conflictive intensity of alliance, conflict, and phase, operating either separately, or in two variable combinations, controlling for a third variable. One-way analysis of variance allowed for the discovery of effects on conflictive intensity of alliance, conflict, and phase acting only separately, controlling for one or two variables.

Three-way analysis of variance shows significant effects due to alliance, conflict, and phase acting separately (main effects) but no significant interaction effects, i.e., two variable combinations of alliance and conflict, as well as alliance and phase are not significantly related to average conflictive intensity. In other words, alliance, conflict, and phase seem to operate more potently alone than in combination.

One-way analysis of variance results first assess the significance of differences in average intensity and secondly for variance in average intensity. For average intensity, here are three tentative findings:

- (1) In connection with alliance, there are more similarities than differences between the Warsaw Pact and NATO with respect to average action intensity. Specifically, the only significant difference (albeit a weak one) in average action intensity due to alliance is for the 1948-1949 conflict.

(2) With respect to conflict, there are more differences than similarities concerning average action intensity. In particular, there are differences between conflicts, especially in the crisis and post-crisis phases. Finally, controlling for both alliance and phase, there are significant differences for NATO only in the crisis phase, while for WTO only in the post-crisis phase.

(3) Regarding phase, there are no similarities across phase, only differences. That is, the three phases are significantly different from each other.

For variance in average intensity, here are three tentative findings:

(1) In connection with alliance, the structure of behavior of the Warsaw Pact over time generally is more homogeneous than is the structure for NATO, but the differences do not hold up when one controls for conflict and phase.

(2) With respect to conflict, there generally is more homogeneity in the structure of action over time for both WTO and NATO in the 1948-1949 Blockade as contrasted with the conflict over the Wall in 1961.

(3) Concerning phase, there is more heterogeneity of behavior over time in the crisis phase of both conflicts for East and West than in the pre- and post-crisis periods.

Comparisons based on alliance, conflict, and phase attributes provide a framework for estimating parameters for event/interaction and organizational processes. Chapter 5 presents 9 hypotheses based on general theoretical expectations, adds 8 other hypotheses in light of historical evidence, presents results on rates of conflict processes, and tests the hypotheses using regression analysis. Rates of conflict processes concern velocity and acceleration. With respect

to velocity, there are 4 tentative findings:

- (1) The Warsaw Pact's conflictive intensity changed more slowly than NATO's during the 1948-1949 conflict in the pre-crisis phase, less so in the post-crisis phase, and the two alliances were about equal in their velocity during the crisis phase.
- (2) The velocity of conflictive intensity for the Warsaw Pact and NATO was relatively equal in 1961, irrespective of phase.
- (3) The crisis phase is the time in which both the Pact and NATO had the highest velocity, especially in 1961.
- (4) Velocity of conflictive intensity is a poor predictor of level of intensity. later, irrespective of alliance, conflict, or phase.

In connection with acceleration, there are 4 tentative findings:

- (1) The Warsaw Pact, and to a greater extent NATO, did not accelerate in the intensification phase but did decelerate moderately in the reduction phase of the 1948-1949 conflict.
- (2) The Warsaw Pact, and to a lesser extent NATO, accelerated in the intensification phase and decelerated in the reduction phase during the 1961 conflict.
- (3) The 1948-1949 conflict is characterized by much slower changes in alliance behavior (little escalation) than the 1961 conflict.
- (4) For both the Warsaw Pact and NATO, the 1948-1949 conflict in the intensification phase displays positive acceleration from some point in time before the peak of the conflict, i.e., about 6 weeks before the peak, rather than increasing positively from the beginning of the conflict up to the peak as is the case for 1961.

The three phase typology (pre-crisis, crisis, post-crisis) failed to yield

regression coefficients of a magnitude sufficient to confirm or reject the theoretical and historical hypotheses. The results using two phases (intensification, reduction) produced coefficients which do permit a test of the hypotheses. As a preliminary to using regression, the study analyzed the error terms in the regression equations. Analysis of the error terms yielded three findings which suggested that the use of regression analysis was justified in general:

- (1) In all cases, autocorrelation among residuals is low, and the condition $E(e_t \cdot e_{t-1}) = 0$ is satisfied.¹
- (2) For the reduction phase of the 1948-1949 conflict, the correlation among the residuals is moderate even after the trend is removed from the data.
- (3) For the intensification phase of the 1961 conflict, the correlation among residuals is moderate. When the model is modified to take into account short term fluctuations in the event/interaction parameter for both alliances (after trend is removed), the correlation of residuals is low enough to satisfy the condition regarding uncorrelated error terms.²

Of the 17 original hypotheses, 7 could not be tested because they involved the three phase typology. Thus, 10 hypotheses could be tested, and here is a list of tentative findings for 6 of these hypotheses:

- (1) In conflict intensification, estimates of event/interaction generally are larger than estimates of organizational processes.
- (2) In conflict reduction, estimates of organizational processes generally are larger than estimates of event/interaction.³

¹ E refers to expected, while e means error. The equation above states that the expected value of the autocorrelation among residuals off the regression line should be zero.

² $E(e_t, e_{t-1}^1) = 0$, i.e., there is no correlation expected (E) between the error terms (e_t, e_{t-1}^1).

³ The correlation among residuals is moderate in the reduction phase in 1948-1949 (without the perception term). Thus, inferences should be qualified to the extent that extraneous variables may be operating via time even after the exponential regression supposedly removed the effects of extraneous variables.

(3) For the Warsaw Pact, estimates of organizational processes generally are larger than estimates of event/interaction, irrespective of conflict in question and particular phase.

(4) For NATO, estimates of event/interaction generally are larger than estimates of organizational processes in the intensification phase, irrespective of conflict in question.

(5) For NATO, estimates of organizational processes generally are larger than estimates of event/interaction in the reduction phase, irrespective of conflict in question.

(6) For 1961, both alliances, had generally larger estimates of organizational processes than in 1948-1949, especially in the reduction phase.

Given the tentative findings from above, Chapter 6--Modelling and Managing International Conflicts--considers some implications for other situations. There are at least 4 issues that should be faced in modelling international conflicts: (1) choice of unit and level of analysis; (2) case selection; (3) phasing within cases; and (4) model specification. With respect to the unit and level, event intensity scores as estimated by the Corson scale are the basic unit of analysis, while alliance constitutes the level of analysis. Both the unit and level decisions seem to be supported given the tentative findings which generally are in accord with theoretical expectations. While the inferences regarding alliance interaction may be valid, those concerning organizational processes remain unvalidated pending the acquisition of relevant organizational data.


In connection with case selection, phasing within conflicts, and model specification, there are implications for modelling. Case selection requires one to make auxiliary spatial-temporal assumptions that often constitute implicit restrictions on a general model. Restricting this study to the two Berlin conflicts appears to be a valid procedure since Berlin is frequently conceived between 1948-1962 as a barometer of East-West relations. Concerning phase cutting points,

the historical record should be used in conjunction with a criterion of "peak intensity" to determine the dividing line between intensification and reduction. Discovery of escalation-deescalation processes may be a way of partially validating these phases. The development of a process model is necessary to provide theoretical grounds for "break points" between phases, i.e., where internal processes give way to external processes. With respect to model specification, interaction and organization are the main parameters constrained by alliance, conflict, and phase, e.g., conditions under which interaction or organizational factors should dominate. A formal process model is necessary to specify these conditions more adequately than is done here.


There is considerable overlap between modelling and management issues. In connection with unit/level choice, case selection, and conflict phasing, modelling and managing tasks converge. For example, the manager needs to monitor international events, pay attention to particular cases, and anticipate when a conflict may reach crisis proportions. In addition, however, the manager needs to apply models to new situations, irrespective of whether such models have been validated through scientific inquiry. The tentative findings suggest that it is possible to monitor and anticipate, but the results say little about the generalizability of the knowledge to new situations and even less concerning strategies. Nevertheless, these tentative findings aid the manager in applying scientific knowledge to situations that may arise.

A CONFLICT MODEL FOR STRATEGISTS
AND MANAGERS

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13. ABSTRACT

The study of intranation political conflict has received a great deal of attention in recent years. Various models--sometimes explicitly specified but often left implicit in the research--have been employed in attempts to explain the causes and consequences of internal instability. This paper outlines a model of conflict behavior within nations which reflects the idea that a behavior of such complexity can be understood only through a multidisciplinary approach. The authors consider conflict from the point of view of both the strategist and the manager, and synthesize three complementary approaches to the study of conflict behavior (instinctive explanation of aggression, frustration, aggression, and rational decision-making) into a conflict model.

KEY WORDS	LINE A		LINE B		LINE C	
	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT	ROLE	WT
intranation conflict strategist manager instinctive frustration-aggression decision-making rational actor						

A Conflict Model for Strategists and Managers

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The study of intranation political conflict has received a great deal of attention in recent years. Various models—sometimes explicitly specified but often left implicit in the research—have been employed in attempts to explain the causes and consequences of internal instability. This paper outlines a model of conflict behavior within nations which reflects the idea that a behavior of such complexity can be understood only through a multidisciplinary approach. That is, a synthesis of a number of models is necessary to explain instability behavior or, for that matter, any other form of conflict behavior (compare Fink, 1968; Mack and Synder, 1957).

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[809]

Further, the authors consider conflict from the point of view of both the strategist—who seeks to engage in conflict behavior to obtain a specified goal or set of goals—and the manager—the actor desiring to limit the scope or intensity of conflict behavior. It is important that the term "strategist" not be interpreted as being equivalent to "insurgent," "civilian," or "revolutionary." Nor is "manager" a term to denote only political authority or government. At times, it may be civilian groups who attempt to manage the level of conflict, just as it may be persons of authority who seek to engage in violence. Terry Nardin (1971: 15) points out that conflict management need not be biased toward the maintenance of the status quo:

Indeed, because of the greater access of topdogs to the means of coercion, their capacity for violence usually far exceeds that of the underdogs. Violence may indeed be yet another of the privileges of rank. If most of the violence in conflicts between topdogs and underdogs is committed by the topdogs, then conflict management being the limitation of all violence, cannot be seen as *prima facie* favoring the topdogs. The equation of conflict management with the suppression of discontent, protest, and radical political action is not the inevitable consequence of valuing "negative peace," but follows rather from a conceptual confusion about the nature and causes of political violence.

The model presented here is a statement of the calculus which members on either side of a conflict situation could evaluate prior to their actions. Hence, the model is applicable for both strategists and managers (compare Leites and Wolf, 1970).

THREE APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF CONFLICT BEHAVIOR

THE INSTINCTIVE EXPLANATION OF AGGRESSION

Some authors, such as Konrad Lorenz (1966) and Robert Ardrey (1966, 1961) regard human aggression (of which

political turmoil is a part) as stemming from an instinctive drive. States Lorenz (1966: x): "Aggression . . . is an instinct like any other and in natural conditions it helps just as much as any other to ensure the survival of the individuals and the species." Ethologists maintain that stimuli may enhance aggressiveness but are not necessary for its manifestation. Aggressive behavior will occur even in the absence of external cues. This essential spontaneity of the aggressive instinct renders measures against its damaging effects of no value. "The most promising means we can apply in our attempt to cope with the miscarrying of aggression—and that of other patterns of social behavior—are those which have proved their efficiency in the course of phylogenic and cultural evolution" (Lorenz, 1966: 278). Lorenz suggests redirection of aggression into sports and other forms of activity.

FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSION MODELS

In contrast to the instinctive drive view of aggression are the stimulus-response models, the most notable of which was originated by Dollard et al. (1939). A basic postulate of their frustration-aggression model is that aggression is always the consequence of frustration. Aggression is any act "the goal response of which is the injury of the person toward whom it is directed," and frustration is an interference with the occurrence of an instigated goal-response at its proper time in a behavior sequence (Dollard et al., 1939: 1-9).

Dollard et al. (1939: 1) hypothesized originally that the occurrence of aggressive behavior assumes the existence of frustration and that the existence of frustration necessarily leads to some form of aggression. Misinterpretation of this sweeping statement caused Miller (1941: 338) to rephrase the latter portion of the hypothesis thusly: "Frustration produces instigations to a number of different types of response, one of which is an instigation to some form of aggression." Thus, the model does not imply that frustration *always* leads to direct, overt aggressive behavior. Rather, the hypothesis states that

when aggressive behavior does occur, it is the result of frustration (see Berkowitz, 1969: 68-69, 1965, 1962; Buss, 1961).

The frustration-aggression model has been a popular framework for the study of domestic conflict. As Feierabend et al. (1969: 635-637) point out, one source of "systemic frustration" within a nation is a gap between the aspirations and expectations of individuals or groups on the one hand, and the achievements that actually occur (see Gurr, 1970, 1968a, 1968b). Samuel Huntington (1968: 53-54), in his discussion of political turmoil within developing nations, comments:

Urbanization, literacy, education, mass media, all expose the traditional man to new forms of life, new standards of enjoyment, new possibilities of satisfaction . . . The ability of a transitional society to satisfy these new aspirations, however, increases much more slowly than the aspirations themselves. Consequently, a gap develops between aspiration and expectation. . . . This gap generates social frustration and dissatisfaction. In practice, the extent of the gap provides a reasonable index to political instability.

The frustration-aggression model has also been employed by William Kornhauser (1959) in his discussion of extremist voting, by Daniel Lerner (1963), who based some of his work dealing with modernization on the concept of deprivation felt by the masses, and by Hadley Cantril (1965). Similar recognition of the frustration-aggression explanation of political instability can be found in the works of Davies (1962), Gurr (1970), Russett (1964), and Tanter and Midlarsky (1967).

One can see in the instinctive-drive and frustration-aggression models a crucial disagreement as to the cause of aggressive behavior. On the one hand, ethologists argue that aggression is a drive as innate, as natural, and as powerful as sex (Storr, 1968: 109); on the other, Dollard and like-minded theorists maintain that if frustrating stimuli are removed, aggression will not occur. Anthony Storr (1968: 109), whose bias is evident in the following quote, voices the difference between these two perspectives.

It is vitally important that we finally discard the kind of futile optimism which is implicit in the frustration-aggression hypothesis, and face the fact that, in man, as in other animals, the aggressive drive is an inherited constant, of which we cannot rid ourselves, and which is absolutely necessary for survival.

Both approaches are similar, however, in that they neglect the rational, conscious aspect of political man. Domestic conflict does not stem totally from instinctive drives. Nor is it solely a response to perceived frustrations. Individuals or groups often engage in aggression because they have found such behavior rewarding (Bandura et al., 1963) or necessary for the attainment of a particular goal. Herbert Kelman (1965: 6) writes, for example, "While war does involve aggressive behavior on the part of many individuals, this behavior is not necessarily at the service of aggressive motives. Leaders may engage in aggressive behavior for strategic reasons, for example, and the population at large for reasons of social conformity."

Moreover, discontent and dissatisfaction are continually present somewhere within every society. An awareness of these conditions is certainly necessary to an understanding of conflict behavior, but it does not constitute in itself an adequate explanation. To ascertain why discontent leads to violence in some instances and to nonviolent bargaining in others, one must examine the ability of bargaining conditions to endow certain kinds of tactics with efficiency in enhancing future bargaining power to achieve all kinds of values (Nieburg, 1969: 44). Thus, conflict behaviors of varying intensities may be viewed by actors as potential tactics which may be utilized or rejected depending upon their probabilities of success given a particular goal or series of goals, plus certain other information.

DECISION-MAKING MODELS

A third approach to the study of conflict conceives of the actors involved as being rational decision makers. Conflict, from this point of view, is rooted neither in instincts nor in psychological frustrations. Rather, as Jessie Bernard (1957: 38)

states: "Conflict arises when there are incompatible or mutually exclusive goals or aims or values expressed by human beings" (see also Boulding, 1962; Axelrod, 1970). Employing rational-choice models in the analysis of noneconomic social behavior is hardly new. John Harsanyi (1969), for example, argues that both the interest-group assumptions of domestic politics and the national-interest conception of international politics are, in effect, imprecise and informalized versions of a broad rational-choice approach. The same may be said of the Marxist theory of class interest (compare Olson, 1968: 102-110).

In the area of conflict management, rational-choice considerations may be found in the work of a number of authors. Scott (1970), for instance, uses an explicitly economic approach in his study of insurgency. Leites and Wolf (1970) similarly employ cost-benefit analysis in a cogent discussion of rebellion and counterinsurgency. H. L. Nieburg (1969, 1963, 1962) has long argued that violence within a conflict often has a rational basis. Ted Gurr (1970: esp. 210-223) also recognizes the value of taking the utility of violence into account in an analysis of conflict. Rational choice models have, of course, been employed most rigorously in the fast-growing area of experimental gaming, and game theory is a fruitful source for the development of both normative and descriptive models of conflict behavior (see Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Davis, 1970; Rapoport, 1970, 1966, 1960).

Although formal decision theory can be quite esoteric, the fundamental ideas underlying this approach are intuitively appealing. It is these basic propositions which we shall touch upon here; for a more complete introduction, the reader is advised to consult, for example, Luce and Raiffa (1957), Edwards and Tversky (1967), Savage (1954), or Edwards et al. (1965).

The most crucial concept of decision theory is that of rationality. Simply stated, a definition of rationality has two parts. First, rationality is the ability to order available alternative outcomes and consistently choose the more preferred over the less preferred options. Second, a rational man makes his

choices in such a way as to maximize something. Most decision theories assume that the actor maximizes *utility*, or (under certain conditions) expected utility.

In conflict situations, however, it is not enough for an actor to consider only his actions, for the outcome will depend generally on what his opponent does. The theory of games focuses upon the various strategies open to rational actors in conflict (Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Rapoport, 1970, 1966, 1960; Davis, 1970). A strategy is simply a set of guidelines an actor establishes which determine how he will respond should his opponent act in any given way. Game theorists offer rules to use in choosing among competing strategies.

The game theoretic approach to conflict is attractive for a number of reasons. Formal models of conflict which employ principles of game theory can be developed and studied in the context of controlled laboratory experiments. The value of such a model is the level of generality it possesses due to its freedom from having to take into account the idiosyncrasies of any actual situation. By excluding these perturbations from its framework, the model achieves what is sometimes called "elegance."

A price is paid for this elegance, however. Models structured in a game theoretic manner are, by themselves, inadequate to explain most aspects of human conflict. For the concepts and insights of game theory to lead to a fruitful descriptive theory of conflict, they must be integrated into a broader framework. As Anatol Rapoport (1966: 206) notes, in formal game theory there is no room for the psychological make-up of the participants.

To the extent that psychological matters are allowed to enter a theory of conflict, the theory ceases to be a model of rational conflict. Its mathematical apparatus must then include parameters, so that conflict behavior would depend on these parameters. The theory would become a behavioral theory, and real behavior can never be explained on the basis of concepts of "rationality" alone. At least "rationality" must be modified to a relative concept to be put into specific psychological contexts.

Another shortcoming of game theory is that it is generally limited to the analysis of decision-making under conditions of complete uncertainty. That is, an actor is assumed to have absolutely no information about the relative likelihood of possible outcomes. Moreover, an actor is assumed to possess *perfect* knowledge regarding his opponents' utility functions and regarding the outcome once he and his opponents have chosen strategies. These assumptions may be unnecessarily restrictive in many instances. An alternative model—the subjectively expected utility (SEU) model—offers another approach. Although the SEU model is typically employed to study games against nature, it may be a not entirely unrealistic model of decision-making within a conflict.

Leonard Savage (1954) was among the first to argue for a decision system which allows the decision maker to utilize whatever information he may possess in order to establish a *subjective* (or personal probability distribution concerning possible states of nature. Subjective probabilities have mathematical properties similar to those of "objective" probabilities, but there is an important difference. A subjective probability is simply a number that represents the extent to which an individual thinks that a given event is likely (Edwards, 1961). Once a subjective probability distribution has been developed (and Savage axiomatically derives a method for doing so), the problem is transformed essentially into an exercise in decision-making under *risk*. The actor still does not know for sure what will happen if he acts in a given way, but he can make certain *probability* statements about alternative outcomes.

In the theory of risky decision-making, the actor is assumed to maximize his subjectively expected utility (SEU; Edwards, 1961, 1955; Savage, 1954; Luce and Raiffa, 1957: 299-306). The SEU maximization principle stems from the traditional mathematical notion of the expected value of a game of chance. The expected value of a bet is obtained simply by multiplying the value of each possible outcome, o_i , by the corresponding probability of occurrence, p_i , and then summing these products across all outcomes. Symbolically:

$$EV = \sum_{i=1}^n o_i p_i$$

To give a simple example, suppose that you were offered the following bet: Roll a "fair" die; if a one or two comes up, you win \$3.00; if any other number occurs, you lose \$2.00. Should you take the bet? To answer this question, you must calculate the expected value of the offer to determine whether this value is favorable to you. The probability of obtaining a one or a two is, obviously, 2/6. Therefore, the probability of obtaining any other number is 1 - 2/6, or 4/6. The EV (expected value) is thus computed:

$$\begin{aligned} EV &= 2/6 (\$3.00) + 4/6 (\$2.00) \\ &= \$1.00 - \$1.33 \\ &= -\$.33 \end{aligned}$$

The expected value of the bet is negative, a rather unattractive situation. Therefore, being the expected value maximizer you are, you refuse the bet.

Making decisions about whether and how to act in a conflict situation is obviously a more complex affair. The value of an outcome must be replaced by the notion of *utility*. One must determine how much utility, however measured, one attaches to various alternative outcomes. Moreover, the probabilities of the occurrence of possible events are not nearly so precisely known; they must be estimated subjectively. Thus, in the SEU model, the *utilities* of possible outcomes must be multiplied by *subjective probabilities*, and it is the resultant subjectively estimated utility which must be maximized.

To some, the notion of strict maximization is immediately objectionable, and in many instances it does appear to be unrealisite. As Ward Edwards (1954a: 381-382) argues, however, "assumptions about maximization only become specific, and therefore possibly wrong, when they specify what is being maximized." Riker and Ordeshook (1968: 27) point out that it

is common for theorists to impose their own interpretation of goals upon observed behavior (compare Shapiro, 1969). The act of voting, for example, may appear irrational if one assumes that the only goal is to elect a candidate to office; the costs of voting almost always outweigh the probable influence of one vote (Downs, 1957). However, if other benefits are taken into account—such as feelings of patriotism, group identity, political efficacy—then voting may often be rational. That is, the utility of voting, particularly from a sociological and psychological point of view, may often outweigh the costs involved.

Similarly, Rapoport (1960: 121) notes that there is more in winning a poker game than simply the amount in the pot.

There is the jingling of the coins, the admiration of the onlookers, the feeling of being "lucky," etc. Perhaps if all of these things are taken into account in some way, the gambling behavior (and more generally all risk behavior) of people can be explained in terms of maximizing some quantity. And if this quantity is different in different people but can be determined for each person or for each class of people, it seems worthwhile to try to do so; the discovery would be an important psychological finding.

Whenever multiple motives are allowed to enter into the decision model, however, one must confront the problem of potential circularity. Many social scientists oppose the use of rational-choice models because, given enough parameters, one can "prove" that any decision is "rational." This problem, these social scientists would argue, becomes particularly apparent when one tries to "explain" why an action was rational after it has already occurred. Indeed, the popular term "rationalize" was coined to emphasize the circularity involved in such a process. Harsanyi (1969) clearly points out, however, that so long as the number of parameters we hypothesize are both relatively few and theoretically plausible, then circularity is not a problem. He continues:

We must definitely resist the temptation of postulating more than a very few basic motives in our theory, whether for the sake of "greater realism" or for any other reason. This is so because a theory

involving a *large* number of distinct motives, and therefore involving a *large* number of parameters to be estimated from the empirical facts, cannot be used to explain these empirical facts without inadmissible circularity. This is of course just another way of saying that if our theory is to have any real explanatory power then our motivational assumptions must be kept at a very low level of complexity—even if they do not have to be made quite as simple as to postulate economic self-interest as the *only* important motive of human behavior [Harsanyi, 1969: 521; italics in original].

A CONFLICT MODEL: SYNTHESIZING COMPLEMENTARY APPROACHES

What is proposed, then, is a model of conflict behavior which takes into account a number of aspects of such behavior. The model will stress the rational nature of decision-making in conflict situations. This approach, however, will not neglect the psychological and sociological factors important to an understanding of conflict.

One assumption of the present work is that conflict is rooted, at least in part, in an incompatibility of the goals or aims of two or more sets of actors. Hence, the model contains terms referring to the goal-related costs and benefits associated with engaging in various conflict behaviors. If:

- B_g : the benefit an actor receives from obtaining specified goal, g ;
- P_g : the subjectively estimated probability that the conflict behavior will bring about B_g ; $0 \leq P_g \leq 1$;
- A_j : the costs of engaging in a conflict behavior which are due to an opponent's response, j ;
- P_j : the subjectively estimated probability of opponent's response, j ; $0 \leq P_j \leq 1$;
- n : the number of specified goals, g ;
- m : the number of possible opponent's responses, j ;
- C_i : the costs of engaging in the conflict behavior which are independent of the opponent's response;

then, SEU, the subjectively expected utility of engaging in a particular conflict behavior, can be expressed thusly:¹

$$SEU = \left(\sum_{g=1}^n B_g P_g - \sum_{j=1}^m A_j P_j \right) - C_i$$

From the equation, it is evident that multiple goals, each associated with some benefit, may exist. Each goal, in turn, is associated with a subjective probability, P_1, P_2, \dots, P_n , that a specific conflict behavior will result in the realization of the goal (compare Wilson, 1961). Similarly, probabilities are associated with costs due to the opponent's retaliatory measures. Probabilities associated with costs and benefits may, of course, be closely related. The probability that an action will achieve a certain goal, for example, may often be related to the probabilities that it will evoke certain retaliatory responses. The term C_i consists of such costs as resource outlays (both time and material), costs due to foregone alternatives, and other costs which must be absorbed regardless of the outcome of the conflict. According to the model, an actor would evaluate the costs and benefits associated with the possible conflict behaviors in which he might engage and choose that behavior with the greatest net utility. The process of interaction between actors in conflict is assumed to be composed of discrete decision points. The SEU model denotes the static decision process undertaken at each decision point. In this regard, this approach considers conflict as a series of alternating decisions among actors.

As a rather elementary example, consider an instance in which a revolutionary group seeks to raise funds or supplies with which to strengthen themselves.¹ The cadre has before them two plans from which they must choose. One plan is to kidnap a government leader and hold him for \$1,000,000 ransom. An alternative scheme is to ambush a military convoy carrying \$1,000,000 worth of munitions in two trucks.²

In the past, six kidnapping attempts have been made, of which three have been successful (that is, have secured a ransom without the participants being captured). In the other instances, the abductors have been sentenced to long prison terms. Possessing no other information, the rebels set their best

estimate of the probability of success at .5. In terms of resource outlays, the rebels estimate that a kidnap attempt will cost \$5,000, to cover such expenses as weapons, bribes, hideouts, and time lost while in hiding. The SEU of a kidnap attempt is calculated:

Let C = capture.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{SEU}_1 &= (\$1,000,000)(.5) - [(.5)C + (.5)(0)] - \$5,000 \\ &= \$495,000 - .5C \end{aligned}$$

The SEU of an ambush attempt is calculated similarly. The rebels estimate that they have a 20% chance of securing both trucks of munitions and a 50% chance of securing one truckload. There is, however, a 30% chance of their being captured. An estimated \$10,000 in resources would be necessary to undertake the ambush. The SEU, then, is:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{SEU}_2 &= [(\$500,000)(.5) + (\$1,000,000)(.2)] - [(.3)C + (.7)(0)] - \$10,000 \\ &= \$440,000 - .3C \end{aligned}$$

By comparing SEU_1 and SEU_2 , the rebels can see that the kidnap offers a greater expected return than does the ambush—but at a 20% greater chance of capture. If they decide that the added likelihood of capture is worth the extra expected gain, they should choose the kidnap plot. If not, they should decide to ambush the convoy.

The model of decision-making in a conflict situation illustrated above is not as unrealistic as it may appear at first blush. Although strategists and managers may not perform the calculations as explicitly as depicted, there is reason to believe that actors in conflict situations often bear in mind the expected costs and benefits of alternative actions. As Abdul Nasution (1965: 21) asserts in *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare*: "A guerrilla must fight with . . . economy . . . he must calculate his gains and losses like a good businessman." Andrew Scott has devised a similar model of insurgency. He notes (1970: 40) that "the stakes for a participant may be thought of

as the gains that he would derive from victory relative to the losses that would be associated with defeat."

The model may be particularly suggestive in regard to the behavior of leaders within the context of a conflict, and by our stress on "strategists and managers" we have been implicitly emphasizing the conduct of individuals in roles of leadership. Gurr (1970: 211) writes:

Men make more or less explicit calculations about the prospective benefits vis-a-vis the prospective costs of violence as a tactic. Such calculations are likely to be more explicit among leaders, more implicit among potential followers. The greater they believe the potential gains to be, the more justifiable violence is likely to appear to them.

There are, however, shortcomings in the model as it stands. Most significantly, it does not take into account psychological and sociological factors which may influence conflict behavior. Lewis Coser (1964: 59) notes that "conflict may be motivated by two distinct yet intermingled factors—a realistic conflict situation and the affective investment in it."

The potential psychological and sociological benefits of engaging in conflict behavior are many. Psychological frustrations or emotional factors may act as an instigation to aggression. Certain conflict strategies might be considered beneficial in that they allow the actor to express these feelings. Leonard Berkowitz (1962: 220) suggests:

Aggression can be gratifying because it involves the expression of an acquired aggressive motive, and/or it signals the reduction of internal conflict, and/or it may restore self-esteem. . . . It may also be that some of the pleasure following the display of aggression results from the completion of a previously interrupted aggressive response sequence. The interruption created tension, and the completion of the sequence brought about a decrease in the disturbing internal excitement.

Scott (1970: 87) similarly points out that "the existence of emotional fervor or strong hatred can alter the cost picture

because of the impact it has on the morale and determination of the antagonists."

In another vein, Coser (1964) writes of the group-binding character of conflict. Thus, individuals may obtain a sense of identity and "belonging" from engaging in conflict as a member of some group. The group may be a relative vague one (e.g., "students") or one which is more clearly defined (the U.S. Marine Corps). States Coser (1964: 35): "It seems to be generally accepted by sociologists that the distinction between 'ourselves, the we-group, or the in-group, and everybody else, or the others-groups, out-groups' is established in and through conflict." More abstract benefits, such as a sense of self-satisfaction at doing what one considers morally correct, or socially legitimate, may also be important motivating factors in a conflict situation (compare Gurr, 1970: chs. 6 and 7).

In the model itself, the type of benefits described above differ from B_g in that their realization may well be independent of the outcome of the conflict. The term D_i , then, is defined as the benefit an actor receives from engaging in a particular conflict behavior act regardless of the outcome of the event.

In contrast to D_i , there are various costs of a psychological or sociological nature which may be associated with certain conflict events. Because psychological costs are always involved in the use of violence, Coser (1967: 107) notes, "it is expected that only relatively small numbers of men will at any time be ready to engage in a politics of violence. For only a few will the psychic gains of violence outweigh the costs." A pacifist, for example, would consider engaging in violent conflict as being extremely costly in a moral and psychological sense. Revolutionary ideologies are likely to offer normative justification for violence and hence rationalize away the moral costs of violent conflict behaviors.

Social costs are also important to consider. One cost of participating in clandestine operations may be social isolation and personal sacrifice for many months. For example, RAND Vietnam interviews (see Leites and Wolf, 1970: 43) report that a Viet Cong defector gave these reasons for changing sides:

I thought that in fighting on the GVN side, a soldier may be happy because he has a good salary and even though he dies on the battlefield, he dies with a full stomach. On the contrary, a VC soldier usually eats at 3 p.m. a rice bowl as small as that [the subject described it with his fingers] and he walks all night long to fight and to die with an empty stomach.

It is, therefore, necessary to give a broader interpretation to C_1 so that it includes psychological and sociological costs as well as resource outlays. Thus, the equation for determining the SEU of a given conflict behavior is:

$$SEU = \left(\sum_{E=1}^n B_E P_E - \sum_{J=1}^m A_J P_J \right) - C_1 + D_1$$

That there are costs and benefits which affect conflict behavior is evident in the following passage from the tactical manual published in connection with the 1971 May Day antiwar demonstrations: "The aim of the Mayday actions is to raise the social cost of the war to a level unacceptable to America's rulers. To do this, we seek to create the specter of social chaos while maintaining the support or at least toleration of the broad masses of American people" (New York Times, 1971). Thus, the May Day leaders (notably, Rennie Davis) were concerned with stopping the Vietnam war not by raising the government's material costs, but by increasing the *social* costs of American involvement in Southeast Asia. Violent demonstrations were eschewed as being too costly in both moral and strategic senses. Moreover, the demonstrators were aware that they must minimize the social costs of their own behavior: they sought to maintain "the support or at least toleration" of the mass public. The May Day demonstrators, then, were acting as both strategists and managers. They sought to raise the level of conflict in one social context (Washington, D.C.) in order to limit the intensity and scope of conflict behavior elsewhere (Southeast Asia).

The May Day leaders' strategy, ironically, bears similarities in

some respects to the Johnson Administration's attempts to coerce North Vietnam. In this instance, the Administration was concerned with increasing the costs to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) of infiltration of South Vietnam. Consider this summary from the Pentagon Papers (1971: vol. 4, p. 1) of a memo from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara dated July 30, 1965:

Future bombing policy should emphasize the threat, minimize DRV loss of face, optimize interdiction over political costs, be coordinated with other pressures on the DRV, and avoid undue risks of escalation.

Thus far, this section has presented a simple SEU maximization approach to the study of decision-making within conflict situations. If one were to focus on a single decision in a conflict -e.g., a "turning-point" in a crisis -then this approach might be particularly useful (compare Allison, 1969; Tanter, 1972). On the other hand, strategists and managers must often be concerned with conflict which occur *over time*. This fact adds two complexities to the simple SEU model:¹ first, the utilities associated with various goals and activities may vary over time; and, second, the subjectively estimated probabilities may be altered as a conflict develops.

The problem of utilities changing over time can be handled with relative ease. The SEU model simply assumes that the decision is based on the utilities that existed at the time the decision was made. Utilities are free to change between decisions so long as the actor uses his most recent utility assessments in determining his actions.

Probability alteration over time is somewhat more complex. An initial subjectively estimated probability (or probability distribution) may be based on very sketchy information. As a conflict progresses over time, however, and as various strategic moves are attempted, additional information is generated regarding the conflict situation as a whole. The question is: How should such information be processed to allow the reevaluation of one's subjective probabilities?

What is required is some method of determining a new (or posterior) subjective probability, given some previous (or prior) estimate plus some new information. The optimal solution to this problem involves Bayes' theorem. Elementary probability theory defines $P(D \cap H)$ as being equal to $P(D | H)P(H)$. That is, the probability that *both* one's information about the "true state" and one's own hypothesis about this state are true is equal to the probability of the information, given the hypothesis, multiplied by the probability that the hypothesis is true. Some algebraic manipulation leads to a basic form of Bayes' theorem:

$$P(H|D) = \frac{P(D|H)P(H)}{P(D)}$$

(provided that $P(D)$ and $P(H) \neq 0$).

A somewhat contrived, although not entirely unrealistic example may be helpful in understanding how Bayes' theorem might be employed:

Two insurgent leaders are working together. One, I_1 , believes that if they engage in activity, A, there is a .4 chance that the government, G, will respond in a certain way. I_2 , however, believes that G probably *will* respond, and he assigns .7 to this probability. Either I_1 or I_2 is correct. I_1 has, in the past, been quite expert at outguessing G, so the probability that he is right is set at .8. The probability that I_2 is correct, then, is $1.0 - .8$, or .2. The insurgents engage in activity A and, sure enough, G responds. How should I_1 and I_2 revise their estimates of who is right in light of this datum?

Once again, Bayes' theorem states that:

$$P(H|D) = \frac{P(D|H)P(H)}{P(D)}$$

where $P(D) = \Sigma P(D | H)P(H)$.

$P(D | H_1)$ is the probability of the government responding, given that I_1 is correct. This probability, we know, is .4. Similarly, $P(D | H_2) = .7$. Moreover:

$$P(H_1) = .8$$

$$P(H_2) = .2.$$

By substitution, then:

$$P(H_1|D) = \frac{(0.4)(0.8)}{(0.4)(0.8) + (0.2)(0.7)} \\ \approx .70$$

$$P(H_2|D) = \frac{(0.2)(0.7)}{(0.4)(0.8) + (0.2)(0.7)} \\ \approx .30$$

Thus, the insurgents have become slightly less confident that I_1 is correct and correspondingly less sure that I_2 is wrong. This is certainly what one would expect, given the datum. This example is simplified in that it deals with point estimates of probabilities rather than with continuous probability distributions. Nevertheless, the basic logic of the process is the same in both instances (see, for example, Edwards et al., 1963).

The next question which one might ask is whether this Bayesian model of information-processing reflects accurately what occurs within the dynamics of a conflict situation. The answer is that it almost certainly does not. There is, in fact, a good deal of experimental work which has shown that human beings tend to be "conservative" information processors when compared with what one would expect from Bayes' theorem (Edwards, 1968; Phillips and Edwards, 1966; Peterson et al., 1965).

If one is concerned with how strategists and managers *should* process the information generated within the context of a conflict, then Bayes' theorem is quite germane. If, on the other hand, an accurate *description* of information-processing is desired, then it is clear that psychological and other factors must be taken into account to explain the conservative nature of human beings. This topic we must leave for discussion elsewhere (see Edwards, 1968).

IMPLICATIONS FOR ANALYSIS

This essay suggests that it may be useful to consider conflict situations as instances in which actors employ behaviors which tend to maximize expected gains and minimize expected losses. Moreover, we have pointed out that these gains and losses may be related to factors other than the particular conflict of interest. It is one thing to make such assertions, however, and quite another to utilize such an approach empirically. A model which considers sociopsychological aspects of a conflict situation within a framework of utility maximization is clearly difficult to operationalize entirely. This does not imply that the model is useless or irrefutable, however; a number of avenues for research are potentially useful for the evaluation of the model and its implications.

One possibility lies in the study of decision-making within experimental settings. Experimental research on SEU and similar axiomatic models of decision-making is well developed. Most of these experiments focus on decisions about bets, but the inferential step to decisions regarding other forms of risky outcomes is not large. Problems which appear at first to be insurmountable, such as the quantification of utilities and subjective probabilities, have been shown to be soluble with a little imagination and insight. Excellent bibliographies of relevant literature are found in two works by Edwards (1961, 1954a).

An important development in conflict research would be to combine decision-making experiments with more explicitly social psychological investigations dealing with conflict behavior. Berkowitz (1969, 1965, 1962) has written extensively about the latter type of research. The kind of investigation we are advocating might examine, for instance, differences in the nature of decisions made at different levels of psychological frustration. Other experiments, similar to those conducted in small-group research, could examine the decision processes of individuals in isolation and within different group contexts. Such experimentation would certainly be useful in uncovering

evidence about the behavioral modifications necessary to make decision theory more descriptive of conflict dynamics.

Another type of model evaluation might employ aggregate data on domestic turmoil (Feierabend and Feierabend, 1966; Gurr, 1968b; Tanter, 1969; Markus and Nesvold, 1972). By examining the success over time of various conflict behaviors along with indicators of systemic frustration, relative deprivation, and the like, one might ascertain the comparative importance of "nonrealistic" (i.e., sociological, psychological, and so on) factors versus "realistic" (i.e., conflict of interest-related) factors in explaining conflict behavior.

The systematic analysis of particular cases might also serve to evaluate the utility of the conflict model proposed here (Wedge, 1969). An in-depth study of how strategists and managers behaved within particular contexts could aid greatly in the understanding of decision-making in conflict situations.

Another approach would employ survey techniques to gather information on individual attitudes about conflict as well as information on the personal experiences of persons in situations of political conflict (Levy, 1970; Cantril, 1965). Such a study might uncover the psychological correlates of participation in conflict behaviors of varying intensities. Moreover, one could examine the ways in which individuals who participate in political conflict differ from those who do not. Data gathered in this way could also indicate whether individuals attempt to weigh the costs and benefits of their potential actions during times of conflict.

Thus, there are a number of methods available to evaluate the validity of the conflict model proposed here. No single approach is necessarily more powerful than any other. Rather, the use of multiple streams of evidence gathered through a number of techniques is the most desirable manner of ascertaining the descriptive value of the SEU model of conflict decision-making.

CONCLUSIONS

What, then, are the implications of this model of conflict

behavior? By assuming a rational component of conflict, the model implies that conflict behaviors—including violent ones—may be engaged in by reasonable men. Thus, conflict is an inevitable occurrence in social life, and violent strategies are often continuations of a general bargaining process among competing actors. Nieburg (1969: 81) makes the point well when he writes:

The "rational" goal (in the behavioral sense of maximizing assets and options) of the threat of violence is accommodation of interests, not provocation of actual violence. Similarly, the "rational" goal of actual violence is demonstration of the will and capacity of action, establishing a measure of the credibility of future threats, not exhausting that capacity in unlimited conflict.

Managers must recognize that conflict is unavoidable and that often it has an objective basis in reality—namely, the incompatibility of the goals of the actors involved. This is not to say that efforts to ease frustration, vent instinctive drive harmlessly, or increase mutual understandings are not beneficial. Such efforts can indeed serve either to prevent unnecessary conflict or to keep conflict behaviors within certain bounds of intensity. The point is that conflicts of interest are inevitable; in such instances the manager must focus on how to regulate the scope or intensity of conflict by manipulating the costs and benefits associated with the range of potential behaviors. As Gurr (1970: 156) notes, "the greater the utility people attribute to tactics of violence in getting what they want, the more readily they will resort to political violence." Put another way, the task of the conflict manager is to affect the utility of violence so that people will find it advantageous to employ other tactics. Elsewhere in this issue, Fink presents a lucid discussion of options available to conflict managers; comments in this essay, therefore, will be brief (see also Gurr, 1970: 352-357).

It should be apparent, however, that to a society the continued suppression of conflict is at least as dangerous as its violent manifestation. A total lack of conflict representation is as undesirable as the sole use of violent confrontation to resolve

conflict. For the conflict manager to prevent these extremes of the "spectrum of political options" from overwhelming the center, he must maintain the efficacy and legitimacy of those modes of political action which minimize violence and facilitate social change (Nieburg, 1969: 159-160). This philosophy is echoed in "The Port Huron Statement," (Jacobs and Landau, 1966: 156) which established the early guidelines for the Students for a Democratic Society. It reads, in part:

In social change or interchange, we find violence to be abhorrent because it requires generally the transformation of the target, be it a human being or a community of people, into a depersonalized object of hate. It is imperative that the means of violence be abolished and the institutions—local, national, international—that encourage non-violence as a condition of conflict be developed.

The manager can affect the utility of violence in two ways. One way, just mentioned, is to increase the utility of nonviolent strategies. The other method, probably more common, is to decrease the utility of violent strategies. One approach involves establishing a pattern of coercive control or negative sanction. If sanctions are applied clumsily or inequitably, however, they may have the effect of increasing rather than decreasing future violence (Gurr, 1970, 1968b; Leites and Wolf, 1970; Markus and Nesvold, 1972). If the level of sanctions is perceived as being inequitable or unjust, then the legitimacy of the manager—either civilian or governmental—may be undermined.

This consequence leads to another management option. The conflict manager can attempt to affect the social and psychological justifications for violence. In this regard, Gurr (1970: 352) notes: "a ruling elite can reduce the likelihood of violence against itself by symbolically reinforcing its legitimacy, censoring those who agitate against it, and providing diversionary means for the expression of hostility." Similarly, civilian managers can enhance their impact and respond to governmental strategists by emphasizing the legitimacy of their demands and the basis of their social support.

The strategist should be aware that in the long run violence

may not be beneficial to him, although it may bring immediate gain. As already stated, the rational goal of violence is the demonstration of a capacity for action, establishing a measure of credibility for future threats, not the exhaustion of that capacity. Thus, the strategist should attempt, by establishing his credibility, to increase the costs to the target of ignoring future demands to resolve a conflict. In this way, the strategist may resort to violence so that less extreme modes of conflict resolution will become more effective.

Additionally, the strategist should be aware that "nonrealistic" considerations may be coloring his decision to increase the scope or intensity of conflict. Whether the strategist will or even can account for—and thereby regulate—these factors is difficult to answer. Nevertheless, the strategist may want to consider if intensifying the level of conflict behavior is likely to resolve the conflict of interest or solely benefit him in other, perhaps more personal, ways.

Finally, the strategist may engage in a particular conflict behavior precisely because of its "nonrealistic" utility. For example, the integrative effect of group conflict behavior has been touched on earlier. A conflict behavior may be chosen not because it is particularly likely to achieve long-term goals, but because it may bind the group together and thereby increase the likelihood of success in later actions.

Some would argue that recent manifestations of conflict within the United States have been qualitatively different from conflict behaviors of the previous decade. Among students and blacks, in particular, there seems to be an increasing awareness of the necessity to coolly and "rationally," if you will, assess the cost-benefit parameters of conflict behaviors. Younger strategists, for example, caution not to engage in action as part of an "ego trip"; they urge that people attempt to "get it together" or pause to evaluate the nature of the conflict. In any event, strategists and managers must recognize the costs of both protracted violence and refusal to bargain over conflicts of interest. One must hope that a better understanding of decision-making in conflict situations will allow competing

actors to resolve conflicts before violent confrontation becomes a necessary, if not attractive, tactic.

NOTES

1. For expository convenience, the SEU model has been decomposed to display the benefits and costs comprising the model. Usually the model is presented in a form similar to the EV equation described earlier.

2. The example assumes a linear utility for money function.

3. An additional potential complexity should also be mentioned. A number of theorists have argued that the variance and even higher moments of a utility distribution are as important as its SEU in determining a decision. Edwards (1954a, 401) offers this example: "You would probably prefer the certainty of a million dollars to a 50-50 chance of getting either four million or nothing. I do not think this preference is due to the fact that the expected utility of the 50-50 bet is less than the utility of one million dollars to you, although this is possible. A more likely explanation is simply that the variances of the two propositions are different. Evidence in favor of this is the fact that if you knew you would be offered this choice 20 times in succession, you would probably take the 50-50 bet each time."

Experimental research, however, shows that the issue of variance preference is not at all straightforward (compare Edwards, 1954b; Royden et al., 1959; Coombs and Pruitt, 1960). For this reason, this essay leaves the topic of variance preferences to one side.

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